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Introduction
This thesis studies so called market games. Ideas from two important fields
of economic theory are combined: General Equilibrium Theory and
Game Theory.
Several types of economies are considered in general equilibrium theory.
Of particular interest for this thesis are pure exchange economies, exchange
economies with production and finite as well as infinite horizon exchange
economies combined with financial markets. In the basic set up, the eco-
nomic agents exchange their initially owned endowments and possibly trade
financial assets. Moreover, firms, if there are some, are allowed to produce
within a given production possibility set. A widely used solution concept
is the notion of a competitive equilibrium defined for example in Debreu
(1959). The basic idea is the following: Given a price system the agents of
an economy maximize their utility taking their individual budget constraint
into consideration while at the same time firms maximize their profits from
production and a market clearing condition is satisfied.
Game theory is divided into two main branches, non-cooperative and
cooperative game theory. A non-cooperative game is usually described by
a set of players, a set of strategies or actions of each player and payoff or
utility functions, that map strategy or action profiles into payoffs or utili-
ties. In non-cooperative game theory the players individually choose their
strategies and cooperation is not allowed or differently even if cooperation
might be profitable, it cannot be enforced. Some well known solution con-
cepts for non-cooperative games are the Nash equilibrium (for normalform
games, Nash 1951) or its refinement the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(for extensive form games, Selten 1965). For games with incomplete infor-
1
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mation the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a widely used concept. In a Nash
equilibrium for each player the action he chooses individually maximizes his
payoff considering the actions of the other players as given. Differently from
non-cooperative game theory, in a cooperative game the players are allowed
to form coalitions and to choose joint actions. In general, a cooperative
game is described by a set of players, from which the set of possible coali-
tions is derived as its power set, and a coalitional function, that defines the
worth a coalition of players can achieve through cooperation (without giving
specific shares to each player). One solution concept for cooperative games
is the core (due to Gillies 1953). The idea of the core is the following: A
utility allocation is in the core, if it is affordable by the grand coalition, con-
sisting of all players, and if there is no coalition that can improve upon this
allocation. Other solution concepts used in this thesis are a refinement of
the core, namely the inner core (for example Shubik 1984, p.681–682), or for
bargaining games, a special class of cooperative games, the Nash bargaining
solution (Nash 1950, 1953).
My thesis includes different types of economies and non-cooperative
games as well as cooperative games. As already mentioned, I look at a
special class of games, so called market games. There is a non-cooperative
version usually referred to as strategic market games introduced by Shapley
and Shubik (1977). Furthermore, there are cooperative or coalitional market
games, often just called market games, that go back to Shapley and Shubik
(1969). The idea behind strategic market games is to model the price for-
mation in an economy as a non-cooperative game and to abstain from the
usual assumption of price taking behavior in general equilibrium models.
Whereas in coalitional market games the relationship between cooperative
games and markets, as a special kind of economies, and their solution con-
cepts are investigated. My thesis consists of two main parts: The first one is
on coalitional market games whereas the second one is on strategic market
games. The goal of this introduction is to give a short overview on the main
literature and the research questions investigated in this thesis including a
short description of the formal results. Each of the different chapters of
the two parts can be read independently. The different chapters are self-
containing and include a more detailed introduction into the subject and its
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underlying literature as well as a complete description of the model.
Part I: Coalitional Market Games
In coalitional market games the relationship between cooperative games
and markets or economies is investigated. From the cooperative point of
view market games are cooperative games, with transferable (TU) or non-
transferable utility (NTU), that generate or induce markets in a certain
sense. Shapley and Shubik (1969) consider TU market games. They prove
that every totally balanced TU game is a market game. Furthermore, Shap-
ley and Shubik (1975) show that starting with a TU game every payoff vector
in the core of that game is competitive in its direct market and that for any
given point in the core there exists at least one market that has this payoff
vector as its unique competitive payoff vector. The idea of market games
was applied to NTU games by Billera and Bixby (1974). Analogously to the
result of Shapley and Shubik (1969) they show that every totally balanced
game, that is compactly convexly generated, is a market game. Qin (1993)
compares the inner core of NTU market games with the competitive pay-
off vectors of markets that represent this game. He obtains the analogous
results for NTU games as Shapley and Shubik (1975) conjectured.
Part I on coalitional market games is divided into three independent chap-
ters, that were established in joint work with Jan-Philip Gamp.
First, we study TU market games in chapter 1. Based on Shapley and
Shubik (1975) we investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the
core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets
linked to that game. This can be considered as the case in between the two
extreme cases of Shapley and Shubik (1975). They already remark that
their results can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but
they omit the details of the proof which we present here. This more general
case is in particular interesting, as the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik
(1975) are included as special cases.
More precisely, let N = {1, 2..., n} be a set of players. The set of all non-
empty coalitions is given by N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. A cooperative game with
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transferable utility (TU) is given by the pair (N, v) where N is the player
set and v : N → R is the characteristic or coalitional function. A market is
given by E = (X i, ωi, ui)i∈N where for every individual i ∈ N
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set,
where ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- ωi ∈ X i is the initial endowment vector,
- ui : X i → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
Combining these two concepts in a certain sense we obtain TU market
games, meaning that for a TU market game there exists a market such
that the value a coalition S can reach according to the coalitional function
coincides with the joint utility that is generated by feasible S-allocations in
the market, resulting from redistributions of the initial endowment vectors
within the coalition S. Having established the link between TU games and
markets we look at the relationship between their solution concepts. Here,
we elaborate on the details to prove the following theorem:
Theorem. Let (N, v) be a TU market game and let A be a
closed, convex subset of the core. Then there exists a market
such that this market represents the game (N, v) and such that
the set of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set A.
Second, in chapter 2 we consider NTU market games. The extension
of the results of Qin (1993) to subsets of the inner core remained so far an
open problem. We extend his results to a large class of closed subsets of the
inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending
on a given closed subset of the inner core. This market represents the game
and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria.
It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely and thus we obtain
a class of markets with the desired property. We have some freedom in
different aspects of our construction. First, to define our market we use
an auxiliary NTU game where we enlarge the given NTU game. For this
enlargement we use for every inner core point one of its normal vectors.
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This normal vector is not always unique. Second, for the auxiliary game
we define a mapping using a ‘projection’. This projection can be chosen in
different ways. Third, we add to the utility function an ε-term, that needs
to be between certain bounds and hence is not defined uniquely. Thus, we
do not obtain a single market but a whole class of markets.
Formally, again let N = {1, 2..., n} be a set of players. The set of all
non-empty coalitions is given by N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. An NTU (non-
transferable utility) game is a pair (N, V ), that consists of a player set N
and a coalitional function V , which defines for every coalition the utility
allocations this coalition can reach, regardless of what the other players
outside this coalition do. Hence, define the coalitional function V from the
set of coalitions, N , to the set of non-empty subsets of Rn, such that for
every coalition S ∈ N we have V (S) ⊆ RS, V (S) is non-empty and V (S) is
S-comprehensive, meaning V (S) ⊇ V (S)−RS+. A market (with production)
is given by E = (X i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N where for every individual i ∈ N
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set,
where ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the production set,
such that Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
- ωi ∈ X i − Y i, the initial endowment vector,
- and ui : X i → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility
function.
Combining these two concepts, in a similar as in the TU case, we obtain NTU
market games. For an NTU market game there exists a market such that the
set of utility allocations a coalition S can reach according to the coalitional
function coincides with the set of utility allocations that is generated by
feasible S-allocations in the market, resulting from redistributions of the
initial endowment vectors within the coalition S and production plans in a
joint production set of the coalition S. Having established the link between
NTU games and markets we look at the relationship between their solution
concepts. Let A be a closed subset of the inner core of a given compactly
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convexly generated NTU market game (N, V ) such that (N, V ) together
with the set A satisfy a certain property, called strict positive separability.
We establish the following result:
Theorem. Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. Then
there exists a market such that this market represents the game
(N, V ) and such that the set of competitive payoff vectors of this
market is the set A.
Third, in Chapter 3 we investigate the relationship between the inner
core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for n-person bargaining
games with complete information. We show that the set of asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights
coincides with the inner core if all points in the underlying bargaining set
are strictly positive. Furthermore, we prove that every bargaining game is a
market game. By using the results of Qin (1993) we conclude that for every
possible vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there
exists an economy that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its
unique competitive payoff vector. We relate the literature of Trockel (1996,
2005) with the ideas of Qin (1993). Our result can be seen as a market
foundation for every asymmetric Nash bargaining solution in analogy to the
results on non-cooperative foundations of cooperative games.
More detailed, we consider NTU bargaining games as a special class of NTU
games where smaller coalitions than the grand coalition do not gain from
cooperation. They cannot reach higher utility levels as the singleton coali-
tions for all its members simultaneously. Only in the grand coalition every
individual can be made better off. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
with a vector of weights θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++, for short θ-asymmetric, for
a n-person NTU bargaining game (N, V ) with disagreement point 0 is de-
fined as the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product given by
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i
over the set V (N). To obtain a market foundation for the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions we establish first the following Proposition:
Proposition. Let (N, V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game
with disagreement point 0 and underlying bargaining set from
Rn+.
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• Suppose we have given a vector of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈
∆n++. Then the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution a
θ for
θ is in the inner core of (N, V ).
Second after having argued that NTU bargaining games are market games
we show:
Proposition. Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N, V )
(with disagreement point 0 and generating set from Rn+) and a
vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++, there is market that represents (N, V )
and where additionally the unique competitive payoff vector of
this market coincides with the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining so-
lution aθ of the NTU bargaining game (N, V ).
Part II: Strategic Market Games
The idea of strategic market games goes back to Shapley and Shubik (1977).
They use a non-cooperative game to describe the price formation in an
exchange economy. Every player is asked to place a bid and an offer for
every commodity. Afterwards the price of the commodity is computed as
the ratio of the total bid to the total offer of that commodity. Strategic
market games enable to study the feedback effect of trading strategies in
illiquid markets when individual trades may have an impact on prices. An
overview about strategic market games and related contributions can be
found in Giraud (2003). In this thesis the departing point is the model in
Giraud and Weyers (2004). They consider a strategic market game with
finite horizon and (possibly) incomplete asset markets. Their main result is
that generically every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-
free stream of allocations can be approximated by a full subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
Part II on strategic market games is divided into two independent chapters,
where the second one was established in joint work with Gae¨l Giraud and
presents a work that is still ongoing.
First, in chapter 4, I study a strategic market game with finite horizon,
incomplete markets and the possibility of default. This is modeled by using
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collaterals. The model of a strategic market game with finite horizon and
incomplete markets of Giraud and Weyers (2004) is extended by introducing
the possibility of default. In order to avoid bankruptcy a collateral require-
ment for financial assets similarly as in Araujo et al. (2002) is introduced. I
show that a given allocation that clears the markets and satisfies the budget
constraints can be induced by defining appropriate, almost full strategies.
Furthermore, I look at the set of sequentially strictly individually rational
allocations and study the existence of approximately subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. It turns out that the analogue of a perfect folk theorem similarly
to the one in Giraud and Weyers (2004) holds. Hence, even with collateral
requirements almost everything is possible as soon as people are sufficiently
patient, since almost every feasible, affordable, sequentially strictly individ-
ually rational consumption stream can be obtained by means of some almost
full approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Formally, the following theorem is established:
Theorem. For any N , there exists an open and dense subset
Ω∗(N) of initial endowments and an integer T 0(N) and R such
that for every finite horizon T ≥ T 0(N) ≥ R: if the initial
endowments belong to Ω∗T (N) and if the issuing nodes of all fi-
nancial assets are in the first T − R − 1 periods, then every
consumption stream (x¯i)i∈N , that is feasible, affordable and se-
quentially strictly individually rational in the first T − T 0(N)
periods, is an approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the strategic market game with finite horizon T .
In a second contribution, chapter 5, coauthored by Gae¨l Giraud, we
study a strategic market game with finitely many traders, infinite horizon
and real assets. To this standard framework (see, e.g. Giraud and Weyers,
2004) we add two key ingredients: First, default is allowed at equilibrium
by means of some collateral requirement for financial assets; second, infor-
mation among players about the structure of uncertainty is incomplete. We
focus on learning equilibria, at the end of which no player shares incorrect
beliefs — not because those players with heterogeneous beliefs were elim-
inated from the market (although default is possible at equilibrium) but
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because they have taken time to update their prior belief. We then prove
a partial Folk theorem a` la Wiseman (2011) of the following form: For any
function that maps each state of the world to a sequence of feasible and
sequentially strictly individually rational allocations (for short ssirf), and
for any degree of precision, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (pbe) in
which patient players learn the realized state with this degree of precision
and achieve a payoff close to the one specified for each state.
More precisely, the uncertain state of the world is a transition matrix that
gives the probabilities with which a succeeding node in a tree-like time struc-
ture is reached. The sets of players and actions are common knowledge, but
the distribution of initial endowments and one-period utility levels condi-
tional on action profiles is chosen randomly in each period, and the players
do not observe nature’s choice. Neither do they observe each player’s ac-
tion. The probability distribution according to which uncertainty realizes in
each period is a (stationary) Markov chain. This Markov distribution itself
is chosen at random once and for all at the start of play, and, again, the
investors do not observe nature’s choice. The players have a common prior
over the finite set of possible Markov chains (states of the world), and they
have various ways of learning the state of the world over time. We make
the following assumptions:
• Assumption G:
The set of consumption goods is partitioned into two distinct subsets.
Only commodities in the one set can be used as collateral, and assets’
promises deliver only in commodities that belong to the other subset.
• Informativeness Assumption (IA):
(1) For any pair of nodes (t, st−1, s) = ξ 6= ξ
′ = (t, st−1, s
′), any player
i, and any strategy profile, σ, that induces an ssirf allocation at
both states, the vectors of signals,
(uiξ(x
i
ξ(σ)), x
i
ξ(σ), w
i
ξ, Aj(ξ))
and
(uiξ′(x
i
ξ′(σ)), x
i
ξ′(σ), w
i
ξ′ , Aj(ξ
′))
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differ.
(2) Every ω is irreducible, aperiodic and admits an invariant mea-
sure, µω. Moreover, for any pair ω, ω
′, if µω and µω′ are two
corresponding invariant measures, then µω = µω′ ⇒ ω 6= ω
′.
Additionally, we introduce in the strategic market games the restriction that
collaterals need to be established from the initial endowments of that period
and we impose a condition avoiding self-trades on the asset markets. We
show:
Theorem. Under (G) and (IA), let ε > 0 and (x∗i[ω])i∈N ,ω∈Ω
be a ssirf allocation in consumption goods, and let P be a prior
belief that assigns strictly positive probability to each state of
the world. Then there exists λ(P) < 1 such that for all λ >
λ(P), there is a pbe that with probability at least 1 − ε, con-
ditional on any state ω being realized, yields a payoff vector
within ε of
(
U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, σ, ω)
)
i
. In equilibrium, conditional on
ω, each player i’s interim private belief converges to the truth:
limt→∞ P
i
ξ=(t,st−1,s)
(hiξ)[ω] = 1 with probability 1.
Introduction en Franc¸ais
Nous nous inte´ressons dans cette the`se de doctorat aux jeux de marche´s. Des
ide´es de deux domaines importants de la the´orie e´conomique y sont com-
bine´s : celles de la the´orie de l’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral et celles de la the´orie
des jeux.
Plusieurs mode`les e´conomiques sont conside´re´s dans la the´orie de l’e´quili-
bre ge´ne´ral. Dans cette the`se on s’inte´resse surtout aux e´conomies d’e´change
pures, aux e´conomies d’e´change avec production et aux e´conomies d’e´change
combine´es a` des marche´s financiers a` horizon fini ou infini. Dans le mode`le
de base les agents e´conomiques e´changent les dotations dont ils disposent au
de´part et peuvent e´galement agir sur les marche´s financiers lorsque ceux-ci
existent. De plus, les entreprises, s’il en existe, peuvent produire des biens
dans un ensemble de production donne´. Un concept de solution largement
re´pandu est la notion d’e´quilibre compe´titif de´finie dans Debreu (1959) par
exemple. L’ide´e principale est la suivante : e´tant donne´ un syste`me de prix,
les agents e´conomiques maximisent leurs utilite´s tout en satisfaisant leurs
contraintes budge´taires respectives, tandis que les entreprises maximisent
leurs profits et une condition de liquidation du marche´ est satisfaite.
La the´orie des jeux comporte deux domaines principaux, celui des jeux
non-coope´ratifs et celui des jeux coope´ratifs. Un jeu non-coope´ratif peut
eˆtre caracte´rise´ par un ensemble de joueurs, un ensemble de strate´gies ou
d’actions possibles pour chacun des joueurs et chaque joueur est dote´ d’une
fonction de paiement ou d’utilite´. Chaque fonction associe a` un profil de
strate´gies un paiement ou une utilite´ pour le joueur auquel elle correspond.
Dans un jeu non-coope´ratif les joueurs choisissent leurs strate´gies indivi-
duellement et la coope´ration est interdite (meˆme si la coope´ration pourrait
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eˆtre rentable, on suppose qu’il n’y a pas de me´canisme permettant qu’elle ait
lieu). Les concepts de solution les plus connus pour les jeux non-coope´ratifs
sont l’e´quilibre de Nash (pour les jeux sous forme normale, Nash 1951) et un
raffinement de cet e´quilibre, a` savoir, l’e´quilibre de Nash parfait en sous-jeux
(pour les jeux dynamiques, Selten 1965). Dans le cas de jeux a` information
incomple`te un des concepts les plus utilise´s est celui d’e´quilibre Baye´sien
parfait. Dans l’e´quilibre de Nash chaque joueur choisit ses actions indivi-
duellement afin de maximiser son paiement en conside´rant les actions des
autres joueurs comme e´tant donne´es. A l’oppose´ des jeux non-coope´ratifs,
les joueurs peuvent former des coalitions et choisir des actions collective-
ment dans les jeux coope´ratifs. En ge´ne´ral un jeu coope´ratif est de´crit par
un ensemble de joueurs et une fonction caracte´ristique, qui associe a` chaque
coalition une valeur. Cette valeur correspond a` ce que les joueurs de la coa-
lition peuvent obtenir par coope´ration (sans spe´cifier les gains de chaque
joueur dans la coalition). Un concept de solution pour les jeux coope´ratifs
est celui de cœur (voir Gillies 1953). L’ide´e sous-jacente est la suivante :
une allocation est dans le cœur du jeu si la grande coalition forme´e par l’en-
semble de tous les joueurs peut obtenir cette allocation et si aucune autre
coalition ne peut ame´liorer le gain de ses membres en quittant la grande coa-
lition. Les autres concepts de solution utilise´s dans cette the`se sont ceux du
cœur interne, qui correspond a` une ame´lioration du cœur (voir par exemple
Shubik 1984, p.681-682) et, pour les jeux de ne´gociation (qui constituent
une classe particulie`re de jeux coope´ratifs), la solution de ne´gociation de
Nash (Nash 1950, 1953).
Ma the`se traite de diffe´rents types d’e´conomies et de jeux non-coope´ratifs
ainsi que de jeux coope´ratifs. J’e´tudie une classe particulie`re de jeux, ap-
pele´s jeux de marche´s. Lorsqu’ils sont non-coope´ratifs, ces jeux introduits
par Shapley et Shubik (1977) sont ge´ne´ralement de´nomme´s jeux de marche´s
strate´giques. Il existe e´galement des jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs, souvent
appele´s jeux de marche´s, introduits par Shapley et Shubik (1969). L’ide´e
des jeux de marche´s strate´giques est d’utiliser un jeu non-coope´ratif afin
de de´crire la formation des prix dans une e´conomie d’e´change ou` l’indi-
vidu a une influence strate´gique sur le prix. Alors que dans le cas des jeux
de marche´s coope´ratifs, le lien entre jeux coope´ratifs et marche´s (des types
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particuliers d’e´conomies) et les concepts de solution associe´s sont e´tudie´s.
Ma the`se comporte deux parties : La premie`re partie porte sur les jeux de
marche´s coope´ratifs et la deuxie`me sur les jeux de marche´s strate´giques.
L’objectif de cette introduction est de pre´senter les proble`mes e´tudie´s, la
litte´rature associe´e ainsi que les principaux re´sultats obtenus. Chaque cha-
pitre de la the`se inclut une description plus de´taille´e du proble`me traite´ et
de la litte´rature associe´e ainsi qu’une description comple`te des mode`les et
des preuves.
Partie I : Les Jeux de Marche´s Coope´ratifs
Dans les jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs la relation entre jeux coope´ratifs et
marche´s ou e´conomies est e´tudie´e. Du point de vue coope´ratif, les jeux de
marche´s sont des jeux coope´ratifs (a` utilite´ transfe´rable (TU) ou utilite´ non-
transfe´rable (NTU)) qui peuvent, dans un certain sens, eˆtre repre´sente´s par
des marche´s. Shapley et Shubik (1969, 1975) conside`rent des jeux de marche´s
coope´ratifs TU. Ils montrent que chaque jeu totalement e´quilibre´ est un jeu
de marche´. De plus, ces auteurs prouvent que chaque vecteur dans le cœur
du jeu est un vecteur de paiement compe´titif dans son marche´ direct et que
pour chaque vecteur dans le cœur, il existe au moins un marche´ ayant ce
vecteur comme unique vecteur de paiement compe´titif. L’ide´e des jeux de
marche´s a e´te´ applique´e aux jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs NTU par Billera et
Bixby (1974). Analogiquement au re´sultat de Shapley et Shubik (1969), ils
montrent que les jeux totalement e´quilibre´s, qui sont ge´ne´re´s compactement
et convexement, sont des jeux de marche´s. Qin (1993) compare le cœur
interne des jeux de marche´s NTU avec des vecteurs de paiement compe´titifs
de marche´s repre´sentant des jeux de marche´s NTU. Il obtient un re´sultat
analogue pour les jeux de marche´s NTU comme conjecture´ par Shapley et
Shubik (1975).
La partie I sur les jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs est subdivise´e en trois
chapitres inde´pendants dont les re´sultats ont e´te´ e´tablis en commun avec
Jan-Philip Gamp.
Tout d’abord, nous e´tudions les jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs TU dans
le chapitre 1. Partant de Shapley et Shubik (1975), nous examinons les
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relations entre certains sous-ensembles du cœur des jeux de marche´s TU
et les vecteurs de paiement compe´titif des marche´s associe´s a` ces jeux.
On peut conside´rer que ce type de relation a de´ja` e´te´ e´tudie´ dans les ap-
proches de Shapley et Shubik (1975). Leurs approches constituent en fait
des cas extreˆmes de notre approche. Ces auteurs ont de´ja` remarque´ que
leurs re´sultats peuvent eˆtre ge´ne´ralise´s a` des sous-ensembles convexes et
ferme´s du coeur, mais ils n’en ont pas donne´ de preuves de´taille´es. Nous
pre´sentons ici une preuve dans un cadre plus ge´ne´ral et obtenons ainsi un
re´sultat plus fort dont les deux re´sultats de Shapley et Shubik (1975) sont
des cas particuliers.
Plus pre´cise´ment, soit N = {1, 2..., n} un ensemble de joueurs. Soit
N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅} l’ensemble des coalitions non vides. Un jeu coope´ratif
avec utilite´ transfe´rable (TU) est de´fini par une paire (N, v) ou` N est l’en-
semble des joueurs et v : N → R est une fonction de coalition, ou fonc-
tion caracte´ristique. Un marche´ est de´fini par E = (X i, ωi, ui)i∈N avec pour
chaque individu i ∈ N :
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ est un ensemble non vide, convexe et ferme´, l’ensemble de
la consommation, ou` ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N est le nombre de biens,
- ωi ∈ X i est le vecteur des dotations initiales,
- ui : X i → R est une fonction continue et concave, la fonction d’utilite´.
En combinant ces deux concepts d’une certaine manie`re, nous obtenons
des jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs TU. Dans un jeux de marche´ coope´ratif TU
il existe un marche´ tel que la valeur v(S) d’une coalition S co¨ıncide avec
l’utilite´ commune ge´ne´re´e par les allocations re´alisables pour S re´sultant
d’une redistribution des dotations initiales au sein de la coalition S. Apre`s
avoir e´tabli ce lien entre les jeux coope´ratifs TU et les marche´s nous e´tudions
les relations entre leurs diffe´rents concepts de solution. Dans ce chapitre 1,
nous pre´senterons les de´tails ne´cessaires a` la preuve du the´ore`me suivant :
The´ore`me. Soit (N, v) un jeu de marche´ coope´ratif et soit A
un sous-ensemble convexe et ferme´ du cœur. Alors il existe un
marche´ qui repre´sente le jeu (N, v) tel que l’ensemble des vec-
teurs de paiement compe´titif de ce marche´ est l’ensemble A.
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Ensuite, dans le chapitre 2, nous conside´rons des jeux de marche´s coope´-
ratifs NTU. L’extension des re´sultats de Qin (1993) e´tait reste´e jusqu’a`
maintenant un proble`me ouvert. Nous e´tendons ses re´sultats a` une large
classe de sous-ensembles ferme´s du cœur interne : e´tant donne´ un jeu de
marche´s coope´ratifs NTU, nous construisons un marche´ qui de´pend d’un
ensemble ferme´ donne´ du cœur interne. Ce marche´ repre´sente le jeu et de
plus l’ensemble ferme´ correspond a` l’ensemble des paiements des e´quilibres
compe´titifs du marche´. Il se trouve que ce marche´ n’est pas de´termine´ de
manie`re unique et nous obtenons ainsi une classe des marche´s avec les
proprie´te´s voulues. Nous disposons d’une marge de liberte´ par rapport a`
certains aspects de notre construction. Premie`rement, pour de´finir notre
marche´ nous utilisons un jeu NTU auxiliaire dans lequel nous e´tendons le
jeu NTU conside´re´. Pour cette extension, nous prenons pour chaque point
dans le cœur interne un de ses vecteurs normaux. Ce vecteur normal n’est
donc pas toujours unique. Deuxie`mement, en ce qui concerne le jeu auxi-
liaire nous de´finissons une ‘projection’. Cette projection peut eˆtre choisie de
diffe´rentes manie`res. Troisie`mement, nous ajoutons a` la fonction d’utilite´ un
terme ε qui est compris entre deux valeurs et qui n’est par conse´quent pas
de´fini de manie`re unique. Pour ces raisons, nous n’obtenons pas un seule
marche´ mais une classe entie`re de marche´s.
D’un point de vue formel, soit N = {1, 2..., n} l’ensemble des joueurs.
L’ensemble des coalitions non vides est donne´ par N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. Un
jeu coope´ratif avec utilite´ non-transfe´rable (NTU) est de´fini par un couple
(N, V ), ou` N est l’ensemble des joueurs et V : N → R est une fonction
de coalition, ou fonction caracte´ristique de´finissant les allocations d’utilite´
possibles pour les coalitions. La fonction caracte´ristique est de´finie de l’en-
semble des coalitions N vers l’ensemble des ensembles non vides de Rn, et
est telle que pour chaque coalition S ∈ N nous avons V (S) ⊆ RS, V (S)
non vide et V (S) est S-compre´hensif, c’est-a`-dire V (S) ⊇ V (S) − RS+. Un
marche´ (avec production) est de´fini par E = (X i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N avec pour
chaque individu i ∈ N :
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ est un ensemble non vide, convexe et ferme´, l’ensemble de
la consommation, ou` ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N est le nombre de biens,
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- Y i ⊆ Rℓ est un ensemble non vide, convexe et ferme´, l’ensemble de la
production, tel que Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
- ωi ∈ X i est le vecteur des dotations initiales,
- ui : X i → R est une fonction continue et concave, la fonction d’utilite´.
De manie`re similaire au cas des jeux coope´ratifs TU, la combinaison des
deux concepts nous donne des jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs NTU. Dans un
jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs NTU il existe un marche´ tel que l’ensemble des
allocations d’utilite´ V (S) d’une coalition S co¨ıncide avec l’ensemble des allo-
cations d’utilite´ ge´ne´re´e par les allocations re´alisables pour S, qui re´sultent
d’une redistribution des dotations initiales et des plans de production dans
l’ensemble de production de la coalition S. Apre`s avoir e´tabli un lien entre
les jeux coope´ratifs NTU et les marche´s, nous e´tudions les liens entre leurs
concepts de solutions. Soit A un sous-ensemble ferme´ du cœur interne d’un
jeu de marche´ coope´ratif NTU (N, V ) a` ge´ne´ration convexe et compacte,
tel que (N, V ) et le sous-ensemble A ve´rifient une proprie´te´ de se´parabilite´
strictement positive. Nous e´tablissons le re´sultat suivant :
The´ore`me. Soit [(N, V ), A] tel que la se´parabilite´ strictement
positive soit satisfaite. Alors il existe un marche´ qui repre´sente
le jeu (N, V ) et tel que l’ensemble des vecteurs de paiement
compe´titif de ce marche´ soit l’ensemble A.
Dans le chapitre 3 nous e´tudions la relation entre le cœur interne et les
solutions de ne´gociation asyme´triques de Nash pour les jeux de ne´gociation
a` n personnes avec information comple`te. Nous prouvons que l’ensemble
des solutions de ne´gociation asyme´triques de Nash relatives pour diffe´rents
vecteurs de poids strictement positifs co¨ıncide avec le cœur interne si tous les
points de l’ensemble de ne´gociation sont strictement positifs. De plus, nous
montrons que les jeux de ne´gociation sont des jeux de marche´s. En utilisant
les re´sultats de Qin (1993) nous concluons que, pour chaque vecteur de poids
possible de la solution de ne´gociation asyme´trique de Nash, il existe une
e´conomie ayant cette solution de ne´gociation asyme´trique comme unique
vecteur de paiement compe´titif. Nous e´tablissons e´galement des liens entre
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les travaux de Trockel (1996, 2005) et de Qin (1993). Notre re´sultat montre
que la the´orie des marche´s peut eˆtre perc¸u comme un fondement de la
solution de ne´gociation asyme´trique de Nash, par analogie avec les re´sultats
concernant les fondements non-coope´ratifs des jeux coope´ratifs.
Plus pre´cise´ment, nous conside´rons les jeux de ne´gociation NTU comme
une sous-classe des jeux coope´ratifs NTU dans lesquels les coalitions diffe´ren-
tes de la grande coalition ne gagnent rien en coope´rant. Elles ne peuvent pas
obtenir plus que la somme des utilite´s des coalitions singletons correspon-
dant a` leurs membres. En revanche, dans la grande coalition, chaque individu
peut obtenir plus que ce qu’il obtiendrait seul. La solution de ne´gociation
asyme´trique de Nash, pour un vecteur de poids θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++ (i.e.
θ-asyme´trique) et pour un jeu de ne´gociation a` n personnes (N, V ) ayant
pour point de de´saccord 0, est de´finie comme le maximiseur du produit θ-
asyme´trique de Nash donne´ par
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i sur l’ensemble V (N). Pour faire
le lien entre la the´orie des jeux de marche´ et la solution de ne´gociation
asyme´trique de Nash, nous e´tablissons d’abord la proposition suivante :
Proposition. Soit (N, V ) un jeu de ne´gociation a` n-personnes
ayant pour point de de´saccord 0 et avec un ensemble de ne´gociation
fondamental dans Rn+.
• Etant donne´ un vecteur de poids θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++,
alors la solution de ne´gociation asyme´trique de Nash aθ
pour θ est dans le cœur interne de (N, V ).
Ensuite, apre`s avoir e´tabli que les jeux de ne´gociation sont des jeux de
marche´s NTU, nous prouvons :
Proposition. Etant donne´ un jeu de ne´gociation a` n-personnes
(ayant pour point de de´saccord 0 et un ensemble de ne´gociation
fondamental dans Rn+), il existe un marche´ qui repre´sente le jeu
(N, V ), de plus, l’unique vecteur de paiement compe´titif de ce
marche´ est la solution de ne´gociation θ-asyme´trique de Nash du
jeu (N, V ).
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Partie II : Les Jeux de Marche´s Strate´giques
L’ide´e de jeux de marche´ strate´giques remonte a` Shapley et Shubik (1977).
Ils utilisent un jeu non-coope´ratif afin de de´crire la formation des prix dans
une e´conomie d’e´change. On demande a` chaque joueur de faire une demande
et une offre pour chaque bien. Ensuite, le prix du bien est calcule´ comme
e´tant le rapport entre la demande totale et l’offre totale de ce bien. Les
jeux de marche´s strate´giques permettent d’e´tudier les effets des strate´gies
individuelles sur les prix lorsque les marche´s sont illiquides. Une introduc-
tion aux jeux de marche´s strate´giques ainsi qu’un re´sume´ de la litte´rature
existante peuvent eˆtre trouve´s dans Giraud (2003). Dans cette the`se le
point de de´part est le mode`le de Giraud et Weyers (2004). Ils e´tudient
un jeu de marche´ strate´gique a` horizon fini en pre´sence de marche´s finan-
ciers (qui peuvent eˆtre) incomplets. Leur re´sultat principal est que chaque
allocation se´quentiellement strictement individuellement rationnelle et sans
de´faut peut eˆtre approxime´e par un e´quilibre de Nash parfait de sous-jeux
a` strate´gies comple`tes.
La partie II se compose de deux chapitres inde´pendants. Les re´sultats du
deuxie`me chapitre correspondent a` un travail commun avec Gae¨l Giraud.
Tout d’abord, dans le chapitre 4, j’e´tudie un jeu de marche´s strate´giques
a` horizon fini, en pre´sence de marche´s financiers incomplets et j’introduis
la possibilite´ de de´faut utilisant des collate´raux. Le mode`le de Giraud et
Weyers (2004) pre´sentant un jeu de marche´s strate´gique a` horizon fini avec
marche´s financiers incomplets est enrichi par la prise en compte de la possi-
bilite´ de de´faut. Pour e´viter la faillite, une obligation de collate´ral pour les
actifs financiers est introduite comme dans Araujo et al. (2002). Je montre
qu’une allocation donne´e des biens qui e´quilibre les marche´s et satisfait les
contraintes budge´taires peut eˆtre induite avec des strate´gies approprie´es,
qui sont presque comple`tes. Ensuite, je regarde l’ensemble des allocations
se´quentiellement strictement individuellement rationnelles et j’e´tudie l’exis-
tence des e´quilibres de Nash parfaits en sous-jeux dans un sens approximatif.
Comme dans Giraud et Weyers (2004), il est alors possible de prouver un
the´ore`me analogue a` un the´ore`me de folk. Ainsi, meˆme en pre´sence d’obli-
gation de collate´ral, presque tout est possible tant que les joueurs sont as-
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sez patients, puisque presque toutes les allocations re´alisables, abordable
et se´quentiellement strictement individuellement rationnelle, peuvent eˆtre
obtenues approximativement par un e´quilibre de Nash parfait en sous-jeux
presque complet.
Formellement le the´ore`me suivant est e´tabli :
The´ore`me. Pour chaque N , il existe un sous-ensemble ouvert et
dense Ω∗(N) des dotations initiales, et T 0(N) et R tel que, pour
tout horizon fini T ≥ T 0(N) ≥ R, si les dotations initiales sont
dans Ω∗T (N) et si les nœuds d’e´mission des actifs financiers sont
dans les premie`res T−R−1 pe´riodes, alors chaque allocation des
biens (x¯i)i∈N re´alisable, abordable et se´quentiellement stricte-
ment individuellement rationnelle dans les premie`res T −T 0(N)
pe´riodes est une approximation de l’ e´quilibre de Nash parfait
en sous-jeux presque complet de jeu de marche´s strate´gique a`
horizon fini T .
Dans une deuxie`me contribution, co–e´crite avec Gae¨l Giraud, nous e´tu-
dions un jeu de marche´ strate´gique avec un nombre fini de joueurs, a` ho-
rizon fini et avec de l’incertitude. Nous ajoutons dans le mode`le standard
(par exemple Giraud et Weyers 2004) les ingre´dients principaux suivants :
Premie`rement, le de´faut est possible dans l’e´quilibre avec exigence de col-
late´ral pour les actifs financiers ; deuxie`mement, l’information entre les joueurs
a` propos de la structure de l’incertitude est incomple`te. Nous nous concen-
trons sur les e´quilibres avec apprentissage a` l’issue desquels aucun des joueurs
n’a de convictions incorrectes — non pas parce que les joueurs ayant des
convictions he´te´roge`nes ont e´te´ e´limine´s (quoique le de´faut est possible dans
l’e´quilibre) mais parce qu’ils ont pris du temps pour ajuster leurs convic-
tions initiales. Nous prouvons alors un the`oreme de folk partiel a` la Wiseman
(2011) de la manie`re suivante : Pour chaque fonction associant a` chaque e´tat
du monde une suite d’allocations admissibles et se´quentiellement strictement
individuellement rationnelles (ssirf), et pour chaque degre´ de pre´cision ar-
bitraire, il existe un e´quilibre Baye´sien parfait (pbe) dans lequel les joueurs
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apprennent l’e´tat du monde avec ce degre´ de pre´cision et ils obtiennent un
paiement proche du paiement spe´cifie´ pour chaque e´tat.
Plus pre´cise´ment, l’e´tat incertain du monde est une matrice de transi-
tion qui donne les probabilite´s avec lesquelles les nœuds suivants d’un arbre
sont re´alise´s. L’ensemble des joueurs et des actions sont connus, mais les
distributions des dotations initiales et les niveaux d’utilite´s conditionnels
aux actions sont choisis de fac¸on ale´atoire a` chaque pe´riode, et les joueurs
n’observent pas le choix de la nature. Il n’ont pas non plus la possibilite´ d’ob-
server les actions des autres joueurs. La distribution des probabilite´s avec
laquelle l’incertitude se re´alise a` chaque pe´riode est une chaine de Markov
stationnaire. Cette chaine de Markov est choisie au hasard une fois au de´but
du jeu, et les investisseurs ne l’observent pas. Les joueurs commencent avec
la meˆme probabilite´ de de´part sur l’ensemble fini des matrices de Markov
(les e´tats du monde) possibles, et ont plusieurs possibilite´s de de´couvrir le
vrai e´tat du monde. Nous faisons les hypothe`ses suivantes :
• Hypothe`se G :
L’ensemble des biens est partitionne´ en deux sous-ensembles distincts.
Seuls les biens dans un sous-ensemble donne´ peuvent eˆtre utilise´s
comme collate´ral et les promesses d’actifs se font en termes de biens
appartenant a` l’autre sous-ensemble.
• Hypothe`se sur les informations (IA) :
(1) Pour toute paire de nœuds (t, st−1, s) = ξ 6= ξ
′ = (t, st−1, s
′),
chaque joueur i et chaque profil de strate´gies, σ, qui induit une
allocation ssirf dans les deux e´tats, les vecteurs de signaux,
(uiξ(x
i
ξ(σ)), x
i
ξ(σ), w
i
ξ, Aj(ξ))
et
(uiξ′(x
i
ξ′(σ)), x
i
ξ′(σ), w
i
ξ′ , Aj(ξ
′))
sont diffe´rents.
(2) Chaque ω est irre´ductible, ape´riodique et admet une mesure in-
variante, µω. En plus, pour chaque paire ω, ω
′, si µω et µω′ sont
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deux mesures invariantes, alors µω = µω′ ⇒ ω 6= ω
′.
En plus, nous introduisons dans les jeux de marche´s strate´giques la res-
triction que les collate´raux doivent eˆtre e´tablis en utilisant les dotations
initiales a` chaque pe´riode, et nous imposons aussi une condition pour e´viter
les ventes a` soi-meˆme sur les marche´s d’actifs. Nous montrons :
The´ore`me. Sous (G) et (IA), soit ε > 0 et soit (x∗i[ω])i∈N ,ω∈Ω
une allocation ssirf des biens de consommation, et soit P une
conviction a priori assignant une probabilite´ strictement positive
a` chaque e´tat du monde. Alors il existe λ(P) < 1 tel que, pour
tout λ > λ(P), il y a un pbe ayant une probabilite´ supe´rieure ou
e´gale a` 1− ε conditionnelle a` chaque e´tat ω re´alise´, permettant
d’obtenir un vecteur de paiement dans ε de
(
U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, σ, ω)
)
i
.
A l’e´quilibre, conditionnel a` ω, la conviction interim prive´e de
chaque joueur i converge vers la verite´
lim
t→∞
Piξ=(t,st−1,s)(h
i
ξ)[ω] = 1
avec une probabilite´ e´gale a` 1.
Part I
Coalitional Market Games
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Chapter 1
Competitive Outcomes and the
Core of TU Market Games
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1.1 Introduction
The idea to consider cooperative games as economies or markets goes back
to Shapley and Shubik (1969). They look at TU market games. These are
cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) that are in a certain sense
linked to economies or markets. More precisely, a market is said to represent
a game if the set of utility allocations a coalition can reach in the market
coincides with the set of utility allocations a coalition obtains according to
the coalitional function of the game. If there exists a market that represents
a game, then this game is called a market game. Shapley and Shubik (1969)
prove the identity of the class of totally balanced TU games with the class
of TU market games. Furthermore, Shapley and Shubik (1975) show that
starting with a TU market game every payoff vector in the core of that game
is competitive in a certain market, called direct market, and that for any
given point in the core there exists at least one market that has this payoff
vector as its unique competitive payoff vector. Moreover, they claim that an
analogous result holds also for closed convex subsets of the core. Shapley
and Shubik (1975) give a hint how this can be shown but they omit the
details of the proof. By following this remark of Shapley and Shubik (1975)
we give a detailed proof how their two main results can be extended to any
closed convex subset of the core. This more general case is in particular
interesting, as the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included
as special cases.
Similarly to the approach of Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1975), Inoue
(2010c) uses coalition production economies as in Sun et al. (2008) instead
of markets. Inoue (2010c) shows that every TU game can be represented
by a coalition production economy. Moreover, he proves that there exists a
coalition production economy whose set of competitive payoff vectors coin-
cides with the core of the balanced cover of the original TU game.
A different extension of Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1975) is Garratt and
Qin (2000). They consider time-constrained market games, where the agents
are supposed to supply one unit of time to the market. Their main result
is that a TU game is a time-constrained market game if and only if it is
superadditive. This result of Garratt and Qin (2000) was again extended by
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Bejan and Go´mez (2011) introducing additionally location and free disposal
constraints. They show that in this sense the entire class of TU games can
be considered as market games.
For NTU market games Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) extend the NTU
analogue to Shapley and Shubik (1975), namely Qin (1993), to closed subsets
of the inner core. Hereby, the techniques used to show the results in the TU
and the NTU case are notably different.
1.2 TU market games
In this section we state the main definitions and results on TU market
games. The following introduction for TU market games is mainly based on
Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Shapley and Shubik (1975).
Let N = {1, 2..., n} be a set of players. The set of all non-empty coali-
tions is given byN = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}. Thus, a coalition is a non-empty sub-
set of players. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is given by
the pair (N, v) where N is the player set and v : N → R is the characteristic
or coalitional function.1 A subgame (T, vT ) of a TU game (N, v) is a subset
of players T ∈ N and the characteristic function vT with vT (S) = v(S) for
S ⊆ T , S 6= ∅. A payoff vector for a TU game (N, v) is a vector x ∈ Rn.
The payoff of a coalition S ∈ N is given by x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. The core C(v)
of a TU game (N, v) is the set of payoff vectors where the value v(N), the
grand coalition N can achieve, is distributed and no coalition can improve
upon,
C(v) = {x ∈ Rn| x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ N}.
Given a set of players N = {1, 2..., n}, a family B ⊆ N is a balanced
family if there exist weights {γS}S∈B, with γS ≥ 0, such that for all i ∈ N
we have ∑
S∈B, S∋i
γS = 1.
1Shapley and Shubik (1969) define the characteristic function as well for the empty set
with v(∅) = 0. Others, for example Billera and Bixby (1974), exclude the empty set
from this definition.
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The weights γS do not depend on the individual players but on the coalition
S ∈ N . The above condition can be as well written as
∑
S∈N
γSe
S = eN
where eS ∈ Rn is the vector with eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and e
S
i = 0 if i /∈ S.
Let the set of weights be denoted by Γ(eN). The balancing weights can be
interpreted as the intensity with which player i participates in a coalition
or the fraction of time he spends to be in this coalition.
A TU game (N, v) is balanced if for every balanced family B with weights
{γS}S∈B we have ∑
S∈B
γSv(S) ≤ v(N).
A TU game (N, v) is totally balanced if all its subgames are balanced.
The totally balanced cover of a TU game (N, v) is the smallest TU game
(N, v¯) that is totally balanced and contains the game (N, v).
Shapley and Shubik (1969) recall the following result of Shapley (1965):
Theorem 1.1 (Shapley and Shubik (1969)). A game has a non-empty core
if and only if it is balanced.
In oder to define a TU market game we first need to introduce the notion
of a market. For the TU case it is sufficient to consider markets without
production.
Definition 1.1 (market). Let N = {1, 2..., n} be the set of agents (or
players). A market is given by E = (X i, ωi, ui)i∈N where for every individual
i ∈ N
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set,
where ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- ωi ∈ X i is the initial endowment vector,
- ui : X i → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility function.
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Note that in the case with non-transferable utility (NTU) usually mar-
kets with production are considered, see for example Billera and Bixby
(1974) or Qin (1993).
Let S ∈ N be a coalition. The set of feasible S-allocations is given by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣∣xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ S,
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
ωi
}
.
Elements of F (S) are often denoted for short by xS. The feasible S-
allocations are those allocations the coalition S can achieve by redistributing
their initial endowments within the coalition.
Now we define a TU market game in the following way:
Definition 1.2 (TU market game). A TU game (N, v) that is representable
by a market is a TU market game. This means there exists a market E such
that (N, vE) = (N, v) with
vE(S) = max
xS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
ui(xi) for all S ∈ N .
For a TU market game there exists a market such that the value a
coalition S can reach according to the coalitional function coincides with
the joint utility that is generated by feasible S-allocations in the market.
Given a TU game we can generate a market from this game in a “natural”
way. Shapley and Shubik (1969) call this market a direct market.
Definition 1.3 (direct market). A TU game (N, v) generates a direct mar-
ket Dv = (X
i, ωi, ui)i∈N with for each individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+,
- the initial endowment ωi = e{i} with e
{i}
i = 1 and e
{i}
j = 0 for j 6= i,
- the utility function ui(x) = max
{ ∑
S∈N
γSv(S)
∣∣∣∣γS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ N , ∑
S∈N
γSe
S = x
}
.
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The utility function ui(·) of the direct market Dv is identical for every
individual i ∈ N and is homogeneous of degree 1, concave and continu-
ous. Note that in a direct market every consumer owns initially his own
(private) good or interpreted differently every player “is” himself a good.
Using the direct market Dv, Shapley and Shubik (1969) obtain the following
characterization of TU market games.
Theorem 1.2 (Shapley and Shubik (1969)). A game is a market game if
and only if it is totally balanced.
This means that in order to consider TU market games it is sufficient
to consider just those TU games that are totally balanced. To obtain the
above result Shapley and Shubik (1969) start by looking at an arbitrary TU
game and its direct market. Hereafter, they consider the TU game of the
direct market and show that it is equal to the totally balanced cover of the
TU game they started with.
In a second paper Shapley and Shubik (1975) investigate the relationship
between competitive payoffs, that arise from a competitive solution in the
market, and the core of TU market games.
Definition 1.4 (competitive solution). A competitive solution is an ordered
pair (p∗, (x∗i)i∈N), where p
∗ is an arbitrary n-vector of prices and x∗N is a
feasible N -allocation, such that
ui(x∗i)− p∗ · x∗i = max
xi∈Rl+
[ui(xi)− p · xi] for all i ∈ N.
We are in a setting with transferable utility. Thus, there is implicitly
the additional commodity money, that makes the transfer of utility possi-
ble. Suppose ξi0 are the initial money holdings of agent i. Then his “true”
maximization problem is
max
xi∈Rl+
[ui(xi) + ξi0 − p ·
(
xi − ωi
)
].
Since the solution of the maximization problem is independent of the initial
money holdings and the initial endowment, it is equivalent to solve the in
the definition above stated maximization problem.
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Definition 1.5 (competitive payoff vector). A vector α∗ is a competitive
payoff vector if it arises from a competitive solution (p∗, (x∗i)i∈N) such that
α∗i = ui(x∗i)− p∗ · (x∗i − ωi).
Shapley and Shubik (1975) show the following two relationships between
the core and competitive payoff vectors.
Theorem 1.3 (1, Shapley and Shubik (1975)). Every payoff vector in the
core of a TU market game is competitive in the direct market of that game.
Theorem 1.4 (2, Shapley and Shubik (1975)). Among the markets that
generate a given totally balanced TU game, there exists a market having any
given core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
These two theorems represent the two extreme cases where on the one
hand the whole core equals the set of competitive payoff vectors of the
direct market and one the other hand a given core point is the unique
competitive payoff vector of a certain other market. The main ideas to
prove the above two theorems are the following: For the first result Shapley
and Shubik (1975) use the direct market to show that its competitive payoff
vectors coincide with the core of the TU market game. To prove the second
theorem they introduce a second game with a modified coalitional function
for the grand coalition N . Afterwards they look at the direct market of the
original game with a modified utility function depending on a given core
point. Finally they show that this market represents the original TU game
and has a given core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
1.3 Results on TU market games
Shapley and Shubik (1975) already remark that for TU market games a
extension of their proof for their second theorem leads to the following
result.
Theorem 1.5. Let (N, v) be a totally balanced TU game and let A be a
closed, convex subset of the core. Then there exists a market such that this
CHAPTER 1. TU MARKET GAMES - CORE 30
market represents the game (N, v) and such that the set of competitive payoff
vectors of this market is the set A.
Shapley and Shubik (1975) omit the details of the proof. We elaborate
on them here. They remark that it is enough to change the definition of the
utility function.
In the following we first define the according market and show afterwards
in two steps that this market satisfies the properties we require.
Let (N, v) be a totally balanced TU game with N = {1, ..., n} the set
of players and the coalitional function v. Let Dv be its direct market as
defined before. For d ∈ R++ define the TU game (N, vd) by
vd(S) = v(S) for all S ⊂ N
and
vd(N) = v(N) + d.
Since d > 0 the game (N, vd) is totally balanced. Analogously let Dvd be
the direct market of (N, vd). Let (u
i
d)i∈N denote the utility functions of Dvd ,
i.e.
uid(x) = max
{∑
S∈N
γSvd(S)
∣∣∣∣γS ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ N ,∑
S∈N
γSe
S = x
}
.
As the utility functions uid in the direct market Dvd are identical for every
individual i ∈ N , we write for short ud.
Let A be a any non-empty closed convex subset of the core. For α ∈ A
let ud,α be defined as
ud,α(x) = min(ud(x), α · x).
Then define the function ud,A by
ud,A(x) = min
α∈A
ud,α(x).
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Since ud,A is continuous and concave we can define a market by
Evd =
(
Rn+, e
{i}, uid,A
)
i∈N
.
with uid,A = ud,A for all i ∈ N . It is easy to see that ud,A is homogeneous of
degree 1.
Next, we show first that the market game of this market is (N, v) and
second that the set of competitive payoff vectors of the market Evd is exactly
the set A.
Proposition 1.1. The market Evd represents the game (N, v).
Proof. Recall that for the market Evd the set
F (S) =
{
xS ∈ Rn·S+ |
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
e{i}
}
is the set of feasible allocations for a coalition S ∈ N .
Looking at the market game generated by the market Evd we obtain
vEvd (S) = maxxS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
uid,A(x
i)
= |S| max
xS∈F (S)
∑
i∈S
1
|S|
ud,A(x
i)
(1)
= |S| max
xS∈F (S)
ud,A
(
eS
|S|
)
= |S|ud,A
(
eS
|S|
)
(2)
= ud,A(e
S)
= min
α∈A
ud,α(e
S)
= min
α∈A
(min(ud(e
S), α · eS))
(3)
= min
α∈A
(min(vd(S), α · e
S))
= min
α∈A
(vd(S), α · e
S)
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(4)
= v(S)
The detailed arguments are the following:
(1) First observe that
∑
i∈S
1
|S|
ud,A(x
i) ≤ ud,A
(∑
i∈S
xi
|S|
)
= ud,A
(
eS
|S|
)
from the concavity of ud,A and the market clearing condition. We take
the maximum on both sides over the feasible S-allocations F (S) and
we observe that x¯i = 1
|S|
eS for all i ∈ S is a feasible S-allocation.
Therefore, we obtain that setting (x¯i)i∈S maximizes the expression on
the left side and hence we get equality.
(2) The equality follows from the homogeneity of degree 1 of ud,A.
(3) Using the totally balancedness of the game (N, vd) we obtain
ud(e
S) = max
{∑
T∈N
γTvd(T )
∣∣∣∣(γT ) ≥ 0,∑
T∈N
γT e
T = eS
}
= vd(S).
(4) For S ⊂ N this minimum is equal to v(S), since α is in the core of the
TU game (N, v) and therefore α · eS ≥ v(S) = vd(S). For S = N the
minimum is equal to α′ · eN for some α′ ∈ A and since α′ is in the core
of (N, v) we have α′ · eN = v(N). As d > 0 we have v(N) < vd(N).
Thus vEvd = v and hence the market Evd generates the game (N, v).
Proposition 1.2. The set of competitive payoff vectors of the market Evd
are coincides with the set A.
Proof. The proof is divided into five parts:
1. First, suppose ((x∗i)i∈N , p
∗) is a competitive solution in the market
Evd , then competitive payoffs are of the form
(
p∗ · e{i}
)
i∈N
.
From the definition of a competitive solution it follows that (x∗i)i∈N
clears the markets,
n∑
i=1
x∗i =
n∑
i=1
e{i} = eN
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and maximizes for each trader i his trading profit given by
ud,A(x
i)− p · xi.
Moreover, we have from the existence of a maximum and the fact
that the trading profit as a function of the consumption bundle is
homogeneous of degree 1 that
ud,A
(
x∗i
)
− p∗ · x∗i = 0.
Looking at the competitive payoffs of competitive solutions we observe
ud,A
(
x∗i
)
− p∗ · x∗i + p∗ · e{i} = p∗ · e{i}.
2. Second, suppose ((x∗i)i∈N , p
∗) is a competitive solution in the mar-
ket Evd , then
((
1
n
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is as well a competitive solution in the
market Evd . In addition the competitive payoffs coincide.
From the fact that the trading profit equals zero we obtain
ud,A
(
1
n
eN
)
− p∗ ·
1
n
eN = ud,A
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x∗i
)
− p∗ ·
1
n
n∑
i=1
x∗i
(1)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ud,A
(
x∗i
)
− p∗ ·
1
n
n∑
i=1
x∗i
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
ud,A
(
x∗i
)
− p∗ ·
n∑
i=1
x∗i
)
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
(
ud,A
(
x∗i
)
− p∗ · x∗i
))
= 0.
The detailed argument is the following:
(1) Using the concavity of ud,A gives us “≥” and from maximality of
x∗i we obtain the equality.
As already seen in 1., looking at the competitive payoffs of these com-
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petitive solutions we observe
ud,A
(
x∗i
)
−p∗·x∗i+p∗·e{i} = ud,A
(
1
N
eN
)
−p∗·
(
1
N
eN
)
+p∗·e{i} = p∗·e{i}.
To summarize these results mean that looking for competitive solu-
tions and their competitive payoffs we can focus on possible equi-
librium prices of the allocation
(
1
N
eN
)
i∈N
. Then those competitive
solutions give us all possible competitive payoffs.
3. Third, as in the proof of Proposition 1.1, equality (3)
ud
(
1
N
eN
)
=
1
N
vd(N) >
1
N
v(N) = ud,A
(
1
N
eN
)
and furthermore
ud,A
(
1
N
eN
)
= α′ ·
(
1
N
eN
)
for all α′ ∈ A. Because of the continuity of ud(·) it follows for all
α′ ∈ A that ud(x) > α
′ · x for x in a small neighborhood of 1
N
eN .
Thus, in a neighborhood of 1
N
eN , ud,A(x) = minα′∈A (α
′ · x).
4. Forth, it remains to check for which prices p∗ the pair
((
1
N
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a competitive solution. In a first step we show that each p∗ ∈ A
can be chosen as an equilibrium price vector, in a second step we show
that any p∗ /∈ A cannot be an equilibrium price vector. For the second
step it is enough to concentrate on p∗ ∈ C(v) \ A as we have seen in
1. that the equilibrium price vector determines the competitive payoff
vector, which are necessarily in the core.
Step 1: Suppose p∗ ∈ A. Then for all xi ∈ Rn+ we have
min
α′∈A
(
α′ · xi
)
− p∗ · xi ≤ p∗ · xi − p∗ · xi = 0
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and furthermore
min
α′∈A
(
α′ ·
(
1
N
eN
))
− p∗ ·
(
1
N
eN
)
= 0.
Hence, xi = 1
N
eN maximizes the trading profit of agent i. Fur-
thermore, the markets clear, as
∑
i∈N
1
N
eN = eN .
So, the pair
((
1
N
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a competitive solution.
Step 2: Suppose p∗ ∈ C(v) \ A. Recall that the set A is com-
pact and convex. Hence, we can apply the separating hyperplane
theorem2 and obtain that there exists x¯ ∈ Rn+ such that for all
α ∈ A
α · x¯− p∗ · x¯ > 0.
Therefore we conclude that
min
α′∈A
α′ · x¯− p∗ · x¯ > 0.
Now, for sufficiently small ε > 0 we have that 1
N
eN + εx¯ is in a
neighborhood of 1
N
eN where we have ud,A(x) = minα′∈A (α
′ · x).
But
min
α′∈A
(
α′ ·
(
1
N
eN + εx¯
))
− p∗ ·
(
1
N
eN + εx¯
)
= ε
(
min
α′∈A
α′ · x¯− p∗ · x¯
)
> 0.
This implies that 1
N
eN does not maximize agent i’s trading profit
for p∗ /∈ A.
5. To summarize the line of argument:
If ((x∗i)i∈N , p
∗) is a competitive solution in the market Evd , then by
2. we have that
((
1
n
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a competitive solution. By 4. we
show that p∗ ∈ A and by 1. we know that its competitive payoff vector
2See for example Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Theorem M.G.2, p.948).
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is equal to p∗.
On the other hand if p∗ ∈ A then by 4. we have that
((
1
n
eN
)
i∈N
, p∗
)
is a competitive solution. The competitive payoff vector is equal to
p∗.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
Shapley and Shubik (1975) investigate the relationship between competitive
payoffs of markets that represent a cooperative game and their relation to
solution concepts for cooperative games. We presented the details of the
proof of Shapley and Shubik (1975), that extends their two main results
to closed, convex subsets of the core. This shows also the two theorems
of Shapley and Shubik (1975). In a further contribution (Brangewitz and
Gamp, 2011a) we establish an analogue result for NTU market games.
Chapter 2
Competitive Outcomes and the
Inner Core of NTU Market
Games
37
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2.1 Introduction
The idea to consider cooperative games as economies or markets goes back
to Shapley and Shubik (1969). They look at TU market games. These are
cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) that are in a certain sense
linked to economies or markets. More precisely, a market is said to represent
a game if the set of utility allocations a coalition can reach in the market
coincides with the set of utility allocations a coalition obtains according to
the coalitional function of the game. If there exists a market that represents
a game, then this game is called a market game. Shapley and Shubik (1969)
prove the identity of the class of totally balanced TU games with the class
of TU market games. Furthermore, Shapley and Shubik (1975) show that
starting with a TU market game every payoff vector in the core of that game
is competitive in a certain market, called direct market, and that for any
given point in the core there exists at least one market that has this payoff
vector as its unique competitive payoff vector.
Cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) can be consid-
ered as a generalization of TU games, where the transfer of the utility within
a coalition does not take place at a fixed rate. In this paper we consider
NTU market games. After Shapley and Shubik (1969), Billera and Bixby
(1974) investigated the NTU case and obtained similar results for compactly
convexly generated NTU games. Analogously to the result of Shapley and
Shubik (1969) they show that every totally balanced NTU game, that is
compactly convexly generated, is a market game. The inner core is a re-
finement of the core for NTU games. A point is in the inner core if there
exists a transfer rate vector, such that - given this transfer rate vector - no
coalition can improve even if utility can be transferred within a coalition
according to this vector. So, an inner core point is in the core of an associ-
ated hyperplane game where the utility can be transferred according to the
transfer rate vector. Qin (1993) shows, verifying a conjecture of Shapley
and Shubik (1975), that the inner core of a market game coincides with the
set of competitive payoff vectors of the induced market of that game. More-
over, he shows that for every NTU market game and for any given point
in its inner core there exists a market that represents the game and further
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has this given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
Similarly to the approach of Billera and Bixby (1974), Inoue (2010b) uses
coalition production economies as in Sun et al. (2008) instead of markets.
Inoue (2010b) shows that every compactly generated NTU game can be
represented by a coalition production economy. Moreover, he proves that
there exists a coalition production economy whose set of competitive payoff
vectors coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original
NTU game.
Here we consider the classical approach using markets. We investigate
the case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993), where on the one
hand there exists a market that has the complete inner core as its set of
competitive payoff vectors and on the other hand there is a market that has
a given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector. We extend
the results of Qin (1993) to closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU
market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of
the inner core. This market represents the game and further has the given
set as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this
market is not determined uniquely. Several parameters in our construction
can be chosen in different ways. Thus, we obtain a class of markets with
the desired property.
Shapley and Shubik (1975) remark that in the TU case their result can
be extended to any closed and convex subset of the core. Whether a similar
result analogously to the one of Shapley and Shubik (1975) holds for NTU
market games, was up to now not clear. Our result shows, that in the NTU
case it is even possible to focus on closed, typically non-convex, subsets of
the inner core.
The inner is one solution concept for NTU games. Extending the results
of Qin (1993) to closed subsets of the inner core means in particular to show
such a result for all solution concepts selecting closed subsets of the inner
core.
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2.2 NTU market games
Let N = {1, ..., n} with n ∈ N and n ≥ 2 be a set of players. Let N =
{S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅} be the set of coalitions. Define for a coalition S ∈ N the
following sets RS = {x ∈ Rn|xi = 0 if i /∈ S} ⊆ R
n, RS+ = {x ∈ R
S|xi ≥
0 for all i ∈ S} ⊆ Rn+, R
S
++ = {x ∈ R
S|xi > 0 for all i ∈ S} ⊆ R
n
++. For
a vector a ∈ Rn and a coalition S ∈ N let aS denote the vector, where for
i ∈ S we have aSi = ai and a
S
j = 0 for j /∈ S. Moreover, for a ∈ R
n and
b ∈ Rn denote the inner product by a · b =
∑n
i=1 aibi and the Hadamard
product by a ◦ b = (a1b1, ..., anbn).
An NTU (non-transferable utility) game is a pair (N, V ), that consists
of a player set N = {1, ..., n} and a coalitional function V , which defines for
every coalition the utility allocations this coalition can reach, regardless of
what the other players outside this coalition do. Hence, define the coalitional
function V from the set of coalitions, N , to the set of non-empty subsets
of Rn, such that for every coalition S ∈ N we have V (S) ⊆ RS, V (S) is
non-empty and V (S) is S-comprehensive, meaning V (S) ⊇ V (S)− RS+.
The literature on NTU market games, as for example Billera and Bixby
(1974) and Qin (1993), considers NTU games that are compactly and con-
vexly generated. An NTU game (N, V ) is compactly (convexly) generated if
for all coalitions S ∈ N there exists a compact (convex) set CS ⊆ RS such
that the coalitional function has the form V (S) = CS − RS+.
Given a player set N = {1, ..., n} the set of balancing weights is defined
by Γ(eN) =
{
(γS)S⊆N |γS ≥ 0 ∀ S ⊆ N,
∑
S⊆N γSe
S = eN
}
. The balancing
weights can be interpreted in the following way: Every player i has one unit
of time that he can split over all the coalitions, he is a member of, with the
constraint that a coalition has to agree on a common weight. Thereby, each
player has to spend all his time. The weight γS can be seen as well as the in-
tensity with which each player participates in the coalition S ∈ N . In partic-
ular, if we have a partition of the player set into a coalition S and its comple-
ment N \S a balancing weight can be defined by γS = γN\S = 1 and γT = 0
for all other coalitions T except for S and N\S. An NTU game (N, V ) is bal-
anced if for all balancing weights γ ∈ Γ(eN) we have
∑
S⊆N γSV (S) ⊆ V (N).
Moreover, an NTU game (N, V ) is totally balanced if it is balanced in
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all subgames. This means for all coalitions T ∈ N and for all balancing
weights γ ∈ Γ(eT ) =
{
(γS)S⊆T |γS ≥ 0 ∀ S ⊆ T,
∑
S⊆T γSe
S = eT
}
we have∑
S⊆T γSV (S) ⊆ V (T ).
In order to define an NTU market game we first consider the notion of a
market which is less general than the notion of an economy according to for
example Arrow and Debreu (1954). In a market the number of consumers
coincides with the number of producers. Each consumer has his own private
production set. In contrast to the usual notion of an economy a market is
assumed to have concave and not just quasi concave utility functions.
Definition 2.1 (market). A market is given by E = (X i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N
where for every individual i ∈ N
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set,
where ℓ ≥ 1, ℓ ∈ N is the number of commodities,
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the production set,
such that Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
- ωi ∈ X i − Y i, the initial endowment vector,
- and ui : X i → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility
function.
As pointed out before in a market each consumer is assumed have his own
private production set. This assumption is not as restrictive as it appears to
be. A given private ownership economy can be transformed into an economy
with the same number of consumers and producers without changing the
set of competitive equilibria or possible utility allocations, see for example
Qin and Shubik (2009, section 4).
In the following, we often consider markets where X i ⊆ Rkn+ with k, n ∈
N. Then, consumption vectors are usually written as xi =
(
x(1)i, ..., x(k)i
)
∈
X i where x(m)i ∈ Rn+ for m = 1, ..., k. In a sense, we divide the kn con-
sumption goods in k consecutive groups of n goods. The vector x(m)i is the
mth group of n consumption goods of the consumption vector xi. We use
an analogous notation for the production goods and price vectors.
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Given a market we define which allocations are considered as feasible for
some coalition S ∈ N . An S-allocation is a tuple (xi)i∈S such that x
i ∈ X i
for each i ∈ S. The set of feasible S-allocations is given by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ S,∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
.
Hence, an S-allocation is feasible if there exist for all i ∈ S production
plans yi ∈ Y i such that
∑
i∈S(x
i − ωi) =
∑
i∈S y
i. We refer to a feasible
S-allocation in the following together with suitable production plans as a
feasible S-allocation (xi)i∈S with (y
i)i∈S.
In the definition of feasibility it is implicitly assumed that by forming
a coalition the available production plans are the sum of the individually
available production plans. This approach is different from the idea to use
coalition production economies, where every coalition has already in the
definition of the economy its own production possibility set. Nevertheless, a
market can be “formally” transformed into a coalition production economy
by defining the production possibility set of a coalition as the sum of the
individual production possibility sets.
Given the notion of a market and of feasible allocations for coalitions
S ∈ N we define an NTU market game in the following way:
Definition 2.2 (NTU market game). An NTU game (N, V ) that is repre-
sentable by a market is an NTU market game. This means there exists a
market E such that (N, VE) = (N, V ) with
VE(S) =
{
u ∈ RS| ∃ (xi)i∈S ∈ F (S), ui ≤ u
i(xi), ∀ i ∈ S
}
.
For an NTU market game there exists a market such that the set of
utility allocations a coalition can reach according to the coalitional function
coincides with the set of utility allocations that are generated by feasible
S-allocations in the market or that give less utility than some feasible S-
allocation.
One of the main results on NTU market games in Billera and Bixby
(1974) is the following:
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Theorem 2.1 (2.1, Billera and Bixby (1974)). An NTU game (N, V ) is an
NTU market game if and only if it is totally balanced and compactly convexly
generated.
Hence, in order to study NTU market games, it is sufficient to look at
those NTU games that are totally balanced and compactly convexly gener-
ated.
For the succeeding analysis, it will be useful to shift a given NTU
game in the following way (compare Billera and Bixby (1973b, Proposi-
tion 2.2)): Given a vector c ∈ Rn define the coalitional function (V + c)
via (V + c) (S) = V (S) +
∑
i∈S ci. To represent a shifted game by a market
we have to shift the utility function of agent i by ci. Hence, the shifted
game with coalitional function (V + c) is again a market game. Further-
more, shifting the utility functions of the agents does not change the set of
competitive equilibria. Having this idea of shifting in mind we will focus in
some proofs on games where for every coalition S ∈ N we have CS ⊆ RS++.
To prove the above result Billera and Bixby (1974) introduce the notion
of an induced market that arises from a compactly convexly generated NTU
game.
Definition 2.3 (induced market). Let (N, V ) be a compactly convexly gen-
erated NTU game. The induced market of the game (N, V ) is defined by
EV = (X
i, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N
with for each individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R
2n,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S∈N
(
CS × {−eS}
)]
⊆ R2n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R with ui(xi) = x(1)ii .
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It can easily be seen that this is a market according to the previous def-
inition. Note that in an induced market we have input and output goods.
Initially every consumer owns one unit of his personal input good that can
only be used for the production process. By using his input good the con-
sumer can get utility just from his personal output good. The consumption
and production set are the same for every player. Just the utility functions
and the initial endowments are dependent on the player.
The individual production sets in an induced market are convex cones
and identical for all agents. In this situation taking the sum over production
sets of some agents leads to the same production set. Setting Y =
∑
i∈N Y
i
the condition for feasibility of S-allocations reduces to
∑
i∈S(x
i − ωi) ∈ Y .
Furthermore, for convex-cone technologies the competitive equilibrium prof-
its are equal to 0. This means that in equilibrium we do not have to specify
shares of the production as it usually done in private ownership economies.
Thus, as long as the individual production sets are convex cones and identi-
cal for all agents, we could alternatively consider a model for the production
where we have only one production set for all agents and possible coalitions
without specifying the shares. This model could be used instead of the
production setup in the definition of a market.
In the definition of the induced market it is assumed that every individ-
ual has already the production possibilities, that become available if coali-
tions form, included in his personal production set. This means he already
knows everything that can be produced in the different coalitions, even if
he does not possess the necessary input commodities himself. Starting with
an NTU game the utility allocations a coalition can reach in the derived
induced market are not described by defining production sets individually
for every coalition but by using input and output commodities. A utility al-
location, that is reachable in the NTU game by a coalition S, is reachable in
the induced market by the same coalition if the individuals pool their initial
endowments using “one general” production possibility set. Utility alloca-
tions that require the cooperation of individuals outside the coalition S are
technologically possible but can actually not be produced as the input com-
modities of these individuals are needed. In contrast to this interpretation
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in coalition production economies every coalition has its own production
set.
The main proof of the above theorem from Billera and Bixby (1974)
relies on Billera (1974). In a similar manner as Shapley and Shubik (1969),
he starts with an NTU game, (N, V ), and looks at the induced market of
that game, EV , and afterwards at the NTU game that is induced by the
induced market, VEV . He shows that this game coincides with the totally
balanced cover of the game (N, V ).
The next step is to investigate the existing literature on and to study
the relationship between solution concepts in cooperative game theory, as
the inner core, and those in general equilibrium theory, as the notion of
a competitive equilibrium. Analogously to the TU case of Shapley and
Shubik (1975), Qin (1993) shows that the inner core of an NTU market
game coincides with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the induced
market of that game. Moreover, he shows that for every NTU market game
and for any given point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the
game and further has the given inner core point as its unique competitive
payoff vector. Before we extend the results of Qin (1993) we recall the basic
definitions and state his main results. We start with the definition of the
inner core and the notion of competitive payoff vectors in the context of
NTU market games. Afterwards, we state the main results of Qin (1993)
and comment on the ideas he uses to prove them.
In order to define the inner core we first consider a game that is related
to a compactly generated NTU game, called the λ-transfer game. Fix a
transfer rate vector λ ∈ Rn+. Define vλ(S) = max{λ · u|u ∈ V (S)} as the
maximal sum of weighted utilities that coalition S can achieve given the
transfer rate vector λ. The λ-transfer game, denoted as (N, Vλ), of (N, V )
is defined by taking the same player set N and the coalitional function
Vλ(S) = {u ∈ R
S|λ · u ≤ vλ(S)}. Qin (1994, p.433) gives the following
interpretation of the λ-transfer game: “The idea of the λ-transfer game may
be captured by thinking of each player as representing a different country.
The utilities are measured in different currencies, and the ratios λi/λj are
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the exchange rates between the currencies of i and j.” As for the λ-transfer
game only proportions matter we can assume without loss of generality that
λ is normalized, i.e. λ ∈ ∆ =
{
λ ∈ Rn+|
∑n
i=1 λi = 1
}
. Define the positive
unit simplex by ∆++ =
{
λ ∈ Rn++
∣∣∣∣∑ni=1 λi = 1
}
.
The inner core is a refinement of the core. The core C(V ) of an NTU
game (N, V ) is defined as the set of utility allocations that are achievable
by the grand coalition N such that no coalition S can improve upon this
allocation. Thus,
C(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∀S ⊆ N ∀u′ ∈ V (S) ∃ i ∈ S such that u′i ≤ ui}.
A utility allocation is in the inner core IC(V ) of a compactly generated
game (N, V ) if it is achievable by the grand coalition N and if additionally
there exists a transfer rate vector λ ∈ ∆ such that this utility allocation is
in the core of the λ-transfer game. More precisely:
Definition 2.4 (inner core). The inner core of a compactly generated NTU
game (N, V ) is given by
IC(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∃λ ∈ ∆ such that u ∈ C(Vλ)}.
Qin (1993, Remark 1, p. 337) remarks that if the NTU game is compactly
convexly generated the vectors of supporting weights for a utility vector in
the inner core must all be strictly positive. This can be seen by the following
argument: If for one player i ∈ N λi is equal to 0, then the core of the λ-
transfer game is empty, because player i can improve upon any u ∈ Vλ(N)
by forming the singleton coalition {i}.
Qin (1994) considers sufficient conditions for the inner core to be non-
empty. In particular he shows that a compactly generated NTU game
(N, V ), where V (N) is convex, has a non-empty inner core if it is balanced
with slack, meaning that for balancing weights (γS)S⊆N with γN = 0 we
have
∑
S⊂N
γSV (S) ⊂ intRn V (N) where intRn V (N) is the interior of V (N)
relative to Rn. Other contributions related to the non-emptiness of the inner
core can be found for example in Iehle´ (2004), Bonnisseau and Iehle´ (2007)
or Inoue (2010a).
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We now define a competitive equilibrium for a market E .
Definition 2.5 (competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for a
market E is a tuple
(
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
)
∈ Rℓn+ × R
ℓn
+ × R
ℓ
+
such that
(i)
∑
i∈N xˆ
i =
∑
i∈N(yˆ
i + ωi) (market clearing),
(ii) for all i ∈ N , yˆi solves maxyi∈Y i pˆ · y
i (profit maximization),
(iii) and for all i ∈ N , xˆi is maximal with respect to the utility function ui
in the budget set {xi ∈ X i|pˆ ·xi ≤ pˆ · (ωi+ yˆi)} (utility maximization).
Given a competitive equilibrium its competitive payoff vector is defined
as (ui (xˆi))i∈N .
Qin (1993) investigates the relationship between the inner core of an
NTU market game and the set of competitive payoff vectors of a market
that represents this game. He establishes, following a conjecture of Shapley
and Shubik (1975), the two theorems below analogously to the TU-case of
Shapley and Shubik (1975).
Theorem 2.2 (1, Qin (1993)). The inner core of an NTU market game
coincides with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the induced market by
that game.
Theorem 2.3 (3, Qin (1993)). For every NTU market game and for any
given point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and
further has the given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
To show his first result Qin (1993) uses the notion of the induced mar-
ket of a compactly convexly generated NTU game as it was already used
by Billera and Bixby (1974). It turns out that the set of competitive equi-
librium payoff vectors of the induced market coincides with the inner core.
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For his second result Qin (1993) fixes an inner core point, denoted by u∗ 1,
and chooses one transfer rate vector λ∗u∗ from an associated λ-transfer game.
He modifies the given NTU game by applying a suitable strictly monotonic
transformation on the utility allocations a coalition can reach. In this mod-
ified game the given inner core point u∗ can be strictly separated from the
set of utility allocations the grand coalition can reach (excluding u∗). De-
note the modified game by (N, V¯ ) and the convex compact sets generating
this game by (C¯S)S∈N . A market to prove Theorem 3 of Qin (1993) can be
defined as follows:
Define for all coalitions S ∈ N
A1S =
{(
uS,−eS,−eS,−eS, 0
)
|uS ∈ C¯S
}
⊆ R5n,
A2S =
{(
uS, 0,−eS, 0,−eS
)
|uS ∈ C¯S
}
⊆ R5n,
A3S =
{(
uS, 0, 0,−eS,−eS
)
|uS ∈ C¯S
}
⊆ R5n.
Let EV¯ ,u∗ = (X
i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N be the market with for every individual
i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = X = Rn+ × {(0, 0, 0)} × R
n
+ ⊆ R
5n
+ ,
- the production set Y i = Y = convexcone
[⋃
S⊆N (A
1
S ∪ A
2
S ∪ A
3
S)
]
⊆
R5n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}
)
∈ R5n+ ,
- the utility function ui(xi) = min
{
x
(1)i
i ,
(λ∗
u∗
◦u∗)·x(5)i
λ∗
u∗i
}
with xi = (x(1)i, 0, 0, 0, x(5)i) ∈ X i and x(1)ik is the k
th entry of x(1)i.
Note that, similarly to the induced market, all individuals have the same
consumption sets and the same production sets. The individuals differ in
their initial endowment vectors and their utility functions. Qin (1993) intro-
duces the sets A1S, A
2
S, A
3
S in order to be able to show that the equilibrium
price vector for the 5th group of n goods, pˆ(5), is strictly positive. The ith
consumer obtains utility from the ith component of the vector of the 1st
1Qin (1993) considers only NTU games where for all coalitions S ∈ N the generating
sets satisfy CS ⊆ RS+ and C
S ∩ RS++ 6= ∅ and hence has u
∗ ≫ 0.
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group of n goods and from all the 5th n goods. The dependence of the util-
ity function on all components of the 5th group of n goods is crucial to show
the positiveness of pˆ(5). To prove his result Qin (1993) shows that the mar-
ket EV¯ ,u∗ represents the modified game and that the given inner core point
is the unique competitive payoff vector of this economy. By applying the
inverse strictly monotonic transformation to the utility functions he obtains
his result.
In order to extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed
subsets of the inner core we make use of the fact that for compactly convexly
generated NTU games competitive payoff vectors need necessarily to be in
the inner core. To see this we use a modified version of Proposition 1 from
de Clippel and Minelli (2005).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents and {1, .., ℓ} be the set of com-
modities. Let X i ⊆ Rℓ+ be a convex set containing 0, the consumption set of
agent i. Each individual has a continuous, concave, (weakly) increasing and
locally non-satiated utility function ui : Rℓ+ → R and an initial endowment
vector ωi ∈ Rℓ+ \ {0}. Let Y
i ⊆ Rℓ be a non-empty and closed convex cone,
the production set of agent i’s firm.
Lemma 2.1. Let
(
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
)
be a competitive equilibrium such that
pˆ ·ωi > 0 for all individuals i ∈ N . Then (ui (xˆi))i∈N is in the inner core of
the game induced by the economy.
The proof of Lemma 2.1 can be found in Appendix 2.5.1.
2.3 An extension of the Results of Qin (1993)
In the above two theorems Qin (1993) considers on the one hand the whole
inner core and on the other hand a single point in the inner core. In this
section we extend the results of Qin (1993) by showing a similar result for
closed subsets of the inner core. In the following we consider NTU market
games and closed subsets of the inner core with certain properties. We
want to ensure that for every point in a subset of the inner core, denoted
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by A, of a given NTU market game (N, V ) we can find a normal vector
such that this point is strictly separated from the set V (N) without the
point by the hyperplane using this normal vector. If we assume that the
individual rational part of V (N) is strictly convex, then this property is
satisfied. Moreover, we want to assume that this set of normal vectors,
where each normal vector corresponds to one point of the set A, is bounded
below by a strictly positive vector. This means that the exchange rates,
represented by the normal vectors, within the set A cannot be too extreme.
We make the following definition:
Definition 2.6 (strict positive separability). A pair [(N, V ), A] consisting
of a compactly, convexly generated and totally balanced NTU game (N, V )
and a closed subset A of its inner core satisfies strict positive separability
[SPS] if the following condition holds:
There exists an ε > 0 and a mapping λ : A → ∆++, that associates
to every point x ∈ A a normal vector λ(x) = λx, such that
– every point x ∈ A can be strictly separated from the set V (N) \
{x} using this normal vector λx, i.e.
λx · x > λx · y for all y ∈ V (N) \ {x},
– for all x ∈ A every coordinate of the normal vector λx is strictly
greater than ε, i.e.
λxi > ε for all i ∈ N.
For a pair [(N, V ), A] satisfying strict positive separability there might
exist more than on mapping λ and more than one ε. In the following we
always consider one fixed mapping λ together with one fixed ε satisfying the
conditions. Whenever λ or ε appear we mean the ones we fixed knowing
that we might have chosen different ones.
The assumption of strict positive separability is not as restrictive as it
might appear. It is satisfied for example if the individual rational part of
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V (N) is strictly convex and A is a closed subset of the interior of the inner
core.
Note that from ε < λxi =
λxi
1
≤
λxi
λxj
it follows that
ε < min
i,j∈N
λxi
λxj
for all λx, x ∈ A.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the idea of strict positive separability with some
examples. Assume that we have always two players and that the coalitional
function is given by V ({1}) = V ({2}) = {0}−R+ and V ({1, 2}) is given as
indicated in Figure 2.1.
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
b
0
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
b
b
0
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
b
b
b
b
0
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
b
b
0
V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
0
V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
b
0
Example 4 Example 5 Example 6
Figure 2.1: Examples where SPS is satisfied.
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In Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4 the set V ({1, 2}) is strictly convex. Here the
inner core is given by all points on the efficient boundary without the two
points on the axes. Thus, the NTU game together with every closed subset
of its inner core satisfies SPS. This holds in particular for single points, finite
sets, closed and connected sets or finite unions of closed sets.
Example 5 illustrates the case where the set V ({1, 2}) is generated by
a square and thus the inner core consists only of the corner point. In this
case all the vectors in the strictly positive two-dimensional simplex support
this inner core point. In order to establish SPS we just take one of these
supporting vectors.
In Example 6 the set V ({1, 2}) is generated by a polyhedron. The set A
is a finite set, consisting of some corner points of the polyhedron. For each
of these corner points there exists a strictly positive normal vector that
strictly separates it from V ({1, 2}) without this corner point. The NTU
game (N, V ) and this choice of the set A satisfy SPS.
Figure 2.2 shows some examples that do not satisfy strict positive sep-
arability. As before assume that we have always two players and that the
coalitional function is given by V ({1}) = V ({2}) = {0}−R+ and V ({1, 2})
is given as indicated in Figure 2.2.
V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
b
0
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
b
b
0
Example 7 Example 8
Figure 2.2: Examples where SPS is not satisfied.
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In contrast to Example 6, in Example 7 the set A is chosen to be the line
segment connecting two neighboring corner points of a polyhedron. Hence,
all points in the set A have a common normal vector. Thus, each of this
points cannot be strictly separated from the polyhedron without this point.
Therefore, SPS is not satisfied. In Example 8 each point in the set A can
be strictly separated from V ({1, 2}) without the point. Nevertheless SPS is
not satisfied, as the set A is not closed.
The properties, that we require at this point by considering only [(N, V ), A]
satisfying SPS, are stronger than the properties, that we really need. For
example it is sufficient if we can strictly separate each point in the bound-
ary of A from A without it. Nevertheless, we choose to consider [(N, V ), A]
which satisfy SPS, because they allow for an easy interpretation. After the
presentation of the main results we discuss the question, how this can be
weakened such that cases as in Example 6 are included in our results.
Now we prove the following result:
Theorem 2.4. Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. Then there
exists a market such that this market represents the game (N, V ) and such
that the set of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set A.
We show this result for NTU games where for every coalition S ∈ N we
have CS ⊆ RS++. Due to the remark on page 43 this is not a restriction as we
can shift an arbitrary given NTU game such that this condition is satisfied.
After having applied our results we shift back the obtained economies such
that they represent the original game. Hence, in the following if we consider
an NTU game, we always assume for every coalition S ∈ N that we have
CS ⊆ RS++.
Before beginning with the construction of a market satisfying the prop-
erties mentioned above, we introduce an auxiliary game and some notation.
Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy SPS. Let (N, V˜ ) be the NTU-game defined by
V˜ (S) =


V (S) if S ⊂ N⋂
a∈A
{z ∈ Rn|λa · z ≤ λa · a} if S = N
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where λa is as in the definition of SPS.
Note that to define the game (N, V˜ ) we use for every point of the set a ∈
A just one normal vector that strictly separates this point from V (N)\{a}.
The games (N, V ) and (N, V˜ ) are equal except for the grand coalition N .
For the coalition N we extend the set V (N) depending on the normal vectors
of the set A. For illustration purposes figure 2.3 shows as an example for
two players the sets V ({1, 2}) and V˜ ({1, 2}).
b
b
b
b
V˜ ({1, 2})
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
A
0
Figure 2.3: Example: The sets V ({1, 2}) and V˜ ({1, 2}) for N = {1, 2}.
To describe the relation between (N, V˜ ) and (N, V ) we introduce the
following notation: Let z ∈ V˜ (N) and
t¯z = min
{
t ∈ R+|z − te
N ∈ V (N)
}
.
Define
C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)
∣∣∃t ∈ R+ such that z − teN ∈ CN} .
Then we also have C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)
∣∣z − t¯zeN ∈ CN}.
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The following remark is easy to verify:
Remark.
1. The game (N, V ) is contained in the game (N, V˜ ). This means we
have V (S) ⊆ V˜ (S) for all S ⊆ N .
2. The set C˜N is convex and furthermore, CN ⊆ C˜N .
3. The game (N, V˜ ) is a convexly generated and totally balanced NTU-
game, but it is not compactly generated. In particular we have V˜ (N) 6=
C˜N − Rn+.
4. SPS ensures in particular: If we take x in V (N) outside from A, then
x is in the interior of V˜ (N),
x ∈ V (N) \ A ⇒ x ∈ int
(
V˜ (N)
)
.
The second point of the remark can be seen as follows: Take z1, z2 ∈ C˜
N
and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exist tz1 and tz2 such that z1 − t
z1eN ∈ CN and
z2 − t
z2eN ∈ CN . As CN is per assumption convex α
(
z1 − t
z1eN
)
+ (1 −
α)
(
z2 − t
z2eN
)
∈ CN . As well the set V˜ (N), as an intersection of halfspaces,
is convex and hence αz1 + (1 − α)z2 ∈ V˜ (N). Thus taking t
αz1+(1−α)z2 =
αtz1+(1−α)tz2 shows that (αz1 + (1− α)z2)−t
αz1+(1−α)z2eN = α
(
z1 − t
z1eN
)
+
(1−α)
(
z2 − t
z2eN
)
∈ CN . Therefore, we have αz1+(1−α)z2 ∈ C˜
N . Hence,
C˜N is convex.
Definition 2.7. Define the mapping PA : V˜ (N) −→ V (N) via
PA (x) = x− t¯
xeN .
The following figure illustrates the mapping PA for the example from
figure 2.3.
Note, that if x ∈ V (N) then t¯x = 0 and PA (x) = x.
Remark.
1. The mapping PA is continuous and its image is V (N).
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b
A
u1
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Figure 2.4: Illustration of the mapping PA for the example from figure 2.3.
2. The set C˜N can be written as
C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)
∣∣PA (z) ∈ CN} = P−1A (CN) ,
thus we have PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN .
2.3.1 The basic idea
First, we present an intermediate result, which is interesting in itself. For
[(N, V ), A] satisfying SPS we construct a market such that this market rep-
resents the given game and such that the set of payoff vectors of competitive
equilibria with strictly positive price vectors coincides with the given set A.
In the last chapter we show, how we deal with the case, when the equilibrium
price vectors are not necessarily strictly positive, using a more complicated
market with a similar structure.
Definition 2.8. Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy SPS. Then the market E0V,A is defined
by
E0V,A =
(
X i, Y i, ui, ωi
)
i∈N
with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {0} × R
n
+ × {0} ⊆ R
4n,
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- the production set
Y i = convexcone



 ⋃
S∈N\{N}, cS∈CS
(
cS,−eS, cS,−eS
)
∪

 ⋃
c˜N∈C˜N
(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN
)

 ⊆ R4n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R
with ui
(
(x(1), 0, x(3), 0)
)
= min
(
x
(1)
i , x
(3)
i
)
.
Note that this market has the same consumption and production set for
every individual i ∈ N . The individuals differ in their initial endowment
vectors and their utility functions. There are input and output commodities.
The 2nd group and the 4th group of n commodities are the input commodities
and every individual i ∈ N owns one unit of his personal input commodity
in the ith component of the 2nd and the 4th group of n goods. The 1st
and the 3rd group of n goods are the output commodities, from whose ith
component player i ∈ N obtains utility. The construction of this market is
based on the idea of the induced market in Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin
(1993).
We now need to establish first that the market E0V,A is indeed a market
for the NTU market game (N, V ).
Lemma 2.2. The market E0V,A represents the game (N, V ).
The proof of Lemma 2.2 is inspired by Billera (1974).
Proof.
• As V (S) = CS−RS+ it is enough to show, that for all S ∈ N the payoff
vectors in the set CS can be achieved by coalition S in the market E0V,A.
Let z ∈ CS. We show, that there exists a feasible S-allocation (xi)i∈S
with (yi)i∈S such that u
i (xi) = zi for all i ∈ S.
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Define for i ∈ S the consumption plan
xi =
(
z{i}, 0, z{i}, 0
)
and let
yi =
1
|S|
(
z,−eS, z,−eS
)
be the production plan for all i ∈ S. By the definition of the con-
sumption sets we observe xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ S. With regard to the
production sets for S 6= N we have immediately yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ S.
For S = N note that z ∈ V (N) ⊆ V˜ (N) and thus PA(z) = z. Hence,
we have yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ N . Observe that
∑
i∈S
(
xi − ωi
)
=
∑
i∈S
yi.
Hence, (xi)i∈S is a feasible S-allocation and
ui
(
xi
)
= zi for all i ∈ S.
• Let
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0
)
i∈S
be a feasible S-allocation with
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i
)
i∈S
in the market E0V,A.
The feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS,
∑
i∈S
x¯(3)i,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i
)
.
Each production set is a convex cone of a union of convex sets. Hence,
an arbitrary production plan can be written in the following way:
Choose one suitable element from each of the convex sets and build a
linear combination (with non-negative coefficients) of these elements.
For the 1st and the 2nd group of n commodities we obtain, that there
exist αiR ∈ R+ for all R ∈ N , z
i
R ∈ C
R for all R ∈ N \ {N} and
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z˜iN ∈ C˜
N , such that
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N\{N}
αiR
(
ziR,−e
R
)
+ αiN
(
PA
(
z˜iN
)
,−eN
)
.
As PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN there exists ziN ∈ C
N such that PA (z˜
i
N) = z
i
N and
hence we have
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N
αiR
(
ziR,−e
R
)
.
As feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
, for the 2nd
group of n coordinates we have that
eS =
∑
i∈S
∑
R∈N
αiRe
R
=
∑
R∈N
(∑
i∈S
αiR
)
eR.
Thus αiR > 0 implies R ⊆ S and if we define α (R) =
∑
i∈S
αiR, then
(α (R))R⊆S is a balanced family for the coalition S. Looking at the 1
st
group of n coordinates we have
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i =
∑
R⊆S
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
=
∑
{R⊆S|α(R)>0}
α(R)
(
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
)
.
Since CR is convex we have
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRzR ∈ C
R
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and hence, using totally balancedness,
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S).
From the definition of the utility function we obtain ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0
)
≤
x¯
(1)i
i . Since
(
x¯
(1)i
i
)
i∈S
≤
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S) we have by the S-comprehensiveness
of V (S) that
(
ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0
))
i∈S
∈ V (S).
We verify that the payoff vectors in the set A are indeed competitive
payoff vectors of the market E0V,A:
Proposition 2.1. Every point in the set A is equilibrium payoff vector of
the market E0V,A.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and λa ∈ ∆ be a normal vector such that a is in the core
of the λa-transfer game. We know that λa is strictly positive (compare the
remark on page 46). By the assumption that CN ⊆ RN++ we know that a is
strictly positive. To prove the proposition, we show that the consumption
and production plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
a{i}, 0, a{i}, 0
))
i∈N
and (
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
a,−eN , a,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ = (λa, λa ◦ a, λa, λa ◦ a)
constitute a competitive equilibrium in the market E0V,A.
First note that as PA(a) = a we have yˆ
i ∈ Y i for all i ∈ N . According
to the remark above, the price system pˆ is strictly positive. As we have a
convex-cone-technology maximum profits are zero. We observe
pˆ · yˆi =
1
n
(
λa · a− (λa ◦ a) · eN + λa · a− (λa ◦ a) · eN
)
= 0.
Hence, the production plan yˆi is profit maximizing.
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As we have a min-type or Leontief utility function, it is optimal for each
agent i to spend his budget in a way such that xˆ
(1)i
i = xˆ
(3)i
i and that he does
not consume anything of the other commodities. Furthermore, he has to
spend all his budget, because the preferences are locally non-satiated and
continuous. The budget constraint is satisfied with equality,
pˆ · xˆi = λa ·
(
a{i} + a{i}
)
= (λa ◦ a) ·
(
e{i} + e{i}
)
= pˆ · ωi
and
xˆ(1)i = a{i} = xˆ(3)i.
Hence, the consumption vector xˆi is utility maximizing on the budget set of
agent i.
Furthermore, the market clearing condition
∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
i∈N
ωi +
∑
i∈N
yˆi
is satisfied.
Thus, we have found a competitive equilibrium with equilibrium payoff vec-
tor (
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
= a.
Looking again at the competitive equilibrium price vectors in the proof
of Proposition 2.1 note: For a competitive equilibrium with payoff vector
a ∈ A the equilibrium price vector for the 1st (respectively 3rd) group of
n goods, the output goods, is the normal vector λa separating the point a
from V (N). The transfer rate vectors coincide with the equilibrium prices
for the output goods of the market. The input goods are priced by λa ◦
a. This is the transfer rate vector weighted by the according point of the
set A. Interpreted differently: The input goods are first weighted by the
point a of the set A and afterwards they are priced by the transfer rate
vector λa. The relationship of the transfer rate vectors and the prices of
competitive equilibria was observed in several publications discussing the
relation between NTU games and economies. Examples are Shubik (1985),
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Shapley (1987), Trockel (1996) and Qin (1993). Shapley (1987, p. 192)
states: “There is a strong analogy though no formal equivalence that we
know of between the comparison weights that we must introduce in order
to obtain a feasible transfer value and the prices in a competitive market.”
Here we obtain a formal equivalence for the prices of the output goods and
an indirect link for the prices of the input goods. Trockel (1996) investigated
this equivalence for NTU bargaining games and Qin (1993) obtained very
similar equilibrium prices as we have here.
Next, we consider the utility allocations outside the set A. Using Lemma
2.1 it is sufficient to consider those vectors in the inner core.
Proposition 2.2. Any payoff vector of a competitive equilibrium of the
market E0V,A with a strictly positive equilibrium price vector is an element of
the set A.
Proof. Lemma 2.1 ensures that every competitive equilibrium payoff vector
is in the inner core. Assume that there exists a competitive equilibrium
((xi)i∈N , (y
i)i∈N , p) such that its payoff vector (u
i(xi))i∈N is in the inner
core but not in the set A and such that the equilibrium price vector is
strictly positive, p≫ 0.
Then, there exists an element cN in the inner core outside A such that
ui(xi) = cNi for all player i = 1, ..., n. Let x
i = (x(1)i, x(2)i, x(3)i, x(4)i). By
the definition of the consumption set we know x(2)i = x(4)i = 0 and by the
definition of the utility function we obtain x
(1)i
i ≥ c
N
i and x
(3)i
i ≥ c
N
i for all
i = 1, ..., n.
Claim 1: From the utility maximization and the strict positivity of the price
vector it follows that we need to have
x
(1)i
i = c
N
i = x
(3)i
i .
The proof of Claim 1 can be found in Appendix 2.5.2.
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We get by the market clearing condition:
y =
∑
i∈N
(
xi − ωi
)
=
(
cN ,−eN , cN ,−eN
)
.
But the production plan y = (cN ,−eN , cN ,−eN ) is not profit maximizing.2
To see this notice the following: As cN is in the inner core but outside
the set A there exists a c˜N with PA
(
c˜N
)
= cN and c˜N ≫ cN . Consider the
production plan
(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN
)
. Looking at the profits and using
the strict positivity of the price vector we observe
p · y = p(1) · cN − p(2) · eN + p(3) · cN − p(4) · eN
< p(1) · cN − p(2) · eN + p(3) · c˜N − p(4) · eN
= p(1) · PA
(
c˜N
)
− p(2) · eN + p(3) · c˜N − p(4) · eN
≤ 0.
Thus, we have found a production plan that has strictly higher profits than
y. This is a contradiction, since y needs to be profit maximizing.
It follows that with strictly positive price vectors the allocations outside
the set A but in the inner core cannot be competitive equilibrium payoff
vectors.
Combining the two propositions above we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 2.5. Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. The set
of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria with a strictly positive equilibrium
price vector of the market E0V,A coincides with the set A.
Positive equilibrium price vectors are required to obtain the above
results
Up to now we always considered competitive equilibria with only strictly
positive equilibrium price vectors. This was indeed necessary. If we also
2Since the individual production sets are convex cones, to check profit maximization it is
sufficient to consider the joint production plans. We have
∑n
i=1 Y
i = Y j for any j ∈ N .
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allow for price vectors that are not strictly positive, then we can construct
a competitive equilibrium with competitive payoff vectors outside the given
set A. To see this fix a /∈ A but in the inner core. Then there exists a˜ ∈ C˜N
such that PA (a˜) = a and a˜≫ a. Consider
xˆi =
(
(PA (a˜))
{i} , 0, a˜{i}, 0
)
=
(
a{i}, 0, a˜{i}, 0
)
for all i ∈ N,
yˆi =
(
1
n
(
PA (a˜) ,−e
N , a˜,−eN
))
=
(
1
n
(
a,−eN , a˜,−eN
))
for all i ∈ N,
pˆ = (λa, λa ◦ a, 0, 0)
where λa is one normal vector from a λa-transfer game and (PA (a˜))
{i}
is the vector that has as its ith coordinate the ith coordinate of PA (a˜) and
zero coordinates otherwise. Analogously define a˜{i}.
We show that ((xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ) constitutes a competitive equilibrium
with the payoff vector a /∈ A.
• First note that ui(xˆi) = min {ai, a˜i} = ai, since we have a˜≫ a.
• For the profit maximization we obtain
pˆ · yˆi =
1
n
(
λa · a− (λa ◦ a) · eN
)
= 0.
Since the maximum profits are zero, yˆi is profit maximizing.
• For the utility maximization we obtain that the budget constraint is
satisfied with equality,
pˆ · xˆi = λa · a{i} = (λa ◦ a) · e{i} = pˆ · ωi,
and furthermore individual i spends all his budget for the ith commod-
ity in the 1st group of n goods. Since the prices are equal to zero for
the 3rd and 4th group of n goods he can consume xˆ
(3)i
i = a˜i without
using any of his budget. Thus, xˆi is utility maximizing.
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• Moreover, the market clearing condition is satisfied
∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
i∈N
ωi +
∑
i∈N
yˆi.
Thus, we have found a competitive equilibrium with equilibrium payoff
vector (
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
= a /∈ A.
2.3.2 The main results
In order to deal with the general case without assuming the strict positiv-
ity of price vectors, we modify the market from the previous section in an
appropriate way. This modification allows us to show, that the prices of
the 3rd group of n commodities are strictly positive, p(3) ≫ 0. For the rest
of this section let [(N, V ), A] satisfy SPS. To simplify the notation of the
market, we introduce some sets before:
For the definition of the production sets define for all coalitions S ∈
N \ {N}
A1S =
{(
cS,−eS, cS,−eS,−eS
)
|cS ∈ CS
}
,
A2S =
{(
cS, 0, cS,−eS, 0
)
|cS ∈ CS
}
,
A3S =
{(
cS, 0, cS, 0,−eS
)
|cS ∈ CS
}
and for the grand coalition N define
A1N =
{(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN ,−eN
)
|c˜N ∈ C˜N
}
,
A2N =
{(
PA
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N ,−eN , 0
)
|c˜N ∈ C˜N
}
,
A3N =
{(
PA
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N , 0,−eN
)
|c˜N ∈ C˜N
}
.
In order to obtain the result without the assumption of strictly positive
price vectors, we modify the utility functions, the production and consump-
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tion sets. The utility functions do not depend anymore only on the two
personal output commodities but also on the whole second group of output
commodities. For that we add ‘a little bit’ of utility from the other players
output goods. This ‘little bit’ is described by using the ε > 0 from the
definition of SPS.
Definition 2.9 (induced A-market). Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy strict positive
separability. Let ε > 0 such that ε < mini,j∈N
λai
λaj
for all a ∈ A. The induced
A-market of the game (N, V ) and the set A is defined by
EV,A,ε = (X
i, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N
with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {0} × R
n
+ × {0} × {0} ⊆ R
5n,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S∈N (A
1
S ∪ A
2
S ∪ A
3
S)
]
⊆ R5n
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R with
ui
(
x(1), 0, x(3), 0, 0
)
= min
(
x
(1)
i , x
(3)
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x
(3)
j
)
.
Note that this market is very similar to the market we defined in the
previous section. We change the definition of the production and consump-
tion sets slightly by introducing a further input commodity. Moreover, the
utility functions here depend on all coordinates of the 3rd group of n goods.
Having defined the induced A-market we prove the following theorem,
which is the main result of this paper:
Theorem 2.6. Let [(N, V ), A] satisfy strict positive separability. Then there
exists a market such that this market represents the game (N, V ) and such
that the set of competitive payoff vectors of this market is the set A.
To prove the above theorem we use the induced A-market EV,A,ε as de-
fined before. We divide the proof of this Theorem into 3 parts: First we
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show, that EV,A,ε represents the game (N, V ), in the second part we prove,
that every vector in the set A is a competitive payoff vector, and in the
third part we show that competitive payoff vectors always belong to the set
A.
Lemma 2.3. The induced A-market EV,A,ε represents the game (N, V ).
The proof of Lemma 2.3 is inspired by Billera (1974).
Proof.
• As V (S) = CS − RS+ it is enough to show, that the payoffs in the set
CS can be achieved by coalition S in the market EV,A,ε. Let z ∈ C
S.
We show, that there exists a feasible S-allocation (xi)i∈S with (y
i)i∈S
such that ui (xi) = zi for all i ∈ S.
Define for i ∈ S the consumption plan
xi =
(
z{i}, 0, z{i}, 0, 0
)
and let
yi =
1
|S|
(
z,−eS, z,−eS,−eS
)
be the production plan for all i ∈ S. By the definition of the con-
sumption sets we observe xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ S. With regard to the
production sets for S 6= N we have immediately yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ S.
For S = N note that z ∈ V (N) ⊆ V˜ (N) and thus PA(z) = z. Hence,
we have yi ∈ Y i for all i ∈ N . Observe that
∑
i∈S
(
xi − ωi
)
=
∑
i∈S
yi.
Hence, (xi)i∈S is a feasible S-allocation and
ui
(
xi
)
= zi for all i ∈ S.
• Let
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0, 0
)
i∈S
be a feasible S-allocation with
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i, y¯(5)i
)
i∈S
in the market EV,A,ε.
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The feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS,
∑
i∈S
x¯(3)i,−eS,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i, y¯(3)i, y¯(4)i, y¯(5)i
)
.
Each production set is a convex cone of a union of convex sets. Hence,
an arbitrary production plan can be written in the following way:
Choose one suitable element from each of the convex sets and build a
linear combination (with non-negative coefficients) of these elements.
For the 1st and the 2nd group of n commodities we obtain, that there
exist αiR ∈ R+ for all R ∈ N , z
i
R ∈ C
R for all R ∈ N \ {N} and
z˜iN ∈ C˜
N , such that
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N\{N}
αiR
(
ziR,−e
R
)
+ αiN
(
PA
(
z˜iN
)
,−eN
)
.
As PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN there exists ziN ∈ C
N such that PA (z˜
i
N) = z
i
N and
hence we have
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
=
∑
R∈N
αiR
(
ziR,−e
R
)
.
As feasibility implies
(∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i,−eS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
y¯(1)i, y¯(2)i
)
, for the 2nd
group of n coordinates we have that
eS =
∑
i∈S
∑
R∈N
αiRe
R
=
∑
R∈N
(∑
i∈S
αiR
)
eR.
Thus αiR > 0 implies R ⊆ S and if we define α (R) =
∑
i∈S
αiR, then
(α (R))R⊆S is a balanced family for the coalition S. Looking at the 1
st
group of n coordinates we have
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∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i =
∑
R⊆S
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
=
∑
{R⊆S|α(R)>0}
α(R)
(
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRz
i
R
)
.
Since CR is convex we have
1
α (R)
∑
i∈S
αiRzR ∈ C
R
and hence, using totally balancedness,
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S).
From the definition of the utility function we obtain ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0, 0
)
≤
x¯
(1)i
i . Since
(
x¯
(1)i
i
)
i∈S
≤
∑
i∈S
x¯(1)i ∈ V (S) we have by the S-comprehensiveness
of V (S) that
(
ui
(
x¯(1)i, 0, x¯(3)i, 0, 0
))
i∈S
∈ V (S).
Proposition 2.3. Every point in A is an equilibrium payoff vector of the
market EV,A,ε.
Proof. The above proposition holds by an argument similar to the one used
in the proof of Proposition 2.1. Let a ∈ A and λa ∈ ∆ an associated normal
vector. We know that λa is strictly positive (compare the remark on page
46). Note that the consumption and production plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
a{i}, 0, a{i}, 0, 0
))
i∈N
and (
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
a,−eN , a,−eN ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λa,
2
3
(λa ◦ a) , λa,
2
3
(λa ◦ a) ,
2
3
(λa ◦ a)
)
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constitute a competitive equilibrium in the market EV,A,ε. The equilibrium
price vector is strictly positive since a and λa are strictly positive.
As we have a convex-cone-technology maximum profits are zero. We
observe
pˆ·yˆi =
1
n
(
λa · a−
2
3
(λa ◦ a) · eN + λa · a−
2
3
(λa ◦ a) · eN −
2
3
(λa ◦ a) · eN
)
= 0.
Hence, the production plan yˆi is profit maximizing.
Next we show that the consumption vector xi is utility maximizing on
the budget set of agent i.
• First notice that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality,
pˆ · xˆi = λa ·
(
a{i} + a{i}
)
=
2
3
(λa ◦ a) ·
(
e{i} + e{i} + e{i}
)
= pˆ · ωi.
• Second the consumption vector of agent i satisfies
xˆ
(1)i
i = xˆ
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
xˆ
(3)i
j .
This means agent i consumes in a way such that he receives the “same
amount of utility” from the 1st group of n goods and the 3rd group of
n goods. For an agent with a min-type or Leontief utility function it
is a necessary condition for utility maximization to consume in such
a way (as long as we have strictly positive prices). This can be seen
by similar arguments like in the proof of Claim 1.
• Third, it remains to check that xˆi is indeed utility maximizing for
agent i on his budget set. Hereby, the crucial point to see is, that
agent i only consumes his personal output goods, and not the output
goods of the other agents. In particular, this means for the 3rd group
of n commodities xˆ
(3)i
j = 0 for j 6= i.
First look at the consumption of the 3rd group of n goods when half
of the wealth, λa · a{i}, is used for these goods.
If agent i spends the wealth only for his personal output commodity,
he consumes xˆ(3)i = a{i}. Then we have pˆ(3) · xˆ(3)i = λa · a{i}. Suppose
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now agent i changes his consumption plan for the 3rd group of n com-
modities to a plan x˜(3)i, where he consumes as well one of the other
agents output goods, meaning x˜
(3)i
j > 0 for one j 6= i. To do this agent
i needs to decrease the consumption in his personal output good and
hence xˆ
(3)i
i > x˜
(3)i
i . Set δ = xˆ
(3)i
i − x˜
(3)i
i . Then this δ he consumes less
gives him an available budget of λai δ, that he can now use to spend
for the other agents commodity j. If agent i now spends λai δ for good
j, he can purchase
λai
λaj
δ units of good j which gives him an additional
level of “utility” in good j of the 3rd group of n goods.
Look at
xˆ
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
xˆ
(3)i
j −
(
x˜
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x˜
(3)i
j
)
= xˆ
(3)i
i −
(
xˆ
(3)i
i − δ + ε
λai
λaj
· δ
)
= δ − ε
λai
λaj
· δ
= δ
(
1− ε
λai
λaj
)
.
The above expression is positive since ε <
λaj
λai
for all i, j ∈ N and hence
ε
λai
λaj
<
λaj
λai
λai
λaj
= 1. Thus we have
xˆ
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
xˆ
(3)i
j > x˜
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x˜
(3)i
j .
The potential loss of utility from consuming less of his personal output
commodity is higher than the potential gain from consuming agent j’s
output commodity given a fixed wealth.
A similar argument also holds true, when agent i changes the con-
sumption in a way such that he consumes output goods of several
other agents.
Thus agent i cannot increase his utility by changing his consumption
plan for the 3rd group of n commodities from xˆ(3)i to x˜(3)i and con-
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suming output commodities of the other agents j 6= i instead of his
own output commodities.
Now it is easy to see, that spending half of the total wealth for each
of the two groups of output commodities leads to the same amount of
utility in both arguments of the min-type utility function and is hence
utility maximizing.
Furthermore, the market clearing condition
∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
i∈N
ωi +
∑
i∈N
yˆi
is satisfied.
Thus, we have found a competitive equilibrium with equilibrium payoff vec-
tor (
ui
(
xˆi
))
i∈N
= a.
In the above proof the competitive equilibrium price vectors are linked
to the transfer rate vectors of points in the set A similarly as in the proof of
Proposition 2.1. The output goods are directly priced by the transfer rate
vectors and the input goods are priced by the transfer rate vectors weighted
by the according point of the set A (multiplied by 2
3
).
It remains to show, that vectors not belonging to the set A cannot be
competitive payoff vectors. The crucial point is to show, that p(3) is strictly
positive.
Lemma 2.4. Let ((xi)i∈N , (y
i)i∈N , p) be any competitive equilibrium for the
induced A-market. Then p(3) is strictly positive.
Proof. Let ((xi)i∈N , (y
i)i∈N , p) be a competitive equilibrium for the induced
A-market. By the market clearing condition we have
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
yi +
(
0, eN , 0, eN , eN
)
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and by profit maximization p · yi = 0 for all i ∈ N . By the definition of the
production set for each i ∈ N there exist γi1S , γ
i2
S , γ
i3
S ≥ 0 for all S ∈ N ,
ui1S , u
i2
S , u
i3
S ∈ C
S for all S ∈ N \ {N} and u˜i1N , u˜
i2
N , u˜
i3
N ∈ C˜
N such that
yi =
∑
S∈N\{N}
(
3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −γ
i1
S e
S,
3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −
(
γi1S + γ
i2
S
)
eS, −
(
γi1S + γ
i3
S
)
eS
)
+
(
3∑
j=1
γijNPA
(
u˜ijN
)
, −γi1Ne
N ,
3∑
j=1
γijN u˜
ij
N , −
(
γi1N + γ
i2
N
)
eN , −
(
γi1N + γ
i3
N
)
eN
)
.
As PA
(
C˜N
)
= CN there exist uijN ∈ C
N such that PA
(
u˜ijN
)
= uijN for
j = 1, 2, 3. Thus, we have for all i ∈ N
yi =
∑
S∈N\{N}
(
3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −γ
i1
S e
S,
3∑
j=1
γijS u
ij
S , −
(
γi1S + γ
i2
S
)
eS, −
(
γi1S + γ
i3
S
)
eS
)
+
(
3∑
j=1
γijNu
ij
N , −γ
i1
Ne
N ,
3∑
j=1
γijN u˜
ij
N , −
(
γi1N + γ
i2
N
)
eN , −
(
γi1N + γ
i3
N
)
eN
)
.
By the definition of the consumption set we need to have x(2)i = x(4)i =
x(5)i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Hence, for all i ∈ N , we obtain, using the market
clearing condition and the definition of the production sets, for all coalitions
S ∈ N
∑
T⊆N
γi1T e
T = eS,
∑
T⊆N
(
γi1T + γ
i2
T
)
eT = eS,
∑
T⊆N
(
γi1T + γ
i3
T
)
eT = eS.
It follows that γi2S = γ
i3
S = 0 for all i ∈ N and for all S ∈ N and that for
some i ∈ N and some S ∈ N we have γi1S > 0.
Suppose now, that p
(3)
i = 0 for at least one i ∈ N . We show, that this leads
to a contradiction.
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First observe: If p
(3)
i = 0 for one i ∈ N , then p
(3)
k = 0 for all k ∈ N .
To see this suppose p
(3)
k > 0 for some k ∈ N . For every individual
j ∈ N the consumption bundle xj maximizes his utility function over
his budget set {xˆj ∈ Xj|p · xˆj ≤ p · ωj}. This implies, if p(3)i = 0 that
agent j does not consume any good that has a positive price. If he did
so, this would decrease his available budget whereas he can reach the
same utility from consuming good i that is for free. Precisely p
(3)
i = 0
implies x
(3)j
k = 0 for all j ∈ N and for all k ∈ N such that k 6= i and
p
(3)
k > 0.
However, the market clearing condition and the definition of the pro-
duction set require
∑
j∈N
x(3)j =
∑
S∈N\{N}
γi1S u
i1
S + γ
i1
N u˜
i1
N ≫ 0,
since ui1S ∈ C
S ⊆ RS++ and u˜
i1
N ≥ u
i1
N ∈ C
N ⊆ RN++. Hence, we obtain
a contradiction and thus p(3) = 0.
Since uj(xˇj) > uj(x¯j) whenever xˇ
(1)j
j > x¯
(1)j
j and xˇ
(3)j > x¯(3)j, it follows
from p(3) = 0 that p
(1)
j must be positive. This holds for all j ∈ N , thus
p(1) ≫ 0.
Since CS ⊆ RS++, it follows that p
(1) · ui1S > 0. Since the maximal profits are
equal to zero because of the convex-cone-technology, it must be true that
p(1) · ui1S − p
(2) · eS − p(4) · eS − p(5) · eS = 0. (⋆)
For any j ∈ N choose u ∈ C{j} ∩ R{j}++ and γ > 0. Then
(
γu, 0, γu,−γe{j}, 0
)
∈ Y j
and
p ·
(
γu, 0, γu,−γe{j}, 0
)
= γ
(
p
(1)
j u− p
(4)
j
)
.
Since p(1) ≫ 0, p(4)j must be positive, because otherwise this would contradict
the fact, that maximal profits are 0. Thus, p(4) ≫ 0. Similarly p(5) ≫ 0.
Therefore, from the equation (⋆) above we obtain using −p(5) · eS < 0 and
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−p(2) · eS ≤ 0
p(1) · ui1S − p
(4) · eS > 0.
Hence, we have
p ·
(
ui1S , 0, u
i1
S ,−e
S, 0
)
= p(1) ·ui1S +p
(3) ·ui1S −p
(4) ·eS = p(1) ·ui1S −p
(4) ·eS > 0.
But
(
ui1S , 0, u
i1
S ,−e
S, 0
)
∈ Y i as it is of the form as points in the set A2S.
This is a contradiction to the fact, that the maximal profits are zero. Thus
p(3) ≫ 0.
We use this result to show the remaining Proposition that completes the
proof of the theorem:
Proposition 2.4. Any payoff vector of a competitive equilibrium of the
market EV,A,ε is an element of the set A.
Proof. Suppose there exists a competitive equilibrium
(
(xi)i∈N (y
i)i∈N , p
)
,
such that (ui (xi))i∈N = c
N with cN /∈ A.
From Lemma 2.1 we know that cN is in the inner core.
That Lemma 2.1 is applicable can be seen as follows: We know that
p ·ωi > 0. Otherwise agent i would have a budget of 0 and we needed
to have p
(2)
i = p
(4)
i = p
(5)
i = 0. This would mean that the production
plan
(
c{i},−e{i}, c{i},−e{i},−e{i}
)
with c{i} ∈ C{i} has strictly positive
profits. This would be a contradiction. Thus, for all individuals i ∈ N
we have p · ωi > 0.
By Lemma 2.4 we know p(3) ≫ 0. Furthermore we know
y =
∑
i∈N
yi =
(
PA
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN ,−eN
)
for some c˜N ∈ C˜N satisfying PA
(
c˜N
)
= cN as any other production would
contradict the market clearing condition in the 1st group of n coordinates.
From the profit maximization we know that c˜N has to be chosen on the
boundary of C˜(N) and hence, since cN /∈ A, we have c˜N ≫ cN . By the
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market clearing condition (for the 3rd group of n coordinates) we have
∑
i∈N
x(3)i = c˜N . (⋆⋆)
Furthermore, by utility maximization we obtain
cNi = x
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x
(3)i
j . (⋆ ⋆ ⋆)
As cN ≪ c˜N , equation (⋆ ⋆ ⋆) implies, that we have x(3)ii < c˜
N
i for all i ∈ N .
Hence, for every i ∈ N we have
∑
j 6=i x
(3)j
i > 0. Thus, for every i ∈ N
there exists j 6= i satisfying x(3)ji > 0. Define a mapping M : N −→ N in
the following way: Every i ∈ N is mapped to one j 6= i satisfying x(3)ji > 0.
Then, we can find k ∈ N and t ∈ N such that M t(k) = k.
We use these results to show some constraints on the equilibrium prices:
As x
(3)M(k)
k > 0, the utility maximization of agent M(k) implies, that we
have p
(3)
k ≤ εp
(3)
M(k). Otherwise, agent M(k) would not consume good k, but
instead more of goodM(k). In the same way, we can show similar equations
for other prices and obtain
p
(3)
k ≤ εp
(3)
M(k) ≤ ε
2p
(3)
M2(k) ≤ ... ≤ ε
tp
(3)
Mt(k) = ε
tp
(3)
k .
But εt < 1. This is a contradiction.
As already mentioned before, assuming SPS is more restrictive than
actually needed. Requiring the strict separation property for all points in
the set A can be weakened to requiring it only for the boundary points
of the set A. In fact, we need for the construction of the auxiliary game
(N, V˜ ) that outside the set A the efficient boundary is strictly enlarged.
This means the property that if we take x ∈ V (N) \ A, then x being in
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the interior of V˜ (N) is the crucial property to eliminate equilibria with a
payoff vector outside the set A. Using this weaker assumption allows a
choice of the set A as in Example 7. An example, where even this weaker
version of the strict positive separability property is violated, and where our
approach cannot be applied can be found in Figure 2.5. Assume as before
that we have always two players and that the coalitional function is given by
V ({1}) = V ({2}) = {0} −R+ and V ({1, 2}) is given as indicated in Figure
2.5.
V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
b
0
V ({1, 2})
A
u2
u1
b
b
b
b
0
Example 7 Example 9
Figure 2.5: Examples where SPS is not satisfied.
In contrast to Example 7, in Example 8 the set A is chosen in such a
way that it is a closed interval of a line segment connecting two neighboring
corner points, but not the whole line segment. Because of the polyhedral
structure none of the points in the set A can be strictly separated from the
set V ({1, 2}) without the point.
Another important aspect of our result is the fact that the induced A-
market is not determined uniquely. We have some freedom in different
aspects of our construction and obtain a whole class of markets, that can
be used to prove our main theorem:
• First, to define the induced A-market we use the auxiliary NTU game
(N, V˜ ) where we enlarge the given NTU game (N, V ). For this en-
largement we use for every inner core point one of its normal vectors.
This normal vector is not always unique.
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• Second, for the auxiliary game (N, V˜ ) we define the mapping PA which
can be chosen in different ways. The important property is that for
the points outside the given subset of the inner core, A, we have
PA(z) ≫ z for all z ∈ IC(A) \ A. Moreover, for points in the given
set A we require PA(z) = z for all z ∈ A.
• Third, we add to the utility function of the induced A-market an
ε-term, that needs to be between certain bounds and hence is not
determined uniquely. Moreover, we can choose different ε for different
players.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have continued the work of Shapley and Shubik (1975)
and Qin (1993) to investigate competitive payoff vectors of markets that
represent a cooperative game and their relation to solution concepts for
cooperative games.
We extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets
of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct the induced
A-market depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This market
represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoff vectors
of competitive equilibria. More precisely, inspired by the construction of
the induced market of Billera and Bixby (1974) and by the markets that
Qin (1993) uses to prove his two main results, we define a market in an
appropriate way to generalize the results of Qin (1993) to a large class
of closed subsets of the inner core. It turns out that this market is not
determined uniquely and thus we obtain a whole class of markets that has
the given closed subset of the inner core as the set of payoff vectors of
competitive equilibria.
In the literature it was already known that one game can be represented
by several markets, see Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993). Our work
confirms that going from NTU games to markets some structural informa-
tion is added that is not present in the NTU game. To a given NTU market
game we can associate a huge class of markets that represents the NTU
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game. In particular, by choosing the structure, that we add, we can control
the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria.
Another point of view on our results is to analyze situations where we
start with given markets and consider the induced games. Looking at com-
petitive equilibria and how they appear in the game, we observe that almost
everything is possible. Depending on the specific market the set of compet-
itive equilibrium payoff vectors might fill up the whole inner core or be
almost any closed subset, in particular any single point. Hence, our result
demonstrates that we can not expect to observe more game theoretic prop-
erties of competitive equilibria than knowing that competitive payoffs are
in the inner core. Only by imposing additional structural assumptions on
the markets, for example restricting the class of utility functions, we may
observe additional game theoretic properties.
We establish a link between closed subsets of the inner core and compet-
itive payoffs of certain economies. Extending the results of Qin (1993) to
closed subsets of the inner core means in particular to establish a link for all
solution concepts selecting closed subsets of the inner core. Therefore, our
results can be seen as a market foundation of game theoretic solution con-
cepts that select closed subsets of the inner core. For the particular class
of bargaining games a more precise presentation of the idea of a market
foundation can be found in Trockel (1996, 2005) and Brangewitz and Gamp
(2011b).
The result presented here includes the result of Qin (1993) for a single
point in the inner core. This holds also in a very general setup by using
monotone transformations of utilities in the same way as it was done in Qin
(1993). Nevertheless, if we consider closed subsets of the inner core that
contain more than a single point, the idea to transform the utilities seems
not to work. Due to this fact we assume some separation properties on the
game and the given closed subset of its inner core.
Furthermore, by investigating the NTU case we realized that a simple
generalization of the approach of Shapley and Shubik (1975) in the frame-
work of Qin (1993) does not work and we need to stay closer to the results
on NTU games. More precisely, changing the utility function in the market,
that Qin (1993) uses to prove his second result, in analogy to the TU case
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of Shapley and Shubik (1975) to
ui(xi) = min
{
x
(1)i
i ,min
u∗∈A
{(
λu
∗
◦ u∗
)
· x(5)i
λu
∗
i
}}
does not lead to markets with the desired properties.
Having our result in mind there remains the open question if we can fur-
ther weaken our assumptions such that the results can be proved for more
general cases. Another interesting related line of research is to continue to
look at the class of games that are linked to coalition production economies
as analyzed by Inoue (2010b). Given a balanced NTU game Inoue (2010b)
defines a coalition production economy such that this economy represents
the game and has moreover the whole inner core as the set of competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors. It remains an open question if one can find anal-
ogously to Qin (1993) and to this work a coalition production economy such
that one inner core point or a certain subset of the inner core are competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors in this coalition production economy. Moreover,
it is interesting to compare the set of competitive equilibrium allocations
of different market representations of a given NTU market game. Does
there exist a general and more simple method to obtain desired competitive
payoffs? Can we characterize a class of NTU games where this is possible?
What happens if we restrict our attention for example to bargaining games?
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
For the proof of Lemma 2.1 we follow the idea of de Clippel and Minelli
(2005).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N and (yˆ
i)i∈N be a competitive equilibrium allocation at a
price pˆ ∈ Rℓ+ \ {0}. For each individual i ∈ N define the set
C i =
{
(u,m) ∈ R2|∃zi ∈ X i : u ≤ ui
(
zi
)
− ui
(
xˆi
)
,m ≤ pˆ ·
(
ωi + yˆi − zi
)}
.
By the concavity of ui, this set is convex. On the other hand, C i∩R2++ =
∅, as xˆi is optimal for individual i in his budget set.
Suppose (u,m) ∈ C i and (u,m) ≫ 0, then there exists zi ∈ X i with
u(xˆi) < u(zi) and pˆ ·zi < pˆ · (ωi+ yˆi) which means zi gives individual i
a higher utility as xˆi and is affordable under the price system pˆ. This
is in contradiction to the optimality of xˆi.
By the separating hyperplane theorem there exists a non-zero, non-negative
vector (αi, βi) ∈ R2+ such that we can separate 0 from C
i and obtain
αiui
(
xˆi
)
≥ αiui
(
zi
)
− βipˆ ·
(
zi − ωi − yˆi
)
for all zi ∈ X i.
As pˆ · ωi > 0, it follows from the above inequality that we have αi > 0.
To see this suppose αi = 0 (βi > 0). Then, as in equilibrium pˆ · yˆi = 0,
we obtain from the above inequality
0 ≤ pˆ ·
(
zi − ωi − yˆi
)
for all zi ∈ X i,
which is not true, as 0 ∈ X i and pˆ · yˆi = 0. Thus αi > 0.
We can assume αi = 1 without the loss of generality. Moreover, monotonic-
ity and locally non-satiation of the utility function imply that βi > 0. Let
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λi = 1
βi
. Summing up over all i ∈ S we obtain
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
xˆi
)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
zi
)
− pˆ ·
∑
i∈S
(
zi − ωi − yˆi
)
for all S ⊆ N and for all zi ∈ Rℓ+ with i ∈ S.
If a coalition S could λ-improve on x with (x¯i)i∈S (with the production
plan y¯i ∈ Y i), then the previous inequality would be violated, because we
have, due to feasibility,
∑
i∈S
(
x¯i − ωi − y¯i
)
≤ 0
and thus we obtain a contradiction by
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
>
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
xˆi
)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
− pˆ ·
∑
i∈S
(
x¯i − ωi − yˆi
)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
− pˆ ·
∑
i∈S
(
x¯i − ωi
)
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
− pˆ ·
∑
i∈S
y¯i
≥
∑
i∈S
λiui
(
x¯i
)
.
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2.5.2 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. We show
x
(1)i
i = x
(3)i
i
by contradiction. Then it immediately follows from ui(xi) = cNi that
x
(1)i
i = x
(3)i
i = c
N
i .
Suppose x
(3)i
i > x
(1)i
i . This cannot be utility maximizing in the presence
of strictly positive prices. If player i consumes a little bit less of the ith good
of the 3rd group of n goods and invests the - not anymore used - additional
budget in the ith good of the 1st group of n goods, then he can strictly
increase his utility.
Precisely, from the assumption ui(xi) = cNi and x
(3)i
i > x
(1)i
i it follows that
x
(1)i
i = c
N
i . For δ sufficiently small, i.e. 0 < δ < x
(3)i
i − x
(1)i
i , player i can
increase his utility by consuming δ less of the ith good of the 3rd group of
n goods and increasing the consumption in the ith good of the 1st group
of n goods by
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δ. To consume
(
x(1)i +
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δe{i}, 0, x(3)i − δe{i}, 0
)
is still
budget feasible for player i, because
p(1)
(
x(1)i +
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δe{i}
)
+ p(3)
(
x(3)i − δe{i}
)
= p(1)x(1)i + p(3)x(3)i ≤ p · ωi.
Hereby, the last inequality follows from the budget feasibility of xi. More-
over, the utility of consumer i strictly increases, since
ui
(
x(1)i +
p
(3)
i
p
(1)
i
δ, 0, x(3)i − δ, 0
)
> x
(1)i
i = u
i
(
x(1)i, 0, x(3)i, 0
)
by the choice of δ. This is a contradiction to the assumption that xi is
utility maximizing. Hence, we have x
(3)i
i ≤ x
(1)i
i .
By exchanging the roles of x
(1)i
i and x
(3)i
i we can analogously show x
(3)i
i ≥
x
(1)i
i . Therefore, we have x
(3)i
i = x
(1)i
i .
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3.1 Introduction
The inner core and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions represent solution
concepts for cooperative games. The inner core is defined for cooperative
games whereas asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions are usually only ap-
plied to a subclass of cooperative games, namely bargaining games. A recent
contribution of Compte and Jehiel (2010) generalizes the symmetric Nash
bargaining solution to other cooperative games (with transferable utility).
In this paper we consider the relationship between the inner core and asym-
metric Nash bargaining solutions for bargaining games. Moreover, as an
application of these results we show how asymmetric Nash bargaining solu-
tions can be justified in a general equilibrium framework as a competitive
payoff vector of a certain economy.
In the first section we give a literature overview to motivate our ideas.
In the second section we recall the definitions of the inner core, a bargaining
game and asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. Afterwards, we investigate
for bargaining games the relationship between the inner core and the set of
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. Finally, we apply these results to
market games and obtain by this a market foundation of asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions.
3.2 Motivation and Background
The inner core is a refinement of the core for cooperative games with non-
transferable utility (NTU). For cooperative games with transferable utility
(TU) the inner core coincides with the core. A point is in the inner core
if there exists a transfer rate vector, such that - given this transfer rate
vector - no coalition can improve even if utility can be transferred within a
coalition according to this vector. So, an inner core point is in the core of an
associated hyperplane game where the utility can be transferred according
to the transfer rate vector. Qin (1993) shows, verifying a conjecture of
Shapley and Shubik (1975), that the inner core of a market game coincides
with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the induced market of that
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game. Moreover, he shows that for every NTU market game and for any
given point in its inner core there exists a market that represents the game
and further has this given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff
vector.
The Nash bargaining solution for bargaining games, a special class of co-
operative games, where just the singleton and the grand coalition are allowed
to form, goes back to Nash (1950, 1953). The (symmetric) Nash bargaining
solution is defined as the maximizer of the product of the utilities over the
individual rational bargaining set or as the unique solution that satisfies
the following axioms: Invariance to affine linear Transformations, Pareto
Optimality, Symmetry and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If the
bargaining power of the players is different an asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution can be defined as the maximizer of an accordingly weighted Nash
product. Concerning the axiomatization this means that the Symmetry ax-
iom is replaced by an appropriate Asymmetry axiom, see Roth (1979). In
addition to the axiomatic approach the literature studies non-cooperative
foundations to justify cooperative solutions like the (asymmetric) Nash bar-
gaining solution. The idea is to find an appropriate non-cooperative game
whose equilibrium outcomes coincide with a given cooperative solution (see
for example Bergin and Duggan (1999), Trockel (2000)). Here, we study the
foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution by having this so-
lution as a payoff vector of a competitive equilibrium in a certain economy.
There are different approaches to consider the relationship between co-
operative games and economies or markets. On the one hand for example
Shapley (1955), Shubik (1959) Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Aumann (1964)
consider economies as games. On the other hand there is the approach to
start with a cooperative game and to consider related economies as it was
introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1969, 1975).
Starting with a market Shapley (1955) considers markets as cooperative
games with two kinds of players, seller and buyer. He introduces in this
context the general notion of an ‘abstract market game’. This is a cooper-
ative game with certain conditions on the characteristic function. Shubik
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(1959) extends the ideas of Edgeworth (from 1881) and studies ‘Edgeworth
market games’. In particular he shows that if the number of players of
both sides in an Edgeworth market game is the same, then the set of im-
putations coincides with the contract curve of Edgeworth. Furthermore, he
considers non-emptiness conditions for the core of this class of games. De-
breu and Scarf (1963) show that under certain assumptions a competitive
allocation is in the core. Aumann (1964) investigates, based among others
on the oceanic games from Milnor and Shapley (1978)1, economies with a
continuum of traders and obtains that in this case the core equals the set
of equilibrium allocations.
Starting with a cooperative game Shapley and Shubik (1969) look at
these problems from a different viewpoint and study which class of cooper-
ative games can be represented by a market. A market represents a game
if the set of utility allocations a coalition can reach in the market coincides
with the set of utility allocations a coalition obtains according to the coali-
tional function of the game. Shapley and Shubik (1969) call any game that
can be represented by a market a ‘market game’. In the TU-case it turns
out that every totally balanced TU game is a market game. Furthermore,
Shapley and Shubik (1975) start with a TU game and show that every payoff
vector in the core of that game is competitive in a certain market, the direct
market. The direct market has a nice structure: Besides a numeraire com-
modity there are as many goods as players and initially every player owns
one unit of ‘his personal commodity’. Moreover, Shapley and Shubik (1975)
show that for a given point in the core there exists at least one market that
has this payoff vector as its unique competitive payoff vector.
The idea of market games was applied to NTU games by Billera and
Bixby (1974). Analogously to the result of Shapley and Shubik (1969) they
show that every totally balanced game, that is compactly convexly gener-
ated, is an NTU market game. Qin (1993) compares the inner core of NTU
market games with the competitive payoff vectors of markets that repre-
sent this game. He shows that for a given NTU market game there exists
a market such that the set of equilibrium payoff vectors coincides with the
1The reference Milnor and Shapley (1978) is based on the Rand research memoranda
from the early 1960’s.
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inner core of the game. In a second result, he shows that given an inner core
point there exists a market, which represents the game and has this given
inner core point as its unique competitive equilibrium payoff. Brangewitz
and Gamp (2011a) extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed
subsets of the inner core.
Apart from this literature Trockel (1996, 2005) considers bargaining
games directly as Arrow-Debreu or coalition production economies. One
difference to other literature is that he allows to obtain output in the pro-
duction without requiring input. In contrast to Shapley and Shubik (1969,
1975), Trockel (1996, 2005) considers NTU games rather than TU games.
Motivated by the approach of Sun et al. (2008) and the approach of Billera
and Bixby (1974), Inoue (2010b) uses coalition production economies in-
stead of markets. Inoue (2010b) shows that every compactly generated
NTU game can be represented by a coalition production economy. More-
over, he proves that there exists a coalition production economy such that
its set of competitive payoff vectors coincides with the inner core of the
balanced cover of the original NTU game.
Here, we show that we can apply the main results of Qin (1993) to a
special class of NTU games, namely bargaining games. By that we obtain a
market foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In contrast
to Trockel (1996, 2005) we do not use Arrow-Debreu or coalition production
economies directly but we consider bargaining games as market games by
using the economies of Qin (1993). By this we relate the approach of Trockel
(1996, 2005) on the one hand with the ideas of Qin (1993) on the other hand.
Our result, similar to Trockel (1996), can be seen as a market foundation
of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions in analogy to the results on non-
cooperative foundations of cooperative games (see Trockel (2000), Bergin
and Duggan (1999)).
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3.3 Inner Core and Asymmetric Nash Bar-
gaining Solution
3.3.1 NTU Games and the Inner Core
Let N = {1, ..., n} with n ∈ N and n ≥ 2 be the set of players. Let N =
{S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅} be the set of non-empty coalitions and P(Rn) = {A|A ⊆
Rn} be the set of all subsets of Rn. Define RS+ =
{
x ∈ Rn+|xi = 0, ∀i /∈ S
}
.
Definition 3.1 (NTU game). An NTU game is a pair (N, V ), where the
coalitional function is defined as
V : N → P(Rn)
such that for all non-empty coalitions S ⊆ N we have V (S) ⊆ RS, V (S) 6= ∅
and V (S) is S-comprehensive.
Definition 3.2 (compactly (convexly) generated). An NTU game (N, V )
is compactly (convexly) generated if for all S ∈ N there exists a compact
(convex) CS ⊆ RS such that the coalitional function can be written as
V (S) = CS − RS+.
In order to define the inner core we first consider a game that is related
to a compactly generated NTU game. Given a compactly generated NTU
game we define for a given transfer rate vector λ ∈ RN+ the λ-transfer game.
Definition 3.3 (λ-transfer game). Let (N, V ) be a compactly generated
NTU game and let λ ∈ RN+ . Define the λ-transfer game of (N, V ) by
(N, Vλ) with
Vλ(S) = {u ∈ R
S|λ · u ≤ vλ(S)}
where vλ(S) = max{λ · u|u ∈ V (S)}.
Qin (1994, p.433) gives the following interpretation of the λ-transfer
game: “The idea of the λ-transfer game may be captured by thinking of
each player as representing a different country. The utilities are measured
in different currencies, and the ratios λi/λj are the exchange rates between
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the currencies of i and j.” As for the λ-transfer game only proportions
matter we can assume without loss of generality that λ is normalized, i.e.
λ ∈ ∆n =
{
λ ∈ Rn+|
∑n
i=1 λi = 1
}
. Define the positive unit simplex by
∆n++ =
{
λ ∈ Rn++
∣∣∣∣∑ni=1 λi = 1
}
.
The inner core is a refinement of the core. The core C(V ) of an NTU
game (N, V ) is defined as those utility allocations that are achievable by the
grand coalition N such that no coalition S can improve upon this allocation.
Thus,
C(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)| ∀S ⊆ N ∀u′ ∈ V (S) ∃ i ∈ S such that u′i ≤ ui}.
Definition 3.4 (inner core, Shubik (1984)). The inner core IC(V ) of a
compactly generated NTU game (N, V ) is
IC(V ) = {u ∈ V (N)|∃λ ∈ ∆ such that u ∈ C(Vλ)}
where C(Vλ) denotes the core of the λ-transfer game of (N, V ).
This means a vector u is in the inner core if and only if u is affordable
by the grand coalition N and if u is in the core of an appropriately chosen
λ-transfer game. If a utility allocation u is in the inner core, then u is as
well in the core.
For compactly convexly generated NTU games we have the following
remark:
Remark (Qin (1993), Remark 1, p. 337). The vectors of supporting weights
for a utility vector in the inner core must all be strictly positive.
3.3.2 NTU Bargaining Games and Asymmetric Nash
Bargaining Solutions
We consider a special class of NTU games, where only the singleton or
the grand coalition can form, namely NTU bargaining games. Two-person
bargaining games with complete information and the (symmetric) Nash bar-
gaining solution were originally defined by Nash (1950).
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Alternatively to the notion based on Nash (1950)2 we adapt the notation
and interpret bargaining games here as a special class of NTU games where
only the grand coalition can profit from cooperation. Smaller coalitions are
theoretically possible but there are no incentives to form them as everybody
obtains the same utility as being in a singleton coalition. Starting from the
definition of a bargaining game based on Nash (1950) we define an NTU
bargaining game. Let B ⊆ Rn be a compact, convex set and assume that
there exists at least one b ∈ B with b ≫ 0. For normalization purposes
we assume here that the disagreement outcome is 0 and that B ⊆ Rn+.
Nevertheless the results presented here can easily be generalized to the case
that the disagreement point is not equal to 0.
Definition 3.5 (NTU bargaining game). Define an NTU bargaining game3
(N, V ) with the generating set B using the player set N and the coalitional
function
V : N −→ P (Rn)
defined by
V ({i}) : = {b ∈ Rn|bi ≤ 0, bj = 0, ∀j 6= i} = {0} − R
{i}
+ ,
V (S) : = {0} − RS+ for all S with 1 < |S| < n,
V (N) : = {b ∈ Rn|∃ b′ ∈ B : b ≤ b′} = B − Rn+.
The definition of an NTU bargaining game reflects the idea that smaller
coalitions than the grand coalition do not gain from cooperation. They can-
2Following the idea of Nash (1950) a n-person bargaining game with complete information
is defined as a pair (B, d) with the following properties:
1. B ⊆ Rn,
2. B is convex and compact,
3. d ∈ B and there exists at least one element b ∈ B such that d≪ a.
(d ≪ b if and only if di < bi for all i = 1, ..., n. This means that there is a utility
allocation in B that gives every player a strictly higher utility than the disagreement
point.)
B is called the feasible or decision set and d is called the status quo, conflict or disagree-
ment point.
3Billera and Bixby (1973a, Section 4) modeled bargaining games in the same way.
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not reach higher utility levels as the singleton coalitions for all its members
simultaneously. Only in the grand coalition every individual can be made
better off. In the further analysis we use the above comprehensive version
of an n-person NTU bargaining game.
One solution concept for bargaining games with complete information
is that of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. To define this solution
we take as the set of possible vectors of weights or bargaining powers the
strictly positive n-dimensional unit simplex ∆n++.
Definition 3.6 (asymmetric Nash bargaining solution). The asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution with a vector of weights θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++,
for short θ-asymmetric, for a n-person NTU bargaining game (N, V ) with
disagreement point 0 is defined as the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash
product given by
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i over the set V (N).
4
Hereby, we consider the symmetric Nash bargaining solution as one par-
ticular asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, namely the one with the vector
of weights θ =
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
. Hence, the correct interpretation of “asymmetric”
in this sense is “not necessarily symmetric”.
As the NTU bargaining game (N, V ) is compactly convexly generated,
the set V (N) is closed and convex and hence the maximizer above exists.
Note that the assumption that the vectors of weights are from ∆n++ instead
of Rn++ can be made without loss of generality.
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is a well-known solution con-
cept for bargaining games. Similarly to the symmetric Nash bargaining
solution the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution satisfies the axioms In-
variance to affine linear Transformations, Pareto Optimality and Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives. As for example shown in Roth (1979,
p.20), these axioms together with an appropriate asymmetry assumption
fixing the vector of weights characterize an asymmetric Nash bargaining so-
lution. Dropping only the Symmetry axiom without making an appropriate
4For bargaining games with a general threat point d ∈ Rn the θ-asymmetric Nash product
is given by
∏n
i=1 (ui − di)
θi .
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asymmetry assumption is not sufficient to characterize the set of asymmet-
ric Nash bargaining solutions. Peters (1992, p.17–25) shows that one needs
to consider so called “bargaining solutions corresponding to weighted hier-
archies” which include as a special case the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solutions.
3.3.3 Relationship between the Inner Core and Asym-
metric Nash Bargaining Solutions
Having introduced the concept of the inner core and the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution, we investigate the relationship of these concepts for
NTU bargaining games. As in NTU bargaining games only the grand coali-
tion can profit from cooperation, looking at the inner core only transfer
possibilities within the grand coalition need to be considered. Hereby, it
turns out that there is a close connection between the inner core and asym-
metric Nash bargaining solutions:
Proposition 3.1. Let (N, V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with
disagreement point 0 and generating set B ⊆ Rn++.
• Suppose we have given a vector of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++. Then
the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, aθ, is in the inner core of
(N, V ).
• For any given inner core point aθ we can find an appropriate vector
of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++ such that a
θ is the maximizer of the
θ-asymmetric Nash product
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i .
Proof.
“⇒” Suppose aθ is the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. To prove
that aθ is in the inner core of (N, V ), we need to show that aθ is in
the core of the NTU bargaining game (N, V ) and that there exists
a transfer rate vector λθ ∈ ∆n+ such that a
θ is in the core of the
λθ-transfer game (N, Vλθ).
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aθ is the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product
n∏
i=1
uθii
over V (N). Since there exists at least one u ≫ 0 in V (N) the θ-
asymmetric Nash product is strictly positive and thus aθ is as well the
maximizer of the logarithm of the θ-asymmetric Nash product
g(u) =
n∑
i=1
θilog(ui).
Since aθ is the maximizer of the θ-asymmetric Nash product, aθ is
Pareto optimal. Thus, there is no coalition S that can improve upon
aθ. Remember that we are considering bargaining games. Thus in
particular no singleton coalition can improve upon aθ. We conclude
that aθ has to be in the core of the bargaining game (N, V ).
Next, we show that aθ is as well in the core of an appropriately chosen
λ-transfer game. The gradient of the function g(u) at aθ is given by
∂g
∂x
(aθ) =
(
θ1
aθ1
, ..., θn
aθn
)
. We show now, that we have
∂g
∂x
(aθ) · x ≤
∂g
∂x
(aθ) · aθ
for all x ∈ V (N).5 To see this, let x ∈ V (N) and t ∈ [0, 1] and define
xt = tx+(1−t)aθ. Observe that xt ∈ V (N) since V (N) is convex. Now
we get using the maximality of aθ and by applying Taylor’s Theorem
that
0 ≥ g(xt)−g(aθ) = (xt−aθ)·
∂g
∂x
(aθ)+O
(
|xt − aθ|2
)
= t(x−aθ)·
∂g
∂x
(aθ)+O(t2).
This means that we have
∂g
∂x
(aθ)(x− aθ) ≤ 0
5Compare for the idea of this argument Rosenmu¨ller (2000, p. 549).
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and hence
∂g
∂x
(aθ) · x ≤
∂g
∂x
(aθ) · aθ.
Taking the normalized gradient, defining
λθ =
(
θ1
aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
)
and observing that λθ ≫ 0 we obtain that aθ is in the core of the
λθ-transfer game (N, Vλθ).
“⇐” If a ∈ Rn+ is some given vector in the inner core of (N, V ), then a is
in the core of (N, V ) and there exists a transfer rate vector λ ∈ ∆n+
such that a is in the core of the λ-transfer game (N, Vλ). Since a is in
the core of the λ-transfer game and the NTU bargaining game (N, V )
is compactly generated, we know that λ needs to be strictly positive
in all coordinates. Otherwise at least one coalition could still improve
upon a. We have a ≫ 0, because a is in the inner core. If we now
take the vector of weights of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
equal to
θ = (θ1, .., θn) =
(
λ1a1∑n
i=1 λiai
, ...,
λnan∑n
i=1 λiai
)
then a is the maximizer of the asymmetric Nash product
∏n
i=1 u
θi
i
over V (N). Hereby, similar arguments as in the first step can be
used to show that this is the appropriate choice of θ. Hence, a is the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights θ of the bargaining
game (N, V ).
One direction of Proposition 3.1 can be generalized to the case where
the generating set is a subset of Rn+ but not a subset of R
n
++. The set of
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions is always contained in the inner core,
but the inner core might be strictly larger then the set of asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions. This can be seen in the following two-player example
with disagreement point (0, 0):
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b
b
V ({1, 2})
u2
u1
0
Figure 3.1: Example.
The two points on the axis are in this example in the inner core, as there
exits a strictly positive transfer rate vector λ, such that they are in the core
of the λ-transfer game. But they cannot result from an asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution as any of these solutions chooses only points that are
strictly larger than the disagreement point in all coordinates. Thus, the
inner core is in this example strictly larger than the set of asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions.
Hence, in general for underlying bargaining sets from Rn+ and not nec-
essarily from Rn++ Proposition 3.1 reduces to the following statement:
Proposition 3.2. Let (N, V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with
disagreement point 0 and underlying bargaining set from Rn+.
• Suppose we have given a vector of weights θ = (θ1, .., θn) ∈ ∆
n
++. Then
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ for θ is in the inner core
of (N, V ).
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3.4 Application to Market Games
3.4.1 Market Games
In this section we use the result from the preceding section to investigate the
relationship between asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs of a market that represents the n-person NTU bargaining game.
We start by showing that every NTU bargaining game is a market game.
Afterwards, we apply the results of Qin (1993) and Brangewitz and Gamp
(2011a) to our results from the previous section.
Definition 3.7 (market). A market is given by E = (X i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N
where for every individual i ∈ N
- X i ⊆ Rℓ+ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the consumption set,
where ℓ ≥ 1 is the number of commodities,
- Y i ⊆ Rℓ is a non-empty, closed and convex set, the production set,
such that Y i ∩ Rℓ+ = {0},
- ωi ∈ X i − Y i, the initial endowment vector,
- and ui : X i → R is a continuous and concave function, the utility
function.
Note that in a market the number of consumers coincides with the num-
ber of producers. Each consumer has his own private production set. This
assumption is not as restrictive as it appears to be. A given private owner-
ship economy can be transformed into an economy with the same number of
consumers and producers without changing the set of competitive equilibria
or possible utility allocations, see for example Qin and Shubik (2009, section
4). Differently from the usual notion of an economy a market is assumed to
have concave and not just quasi-concave utility functions.
Let S ∈ N be a coalition. The feasible S-allocations are those allocations
that the coalition S can achieve by redistributing their initial endowments
and by using the production possibilities within the coalition.
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Definition 3.8 (feasible S-allocation). The set of feasible S-allocations is
given by
F (S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ S,∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
.
Hence, an S-allocation is feasible if there exist for all i ∈ S production
plans yi ∈ Y i such that
∑
i∈S(x
i − ωi) =
∑
i∈S y
i.
In the definition of feasibility it is implicitly assumed that by forming
a coalition the available production plans are the sum of the individually
available production plans. This approach is different from the idea to use
coalition production economies, where every coalition has already in the
definition of the economy its own production possibility set. Nevertheless, a
market can be “formally” transformed into a coalition production economy
by defining the production possibility set of a coalition as the sum of the
individual production possibility sets.
Definition 3.9 (NTU market game). An NTU game that is representable
by a market is a NTU market game, this means there exists a market E =
(X i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N such that (N, VE) = (N, V ) with
VE(S) = {u ∈ R
S| ∃ (xi)i∈S ∈ F (S), ui ≤ u
i(xi), ∀ i ∈ S}.
For an NTU market game there exists a market such that the set of
utility allocations a coalition can reach according to the coalitional function
coincides with the set of utility allocations that are generated by feasible
S-allocations in the market or that give less utility than some feasible S-
allocation.
In order to show that every NTU bargaining game is a market game we
use the following result from Billera and Bixby (1974):
Theorem 3.1 (2.1, Billera and Bixby (1974)). An NTU game is an NTU
market game if and only if it is totally balanced and compactly convexly
generated.
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Proposition 3.3. Every bargaining game (N, V ) is a market game.6
Proof. We show that every bargaining game is totally balanced. Suppose
we have an n-person NTU bargaining game. For totally balancedness we
need to check that for every coalition T ⊆ N and for all balancing weights
γ ∈ Γ(eT ) =
{
(γS)S⊆T ∈ R+|
∑
S⊆T
γSe
S = eT
}
we have ∑
S⊆T
γSV (S) ⊆ V (T ).
Since the worth each coalition S ( N can achieve is V (S) = {0} − R+ and
since the grand coalition N can achieve V (N) = B − Rn+ with at least one
element b ∈ B with b ≫ 0, we have for all S ⊆ N that V (S) ⊆ V (N)
holds. Since for all S ⊆ N we have for the balancing weights 0 ≤ γS ≤ 1
and
∑
S⊆T γSe
S = eT the balancedness condition is satisfied. Thus, the
bargaining game is totally balanced and hence a market game.
We now define a competitive equilibrium for a market E .
Definition 3.10 (competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for
a market E is a tuple
(
(xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ
)
∈ Rℓn+ × R
ℓn
+ × R
ℓ
+
such that
(i)
∑
i∈N xˆ
i =
∑
i∈N(yˆ
i + ωi) (market clearing),
(ii) for all i ∈ N , yˆi solves maxyi∈Y i pˆ · y
i (profit maximization),
(iii) and for all i ∈ N , xˆi is maximal with respect to the utility function ui
in the budget set {xi ∈ X i|pˆ ·xi ≤ pˆ · (ωi+ yˆi)} (utility maximization).
6This result was already observed by Billera and Bixby (1973a, Theorem 4.1). In their
proof they define a market representation of a bargaining game with m ≤ n2 commodi-
ties and nondecreasing utility functions.
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Given a competitive equilibrium ((xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ
i)i∈N , pˆ) its competitive pay-
off vector is defined as (ui (xˆi))i∈N .
Qin (1993) investigates the relationship between the inner core of an
NTU market game and the set of competitive payoff vectors of a market
that represents this game. He establishes, following a conjecture of Shapley
and Shubik (1975), the two theorems below analogously to the TU-case of
Shapley and Shubik (1975).
Theorem 3.2 (3, Qin (1993)). For every NTU market game and for any
given point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and
further has the given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector.
Theorem 3.3 (1, Qin (1993)). For every NTU market game, there is a
market that represents the game and further has the whole inner core as its
competitive payoff vectors.7
3.4.2 Results
Now we apply Theorem 3 of Qin (1993) to prove the existence of an economy
corresponding to some vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++, such that the unique
competitive payoff vector of this economy coincides with the θ-asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution of the n-person NTU bargaining game.
Proposition 3.4. Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N, V ) (with
disagreement point 0 and generating set from Rn+) and a vector of weights
θ ∈ ∆n++, there is market that represents (N, V ) and where additionally
the unique competitive payoff vector of this market coincides with the θ-
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ of the NTU bargaining game (N, V ).
Proof. (N, V ) is a market game by Proposition 3.3. Moreover, Proposition
3.1 (or Proposition 3.2 respectively) shows, that the θ-asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution aθ is an element of the inner core. Thus, we can apply
Theorem 3 from Qin (1993).
7A market that satisfies this property is the so called “induced market” introduced by
Billera and Bixby (1974). Its definition can be found in Qin (1993).
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The market behind Proposition 3.4 can be taken from Qin (1993) or
Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) taking necessary monotone transformations
of the original game as done in Qin (1993) into consideration. A version of
these markets for NTU bargaining games can be found in Appendix 2.1 and
2.2.
An Alternative Market for Proposition 3.4
The two markets from Qin (1993) or Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) have
a quite complicated structure. In the following we give a simpler version a
market, where strictly positive prices are required. This market is a modi-
fication from Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a).
Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N, V ) and a vector of weights
θ ∈ ∆++. Let a
θ be the θ-asymmetric bargaining solution. From Proposition
3.1 (or Proposition 3.2 respectively) we know that the corresponding λθ-
transfer game is (N, Vλθ)
λθ =
(
θ1
aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
)
.
Figure 3.2 illustrates as an example for N = {1, 2} the sets V ({1, 2})
and Vλθ({1, 2}) for an NTU bargaining game with disagreement point (0, 0).
Vλθ({1, 2})
V ({1, 2})
aθ
u2
u1
0
b
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the sets V ({1, 2}) and Vλθ({1, 2}).
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Let z ∈ Vλθ (N) and t¯
z = min
{
t ∈ R+|z − te
N ∈ V (N)
}
. Define the
mapping Pθ by Pθ : Vλθ (N) −→ V (N) via Pθ (z) = z − t¯
zeN . Figure 3.3
illustrates for the same example as in Figure 3.2 the mapping Pθ.
aθ
u1
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the mapping Pθ.
The market for the NTU bargaining game (N, V ) and vector of weights
θ, denoted by EV,θ, is defined as follows: Let for every individual i ∈ N be
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × R
n
+ × {0} ⊆ R
3n,
- the production set
Y i = convexcone



 ⋃
S∈N\{N}
{(
0, 0,−eS
)}
⋃ ⋃
c∈(Vλθ (N)∩Rn+)
{(
Pθ(c), c,−e
N
)}

 ⊆ R3n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, 0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R with ui (xi) = min
(
x
(1)i
i , x
(2)i
i
)
where x(1)i denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th
coordinate; similarly x(2)i and x
(2)i
j .
It can be shown using the arguments of Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a)
that the market EV,θ represents the NTU bargaining game (N, V ) and has as
its unique competitive equilibrium payoff vector (assuming strictly positive
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equilibrium price vectors) the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ.
For the method of proof and the details we refer to Brangewitz and Gamp
(2011a). Here, we only state how the competitive equilibria of the market
EV,θ look like:
The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
,
(
aθ
){i}
, 0
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ, aθ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ, λθ, 2 λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθia
θ
i , constitute a competitive equilibrium
in the market EV,θ.
Considering NTU bargaining games as NTU market games there is a
market such that the same sets of utility allocations are reachable in the
game and the market. Proposition 3.4 shows that in the class of markets
representing a given NTU bargaining game there is a market that has a given
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (with a fixed vector of weights) as its
unique competitive payoff vector. We establish a link between utility alloca-
tions coming from asymmetric Nash bargaining in NTU bargaining games
and payoffs arising from competitive equilibria in certain markets. Our re-
sult, similar to Trockel (1996), can be seen as a market foundation of asym-
metric Nash bargaining solutions. Instead of considering non-cooperative
games to give foundations of cooperative solutions, we link cooperative be-
havior described by asymmetric Nash bargaining with competitive behavior
in markets.
In addition a similar interpretation holds true for the whole inner core
and certain of its subsets. Combining Proposition 3.1 with Theorem 1 of
Qin (1993) we obtain:
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Proposition 3.5. Let (N, V ) be a n-person NTU bargaining game with
disagreement point 0 and generating set from Rn++. Then there is market
that represents (N, V ) and where additionally the set of asymmetric Nash
solutions of (N, V ) coincides with the set of competitive payoff vectors of the
market.
Proof. (N, V ) is a market game by Proposition 3.3 and the set of asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions for different strictly positive vectors of weights
coincides with the inner core of (N, V ) by Proposition 3.1. Thus, we can
apply Theorem 1 of Qin (1993).
The two results of Qin (1993) we use above represent two extreme cases.
On the one hand he uses the whole inner core and on the other hand he uses
only one single point from the inner core. Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a)
show how the results of Qin (1993) can be extended to a large class of closed
subsets of the inner core. Using their results we obtain:
Proposition 3.6. Given a n-person NTU bargaining game (N, V ) (with
disagreement point 0 and generating set from Rn+) and a closed set Θ ⊂
∆n++ of strictly positive vectors of weights. Moreover, assume that every
θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ with vector of weights θ ∈ Θ
can be strictly separated from the set V (N) \ {aθ}.8 Then there is market
that represents the NTU bargaining game (N, V ) and the set of competitive
payoff vectors of this market coincides with the set of θ-asymmetric Nash
bargaining solutions with vectors of weights θ ∈ Θ, {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}, of the NTU
bargaining game (N, V ).
Proof. (N, V ) is a market game by Proposition 3.3. Moreover, Proposition
3.1 (or Proposition 3.2 respectively) shows, that the θ-asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with a vector of weights θ ∈ ∆n++ is an element of the
inner core. Furthermore, note that the set of vectors of weights Θ is assumed
to be closed. If we take now as a parameter the vectors of bargaining weights
θ and consider the function that associates to every vector of weights θ the
θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution aθ, we observe that this function is
8More details concerning this assumptions and how they might be weakened can be found
in Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a).
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continuous in θ.9 Moreover, as continuous functions map compact sets into
compact sets, we know that if we take a closed set of vectors of weights Θ
that the set of θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions {aθ|θ ∈ Θ} is closed.
Therefore, the assumptions in Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) are satisfied
and their result can be applied.
Proposition 3.5 can be regarded as the other extreme case in contrast
to the result in Proposition 3.4. Knowing that competitive payoff vectors
are under weak assumptions always in the inner core (compare de Clippel
and Minelli (2005), Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a)), in the class of markets
representing a game the market behind Proposition 3.5 is the market with
the largest set of possible competitive payoff vectors.
Proposition 3.6 has the following interpretation: If the vector of weights
or interpreted differently the bargaining power is not exactly known, then
as an approximation using Proposition 3.6 we obtain the coincidence of the
set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions with a closed subset of weight
vectors and the set of competitive payoff vectors of a certain market.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The results above show that asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions as so-
lution concepts for bargaining games are linked via the inner core to com-
petitive payoff vectors of certain markets. Thus, our result can be seen as a
market foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions. This result
holds for bargaining games in general as any asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution is always in the inner core (Proposition 3.2). The idea of a market
foundation parallels the one that is used in implementation theory. Here,
rather than giving a non-cooperative foundation for solutions of coopera-
tive games, we provide a market foundation. Our result may be seen as an
existence result.
Another interesting related line of research, that we do not follow here,
is to consider the recent definition of Compte and Jehiel (2010) of the coali-
9To see this we use Theorem 2.4 of Fiacco and Ishizuka (1990) applied to maximization
problems.
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tional Nash bargaining solution. They consider cooperative games with
transferable utility (TU) and define the coalitional Nash bargaining solu-
tion as the point in the core that maximizes the Nash product (with equal
weights). Thus, using Theorem 2 of Shapley and Shubik (1975) for TU mar-
ket games, where they define for any given core point a market that has this
point as its unique competitive payoff vector, gives a market foundation as
well for the symmetric coalitional Nash bargaining solution by choosing the
symmetric coalitional Nash bargaining solution as this given core point. It
seems interesting to study how this idea can be generalized for asymmetric
coalitional Nash bargaining solutions or for (asymmetric) coalitional Nash
bargaining solutions for NTU games.
Our approach parallels the one in Trockel (1996, 2005). Trockel (1996)
is based on a direct interpretation of a n-person bargaining game as an
Arrow-Debreu economy with production and private ownership, a so called
bargaining economy. He shows that, given a bargaining economy, the con-
sumption vector of the unique stable Walrasian equilibrium coincides with
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with the vector of weights corre-
sponding to the shares in the production of the bargaining economy. The
main difference between our result and his is that Trockel (1996) did not
consider markets in the sense of Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993)
and thus his bargaining economies do not constitute the kind of market
representation as defined in Billera and Bixby (1974) or Qin (1993). Simi-
larly Trockel (2005) uses coalition production economies to establish a core
equivalence of the Nash bargaining solution. By using the markets of Qin
(1993) we obtained a market foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. This can be seen as a link between the literature on market games
(as in Billera and Bixby (1974), Qin (1993)) and the ideas of Trockel (1996,
2005).
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 The Market behind Proposition 3.4 from Qin
(1993)
Qin (1993) considers NTU games in general and does not restrict his atten-
tion to NTU bargaining games. The market behind Proposition 3.4 from Qin
(1993) has a simpler structure if we restrict our attention to NTU bargain-
ing games. The difference lies in the description of the private production
sets.
To show his result Qin (1993) modifies the given NTU game by applying
a strictly monotonic transformation to the utility functions. This allows
him to assume that the given inner core point can be strictly separated in
the modified NTU game. Qin (1993) shows that this market represents the
modified game and that the given inner core point is the unique competitive
payoff vector of this economy. By applying the inverse strictly monotonic
transformation to the utility functions he obtains his result. As we do
not want to restrict our attention to bargaining games with strictly convex
generating sets, a similar transformation need to be applied to the NTU
bargaining game to use the market defined below.
The transformed bargaining game is denoted by (N, V¯ ) with generating
set C¯N . Define for the grand coalition N the following sets
A1N =
{(
uN ,−eN ,−eN ,−eN , 0
)
|uN ∈ C¯N
}
⊆ R5n,
A2N =
{(
uN , 0,−eN , 0,−eN
)
|uN ∈ C¯N
}
⊆ R5n,
A3N =
{(
uN , 0, 0,−eN ,−eN
)
|uN ∈ C¯N
}
⊆ R5n,
and for the remaining coalitions
A1S =
{(
0,−eS,−eS,−eS, 0
)}
⊆ R5n,
A2S =
{(
0, 0,−eS, 0,−eS
)}
⊆ R5n,
A3S =
{(
0, 0, 0,−eS,−eS
)}
⊆ R5n,
Let θ ∈ Θ be a given vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash
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bargaining solution. Define
λθ =
(
θ1
aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
)
.
Let EV¯ ,θ = (X
i, Y i, ωi, ui)i∈N be the market with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {(0, 0, 0)} × R
n
+ ⊆ R
5n
+ ,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S⊆N (A
1
S ∪ A
2
S ∪ A
3
S)
]
⊆ R5n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}, e{i}
)
∈ R5n+ ,
- the utility function ui(xi) = min
{
x
(1)i
i ,
∑n
j=1 λ
θ
j a
θ
j x
(5)i
j
λi
}
where x(1)i denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th
coordinate; similarly x(5)i and x
(5)i
j .
Qin (1993) shows that the market EV¯ ,θ represents the modified NTU
bargaining game (N, V¯ ) and has as its unique competitive payoff vector aθ,
a given inner core point. For the method of proof and the details we refer
to Qin (1993). Here, we only state for the case of NTU bargaining games
how the competitive equilibria of the market EV¯ ,θ look like:
The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0, 0, 0, e{i}
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN ,−eN ,−eN , 0
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ,
1
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
,
1
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
,
1
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
, λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθia
θ
i , constitute the unique competitive
equilibrium in the market EV¯ ,θ.
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3.6.2 The Market behind Proposition 3.5 from Qin
(1993)
Similarly to Proposition 3.4 the market behind Proposition 3.5 from Qin
(1993), called the induced market of an NTU market game, simplifies for
NTU bargaining games to:
Definition 3.11 (induced market). Let (N, V ) be NTU bargaining game.
The induced market of the game (N, V ) is defined by EV = (X
i, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N
with for each individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {0} ⊆ R
2n,
- the production set
Y i = convexcone

 ⋃
S∈N\N
{
(0,−eS)
}
∪
(
CN × {−eN}
) ⊆ R2n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R with ui(xi) = x(1)ii
where x(1)i denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th
coordinate.
Qin (1993) shows that the market EV represents the NTU bargaining
game (N, V ) and has as its set of competitive payoff vectors the whole inner
core. For the method of proof and the details we refer to Qin (1993). Here,
we only state for the case of NTU bargaining games how the competitive
equilibria of the market EV look like:
Let θ ∈ Θ be a given vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution. Define
λθ =
(
θ1
aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
)
.
The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0
))
i∈N
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and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ, λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθia
θ
i , constitute a competitive equilibrium
in the market EV .
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3.6.3 The Market behind Proposition 3.6 from Brange-
witz and Gamp (2011a)
Similarly to Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.5 the market behind Proposi-
tion 3.6 from Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a), called the induced A-market of
an NTU market game, can be simplified for NTU bargaining games (under
the assumptions of Proposition 3.6). For θ ∈ Θ define
λθ =
(
θ1
aθ1∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
, ...,
θn
aθn∑n
i=1
θi
aθi
)
.
Let (N, V˜ ) be the NTU-game defined by
V˜ (S) =


V (S) if S ⊂ N⋂
θ∈Θ
{
u ∈ Rn|λθ · u ≤ λθ · aθ
}
if S = N
where aθ denotes the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
Define the mapping PΘ : V˜ (N) −→ V (N) via
PΘ (x) = x− t¯
xeN .
Define
C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)
∣∣∃t ∈ R+ such that z − teN ∈ CN} .
Then we also have C˜N =
{
z ∈ V˜ (N)
∣∣z − t¯zeN ∈ CN}.
For the definition of the production sets define for all coalitions S ∈
N \ {N}
A1S =
{(
0,−eS, 0,−eS,−eS
)}
,
A2S =
{(
0, 0, 0,−eS, 0
)}
,
A3S =
{(
0, 0, 0, 0,−eS
)}
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and for the grand coalition N define
A1N =
{(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN ,−eN
)
|c˜N ∈ C˜N
}
,
A2N =
{(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N ,−eN , 0
)
|c˜N ∈ C˜N
}
,
A3N =
{(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
, 0, c˜N , 0,−eN
)
|c˜N ∈ C˜N
}
.
The market EV,Θ using the closed set of weights Θ of the NTU bargaining
game is defined by
EV,Θ = (X
i, Y i, ui, ωi)i∈N
with for every individual i ∈ N
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {0} × R
n
+ × {0} × {0} ⊆ R
5n,
- the production set Y i = convexcone
[⋃
S∈N (A
1
S ∪ A
2
S ∪ A
3
S)
]
⊆ R5n
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R with
ui
(
xi
)
= min
(
x
(1)i
i , x
(3)i
i + ε
∑
j 6=i
x
(3)i
j
)
where ε is chosen such that ε < λθi =
λθi
1
≤
λθi
λθj
for all θ ∈ Θ and x(1)i
denotes the first group of n goods of xi and x
(1)i
j its j
th coordinate;
similarly x(3)i and x
(3)i
j .
Using Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) it can be shown that the market
EV,Θ represents the NTU bargaining game (N, V ) and its set of competitive
equilibrium payoff vectors coincides with the set {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}. For the method
of proof and the details we refer to Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a).
The competitive equilibria of the market EV,Θ are of the following form:
Let θ ∈ Θ be the vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0,
(
aθ
){i}
, 0, 0
))
i∈N
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and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN , aθ,−eN ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ,
2
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
, λθ,
2
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
)
,
2
3
(
λθ ◦ aθ
))
with λθ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθia
θ
i , constitute a competitive equilibrium
in the market EV,Θ.
In addition to the market EV,Θ Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) define
a market where the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria with a
strictly positive equilibrium price vectors coincides with the set {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}.
This market, denoted by E0V,Θ, is defined as follows: Let for every individual
i ∈ N be
- the consumption set X i = Rn+ × {0} × R
n
+ × {0} ⊆ R
4n,
- the production set
Y i = convexcone



 ⋃
S∈N\{N}
{(
0,−eS, 0,−eS
)}
∪

 ⋃
c˜N∈C˜N
(
PΘ
(
c˜N
)
,−eN , c˜N ,−eN
)

 ⊆ R4n,
- the initial endowment vector ωi =
(
0, e{i}, 0, e{i}
)
,
- and the utility function ui : X i → R with ui (xi) = min
(
x
(1)i
i , x
(3)i
i
)
.
Similarly as for the market presented before, it can be shown using
Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a) that the market E0V,Θ represents the NTU
bargaining game (N, V ) and its set of competitive equilibrium payoff vec-
tors with strictly positive prices coincides with the set {aθ|θ ∈ Θ}. For the
method of proof and the details we refer to Brangewitz and Gamp (2011a).
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Here, we only state how the competitive equilibria of the market E0V,θ look
like:
Let θ ∈ Θ be the vector of weights and aθ the θ-asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The consumption plans
(
xˆi
)
i∈N
=
(((
aθ
){i}
, 0,
(
aθ
){i}
, 0
))
i∈N
and the production plans
(
yˆi
)
i∈N
=
((
1
n
(
aθ,−eN , aθ,−eN
)))
i∈N
together with the price system
pˆ =
(
λθ, λθ ◦ aθ, λθ, λθ ◦ aθ
)
with λθ◦ aθ the vector with entries λθia
θ
i , constitute a competitive equilibrium
in the market E0V,Θ.
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Finite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Collateral
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4.1 Introduction
Default and collateral have been important in the subprime crisis in 2008.
The crisis showed that the liquidity of the market may suddenly vanish. We
study financial strategic market games that incorporate the market illiquid-
ity. Geanakoplos (1990, page 11) argues
“The main problem is that competitive equilibrium does not pro-
vide an explanation of the process of price formation. The single
period condenses a sequence of exchanges over which informa-
tion is revealed. It is probably worthwhile to consider an explicit
model of price formation such as the Shapley-Shubik mechanism,
in which agents act before they know the prices. Agents might
then not be aware of all the spot prices before they decided on
their bids and offers.”
By choosing their actions the individuals in the economy may have an influ-
ence on the prices of goods and financial assets. The idea of strategic market
games goes back to Shapley and Shubik (1977). They use a non-cooperative
game to describe the price formation in an exchange economy. Every player
is asked to place a bid and an offer for every commodity. Afterwards the
price of the commodity is computed as the ratio of the total bid to the total
offer of that commodity. Strategic market games enable to study the feed-
back effect of trading strategies in illiquid markets when individual trades
may have an impact on prices. An overview about strategic market games
and related contributions can be found in Giraud (2003).
With this contribution we extend the model of Giraud and Weyers (2004)
by introducing the possibility of default. We change the structure of the fi-
nancial market and introduce a collateral requirement for financial assets as
it is for example done in Araujo et al. (2002). We show that we can induce a
given allocation that clears the markets and satisfies the budget constraints
by defining appropriate, almost full strategies. Furthermore, we look at the
set of sequentially strictly individually rational allocations and study the ex-
istence of approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria. It turns out that we
obtain an analogue of a perfect folk theorem similarly to the one in Giraud
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and Weyers (2004). Hence, even with collateral requirements almost every-
thing is possible as soon as people are sufficiently patient, since almost every
feasible, affordable, sequentially strictly individually rational consumption
stream can be obtained by means of some almost full approximate subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Literature Overview
In this paper we combine the literature from different areas. This includes
in particular the literature on economies with incomplete financial markets,
modeling default by using collaterals and strategic market games.
In this section we present a literature overview on these areas. We start
with the literature on incomplete markets and collateral and afterwards give
an overview on strategic market games.
Incomplete Financial Markets
Models with incomplete financial markets incorporate that there are not al-
ways enough financial assets to make current contracts for all future events.
There are some future events (or dates) for which no contracts can be made
contingent on those events. Radner (1972) studies the existence of equilibria
with incomplete financial markets in an economy with finite horizon. He de-
fines an equilibrium as “[...] a set of prices at the first date, a set of common
price expectations for the future, and a consistent set of individual plans
for consumers and producers such that, given the current prices and price
expectations, each individual agent’s plan is optimal for him, subject to an
appropriate sequence of budget constraints.” (Radner, 1972, page 289). To
show his existence result Radner (1972) imposes a bound on forward trans-
actions. Similarly to Radner (1972), but without this bound, Hart (1975)
addresses the question of optimality and of existence of equilibria in a three
period pure exchange general equilibrium model with incomplete markets,
finitely many consumers, goods and securities for contingent future com-
modities. He shows by simple examples that equilibria are not generally
Pareto optimal if the market structure is incomplete and that opening new
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markets might make everybody worse off. Moreover, he establishes that in
the presence of incomplete markets and under the standard convexity and
continuity assumptions an equilibrium might fail to exist, without the addi-
tional assumption Radner (1972) made, and moreover he gives conditions for
the existence. Werner (1985) establishes, making some assumptions on the
preferences and the initial endowments, the existence of an equilibrium in a
model with purely financial, incomplete future markets. Another, generic,
existence result, where securities are claims to future commodity bundles,
can be found in Duffie and Shafer (1985, 1986). Geanakoplos (1990) and
Magill and Schafer (1991) give an overview of general equilibrium models
with incomplete asset markets. Magill and Quinzii (1994) study the exis-
tence of equilibria in an infinite horizon version of this model imposing debt
constraints or transversality conditions to avoid Ponzi schemes.
Modeling Default
There are different approaches in the literature how default can be modeled:
Collateral or Default Penalties.
The first possibility is to introduce for every financial asset a collateral
requirement. This means each time an individual sells a financial asset
a specified amount of certain goods, called collateral, is needed to ensure
that this individual keeps its promise. If the financial asset does not de-
liver the promised amount, then there still remains the collateral for the
buyer of the asset, assuming implicitly some kind of durability of the col-
lateral. Depending on the future prices the asset defaults or not. There is
no further punishment if the promise is not fulfilled. Geanakoplos (2003a),
Geanakoplos (2003b) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2007) study a two-period
general equilibrium model with durable goods and collateralized assets view-
ing individuals as price-takers. They analyze the impact of the presence of
the collateral on prices, allocations and efficiency of markets. Araujo et al.
(2002) study infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets and collat-
eral structure. They assume finitely many agents, commodities and assets.
Their main result is the existence of an equilibrium in such a model with-
out a further assumption on debt constraints or transversality conditions to
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avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes. The collateral structure implies the
presence of a uniform borrowing constraint in equilibrium (Araujo et al.,
2002, Remark 2).
A second possibility to model default is allowing the individuals to de-
fault whenever they want to and introducing at the same time a default
penalty if they do so. This concept was for example considered by Shubik
and Wilson (1977), Zame (1993) or more recently by Dubey et al. (2005).
An early contribution containing already default penalties is Shubik and
Wilson (1977). They look at a strategic market game with an outside bank
to borrow money. In case of default an individual suffers a default penalty.
Zame (1993) argues that default may play an important positive role in
an economy with incomplete markets. He shows that introducing default
penalties and hence allowing the individuals strategically to default, may
enhance the efficiency compared to the no default scenario. Dubey et al.
(2005) study a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets in which
they model default using default penalties. They consider assets as pools
and introduce expected delivery rates for the assets. One of their results
shows the existence of an equilibrium (according to their specified notion).
An interesting contribution studying the relationship between economies
with collateral and economies with default penalties is Maldonado and Or-
rillo (2007). They compare the equilibria in a two period economy for these
two classical ways modeling default. Their main result is that starting from
an equilibrium for an economy with collateral requirements they show this
equilibrium is as well an equilibrium with default penalties by defining an
appropriate economy. For the converse to be true they need some addi-
tional assumptions on the payoff functions and the initial endowments of
the agents.
Strategic Market Games
The idea of strategic market games goes back to Shapley and Shubik (1977):
“A general model of non-cooperative trading equilibrium is de-
scribed in which prices depend in a natural way on the buying
and selling decisions of the traders, avoiding the classical as-
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sumption that individuals must regard prices as fixed. The key
to the approach is the use of a single, specified commodity as
“cash,” which may or may not have intrinsic value.”
Shapley and Shubik (1977) use a non-cooperative game to describe the
price formation in an exchange economy. Every player is asked to place a
bid and an offer for every commodity. Afterwards the price of the com-
modity is computed as the ratio of the total bid to the total offer of that
commodity. Shapley and Shubik (1977) make the assumption that the indi-
viduals offer all their initial endowments. This assumption was relaxed for
example by Shapley (1976) or Peck et al. (1992), who study the dimension-
ality of Nash equilibrium allocations. Concerning the “money” Shapley and
Shubik (1977) take an explicit numeraire commodity, called money. The
feasible bids in this case are constrained by the endowments in money. An
other possibility is to take inside or fiat money and to introduce a budget
constraint that depends on the prices and hence on the strategies of the
other players as in Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978). An overview on the
existing literature concerning strategic market games can be found in Gi-
raud (2003). As already mentioned the model here relies on Giraud and
Weyers (2004) and builds on the investigation of subgame-perfect equilibria
of a strategic market game with a finite horizon. Compared to Giraud and
Weyers (2004) we change the structure of a no default financial market to
a structure with default by introducing collateral requirements.
4.3 Finite Horizon Strategic Market Games
with Collateral
We look at a strategic market game with finitely many discrete time peri-
ods, t = 1, ..., T . We take a tree-like time structure and assume that the
individuals play at every point in time a strategic market game in the econ-
omy, taking into consideration the trades on the financial markets from the
previous periods. Hence, the game we consider is not a repeated game in the
usual sense, as part of the available budget in the actual period is a result
of the actions chosen in the previous periods. Nevertheless, the mechanism
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of price formation remains the same. By using a strategic market game we
drop the assumption of price-taking behavior from the usual competitive
framework. The individuals have the possibility to influence the prices in
the economy by choosing their actions strategically.
4.3.1 The Economy
The Time Structure
The set of finitely many time periods is denoted by T = {1, ..., T}. Let
S = {1, ..., S} be the set of possible states of nature. We assume that, when
the game starts, no information about the state of nature is available and
when the game ends the uncertainty is resolved. This is modeled by an
increasing family of information partitions (in the sense as defined below),
denoted by (Ft)t∈T , with the property F1 = {S} and FT = {{1}, ..., {S}}.
For each date t ∈ T and each ς ∈ Ft, we call the pair ξ = (t, ς) a date-
event or a node. Let D =
⋃
t∈T ({t} × Ft) be the finite set of all nodes.
Define a partial order ≥ (>) on D by ξ = (t, ς) ≥ (>)ξ′ = (t′, ς ′) if and
only if t ≥ (>)t′ and ς ⊆ ς ′. The pair (D,≥) is called a tree and its root
is ξ0 = (1,S). The terminal nodes are elements (T, ς) ∈ {T} × FT and the
set of terminal nodes is denoted by DT . Let D
− = D \ DT be the set of
non-terminal nodes. Each non-terminal node ξ = (t, ς) ∈ D− has a finite
set of immediate successors
ξ+ = {ξ′ ∈ D|ξ′ = (t+ 1, ς ′), ς ′ ⊆ ς}.
Moreover every node ξ = (t, ς), except the root, has a unique predecessor
ξ− = (t − 1, ς ′) with ς ⊆ ς ′. For any node ξ ∈ D the set of all nodes with
ξ′ ≥ (>)ξ is denoted by D(ξ) (D(ξ)+) and is itself a tree with root ξ. Let
d = |D| denote the number of nodes in the tree and let τ(ξ) be the time at
which node ξ is reached, i.e. τ : D→ T such that ξ = (t, ς) 7→ t.
Consumption Goods and Financial Assets
We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many individuals and L
consumption goods combined with a financial market where the players are
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Figure 4.1: The T -period strategic market game.
allowed to purchase or sell financial assets. There is a finite set of players,
denoted N = {1, ..., N}, and a finite set of consumption goods, denoted by
L = {1, ..., L}. Consumption goods need to be consumed or can be used
as a collateral on the financial markets. There is no possibility to store a
consumption good for the next period except for using it as a collateral.
We assume that there are J possible short-term assets. The set of assets
is given by J = {1, ..., J}. The available financial assets are supposed to
be exogenously given. A financial asset j ∈ J is characterized by a tuple
(ξj, Aj, Cj) consisting of three elements: an issuing node, a promised amount
of goods and collateral requirement. The issuing node is a node in the tree
D and for short denoted by ξj. The promised amount of goods is described
by a function Aj : D → R
L
+ such that Aj(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ D \ (ξ
j)
+
.
For ξ′ ∈ (ξj)
+
the promises Aj(ξ
′) are the amounts of goods that a seller of
asset j promises to deliver to a buyer of asset j in the next period after the
issuing node ξj. The delivery, pξ ·Aj(ξ), is assumed to be made in fiat money
using spot prices, pξ. We only consider short-term assets. Therefore, for
other nodes before the issuing node and at least two periods after the asset
was issued, we the promised amount is zero. The collateral requirements
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Cj ∈ R
L
+ are to ensure that the promised amounts of goods Aj is delivered.
The consumption goods serve as a collateral. We assume that the individuals
are not allowed to consume the collateral. The collateral is stored in a
warehouse for one period and is required at the issuing node ξj of asset j.
For ξ′ ∈ (ξj)
+
the collateral, stored in a warehouse, underlies a depreciation
Y sξ′ . Tobacco is one example of a consumption good that possess the required
properties to serve as a collateral. We assume that in the last period T no
assets are traded.
The Players
Every player i ∈ N is characterized by a family of twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing and concave utility functions. For each date
t ∈ T and each player i ∈ N there is a time-independent utility function
uit : R
L
+ → R. Moreover every player i ∈ N possesses a strictly positive
initial endowment in consumption goods wi(ξ) ∈ RL++ at every node ξ ∈ D.
Player i is supposed to maximize the discounted sum of expected utilities.
We assume that every player i has a discount factor λi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, his
utility function is of the form
ui(xi) = (1− λi)
T∑
t=1
(λi)t−1E[uit(x
i
t)]
where the expected values at all dates t ∈ T are taken using given proba-
bility distributions on the respective succeeding nodes,
E[uit(x
i
t)] =
∑
ξ:τ(ξ)=t
pt(ξ)u
i
t(x
i
t(ξ))
with
∑
ξ:τ(ξ)=t pt(ξ) = 1 and pt(ξ) > 0 for all ξ with τ(ξ) = t.
4.3.2 The T-Period Strategic Market Game
In the strategic market game, based on the idea of Shapley and Shubik
(1977), each player places for every consumption good ℓ ∈ L at every node
ξ ∈ D a bid biℓ(ξ) and an offer q
i
ℓ(ξ). The bid b
i
ℓ(ξ) signals how much (in
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terms of fiat money) player i is willing to pay for the purchase of good ℓ and
the offer qiℓ(ξ) (in terms of physical commodities) is the amount he wants
to sell. The price of good ℓ is then computed as the ratio of the total bid
to the total offer, that is
pℓ(ξ) =
{ ∑N
i=1 b
i
ℓ
(ξ)
∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ
(ξ)
if
∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ) > 0
0 otherwise
Hence, if there are no offers on the market the price is set equal to 0. Likewise
if there are no bids, the price is as well equal to 0. A market without trade
is called closed.1
Similarly to trade assets on financial markets at every non-terminal node
ξ ∈ D− each player places a bid βij(ξ) containing the amount of money he
wants to spend for buying the real asset j ∈ J and an offer γij(ξ) containing
the amount of assets he wants to sell. The price of the real asset is given by
πj(ξ) =


∑N
i=1 β
i
j(ξ)
∑N
i=1 γ
i
j(ξ)
if
∑N
i=1 γ
i
j(ξ) > 0
0 otherwise
Thus, price vectors are given by
(
(pℓ(ξ))ℓ∈L , (πj(ξ))j∈J
)
.
When the promises are settled a seller of the asset j ∈ J compares the
value of the promise with the value of the collateral and pays back the min-
imal value, either p(ξ′)Yξ′Cj or p(ξ
′)Aj(ξ
′), at the node ξ′ ∈ (ξj)
+
. Hence, if
default appears or not depends on the value of the promise compared to the
value of the collateral. This again depends on the price pℓ(ξ
′) which is deter-
mined by the bids and offers at the node ξ′ on the market for consumption
goods.
Define for every asset j ∈ J at the nodes ξ′ ∈ (ξj)
+
Dj(ξ
′) = min {p(ξ′)Aj(ξ
′), p(ξ′)Yξ′Cj} .
1Defining the price as zero when there are no offers on the market we follow here for
example Amir et al. (1990, p.128). Similar assumptions can be found in Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1978, p.128), Peck et al. (1992, p.275) or Giraud and Weyers (2004, p.474).
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Feasible Bids and Offers
There are some physical and budgetary restrictions on the bids and offers
the individuals can choose. In this section we define the feasible bids and
offers at every node ξ ∈ D. We take into consideration that for every asset
j ∈ J player i sells, he has to have the required amount of collateral. The
amount of collateral needed depends on the asset sales and not on the net
trades. Suppose we are at node ξ and asset j ∈ J is issued at this node.
Assume player i offers to sell γij(ξ) units of asset j, which means that he
promises to deliver γij(ξ)Aj(ξ
′) at the nodes ξ′ ∈ (ξj)
+
. In this case he
needs to have an amount of γij(ξ)Cj ∈ R
L
+ goods as a collateral. In oder
to fulfill the obligations from the asset markets player i is allowed to offer
his collateral from the previous period on the goods market. The money
needed to pay his obligations is included in the individual budget constraint
on feasible bids and offers.
The feasible bids and offers are given by:
qiℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ)Cjℓ ≤ w
i
ℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ (F1ξ)
for all ℓ ∈ L,
qiℓ(ξ), b
i
ℓ(ξ), β
i
j(ξ), γ
i
j(ξ) ≥ 0 (F2ξ)
for all ℓ ∈ L, j ∈ J and
βij(ξ) = γ
i
j(ξ) = 0 if ξ 6= ξ(j) (F3ξ)
for all j ∈ J . We assume that the initial holdings of assets are equal to 0.
The offered amount of goods plus the amount of goods that is needed as
a collateral cannot exceed the initial endowment of player i at node ξ ∈ D
plus the depreciated collateral, he put aside in the previous period to fulfill
his promises, condition (F1ξ). Furthermore, the bids and offers cannot be
negative, condition (F2ξ), and assets can only be traded at their issuing
node, condition (F3ξ), as the assets are assumed to be short-term assets.
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Remark. Condition (F3ξ) is needed in the proof of our main theorem.
In order to give the agents incentives to play certain strategies there is a
final reward phase with closed asset markets. Condition (F3ξ) ensures that
financial assets can only be traded at their issuing date. Therefore, the
individuals are not allowed to trade financial assets in the following way:
Suppose all individuals play a strategy bidding and offering zero for asset j.
Then, say individual i could unilaterally deviate and bid and offer a strictly
positive amount for asset j and trade in this way with “himself” as there is
no other player trading asset j. This action has the consequence that the
collateral need to be put up and is be stored until next period. Therefore,
even if the all agents play a Nash equilibrium on the goods markets and no
trade on the asset markets, there might be a profitable deviation using this
kind of “self-trading” actions. These strategies are excluded by condition
(F3ξ) together with an assumption on the issuing nodes of an exogenously
given financial structure. A different condition avoiding “self-trade” actions
is made in Brangewitz and Giraud (2011) where an appropriate condition
is directly added to the feasibility constraints. We can adopt this way here
as well.
Moreover, player i faces the following budget constraints on fiat money
when placing bids and offers:
L∑
ℓ=1
biℓ(ζ) +
J∑
j=1
βij(ζ)
≤
L∑
ℓ=1
pℓ(ζ)q
i
ℓ(ζ) +
J∑
j=1
πj(ζ)γ
i
j(ζ) +
J∑
j=1
(
βij(ζ
−)
πj(ζ−)
− γij(ζ
−)
)
Dj(ζ) (∗
i
ξ)
for all ζ ≤ ξ. Thus, by condition (∗iξ) the total value of bids for con-
sumption goods and promises cannot exceed the total monetary amount of
consumption goods and of promises that is offered including the dividends.
This needs to hold for the actual node and all nodes before. If one of the
budget constraints in (∗iξ) is violated, then individual i is removed from
the economy for all nodes D+(ξ) and all his goods are confiscated for those
nodes.
After trading took place player i’s allocation of good ℓ ∈ L available for
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consumption at the end of the current period, time t, is
xiℓ(ξ) =


wiℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ − q
i
ℓ(ξ) +
bi
ℓ
(ξ)
pℓ(ξ)
−
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ)Cjℓ if (∗
i
ξ) holds and pℓ(ξ) > 0
wiℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ − q
i
ℓ(ξ)−
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ)Cjℓ if (∗
i
ξ) holds and pℓ(ξ) = 0
0 otherwise.
Furthermore, his holdings of asset j ∈ J are given by his sales
ϕij(ξ) =
{
γij(ξ) if (∗
i
ξ) holds
0 otherwise
and his purchases
θij(ξ) =
{
βij(ξ)
πj(ξ)
if (∗iξ) holds and πj(ξ) > 0
0 otherwise.
Hence, if θij(ξ)− ϕ
i
j(ξ) < 0 then player i sold more of the financial asset
j ∈ J than he bought. Analogously for θij(ξ)−ϕ
i
j(ξ) > 0 he is a net buyer.
Allowable Actions and Strategies
The actions of the players are the choices of bids and offers. The action set
of player i at node ξ is defined as
Ai(ξ) =
{(
qiℓ(ξ), b
i
ℓ(ξ)
)
ℓ∈L
,
(
γij(ξ), β
i
j(ξ)
)
j∈J
∈ R2L+ × R
2J
+
∣∣(F1ξ), (F2ξ) and (F3ξ) are satisfied } .
Let A(ξ) = ×Ni=1A
i(ξ). Note that the definition of the action sets includes
actions that possibly violate the budget constraint (∗iξ). As the prices for
consumption goods and financial assets depend on the actions of all play-
ers, including the budget constraint (∗iξ) as a further restriction into the
definition of the action sets would make the action sets dependent on the
other players’ actions. And hence, we would obtain a generalized game as
introduced by Debreu (1952).2 To avoid this we define the feasible strate-
gies using only the conditions (F1ξ), (F2ξ) and (F3ξ) and assume as stated
before the removal of individuals from the economy that violate the budget
2For more information on generalized Nash equilibrium problems see for example Debreu
(1952), Harker (1991) or Facchinei and Kanzow (2010).
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constraint (∗iξ). The stage-payoff of player i at node ξ is given by the utility
he obtains from consumption.
In a strategic market game the allocation an individual finally obtains
depends on his own actions and the prices, which represent an aggregate of
the own and the other individual’s actions. Because of this it is enough for
an individual to know the prices of the commodities and assets rather than
the particular actions of the other individuals.
A strategy for the T -period strategic market game consists of choosing
actions at every node ξ ∈ D. Let H i(ξ) denote the set of possible histories
for individual i at node ξ given by
H i(ξ) =
{
p(ξ′), π(ξ′), ϕi(ξ′), θi(ξ′)
∣∣ for all ξ′ < ξ} .
The history at the root ξ0 is given by H
i(ξ0) = ∅. Therefore, a strategy of
individual i is given by σi :
⋃
ξ∈DH
i(ξ)→
(
RL+
)2
×
(
RJ+
)2
such that
σi(h) ∈ Ai(ξ)
for all ξ ∈ D and for all h ∈ H i(ξ).
Definition 4.1 (full, almost full strategy profiles). A strategy profile for
the strategic market game with N player and finite horizon T
((
qiℓ(ξ), b
i
ℓ(ξ)
)
ℓ∈L
,
(
γij(ξ), β
i
j(ξ)
)
j∈J
)
i∈N ,ξ∈D
is called full if
N∑
i=1
qiℓ(ξ) > 0,
N∑
i=1
biℓ(ξ) > 0,
N∑
i=1
γij(ξ) > 0,
N∑
i=1
βij(ξ) > 0
hold for all ℓ ∈ L, j ∈ J , ξ ∈ D. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is called full if it is a full strategy profile. We define a strategy profile as
almost full if the strict inequality holds on the goods markets. This means
N∑
i=1
qiℓ(ξ) > 0,
N∑
i=1
biℓ(ξ) > 0
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hold for all ℓ ∈ L, ξ ∈ D. Analogously a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is called almost full if it is an almost full strategy profile.
Next, we study the existence of approximate subgame perfect Nash equi-
libria of the T -period strategic market game. First we show that any given
feasible and affordable allocation can be induced by some trading strategies
that not equal to zero.
Definition 4.2 (feasible and affordable allocation). An allocation (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N ∈
RL·d·N+ × R
J ·d·N
+ × R
J ·d·N
+ is said to be feasible and affordable, if there exists
a price system (p¯, π¯) ∈ RL·d+ × R
J ·d
+ such that the following conditions are
satisfied at every node ξ ∈ D:
• Individual budget restriction for every player i ∈ N :3∑L
ℓ=1 p¯ℓ(ξ)
(
x¯iℓ(ξ) +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
j(ξ)Cjℓ
)
+
∑J
j=1 π¯j(ξ)
(
θ¯ij(ξ)− ϕ¯
i
j(ξ)
)
=
∑L
ℓ=1 p¯ℓ(ξ)
(
wiℓ(ξ) +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
j(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ
)
+
∑J
j=1
(
θ¯ij(ξ
−)− ϕ¯ij(ξ
−)
)
Dj(ξ),
• market clearing on spot markets for every good ℓ ∈ L:∑N
i=1
(
x¯iℓ(ξ) +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
j(ξ)Cjℓ
)
=
∑N
i=1
(
wiℓ(ξ) +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
j(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ
)
,
• and market clearing on financial markets for every asset j ∈ J :∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
j(ξ) =
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
j(ξ),
(x¯i)i∈N is called a feasible and affordable consumption stream.
The following remark is easy to verify.
Remark. Convexity of the set of feasible and affordable consumption streams:
Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. Let (x¯i)i∈N and (x¯
′i)i∈N be two feasible and affordable con-
sumption streams.
1. Then (
δx¯i + (1− δ)x¯′i
)
i∈N
is a feasible and affordable consumption stream as well.
3We define ϕ¯ij(ξ
−
0 ) = θ¯
i
j(ξ
−
0 ) = 0.
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2. Since the utility functions are assumed to be concave we have for every
node ξ = (t, ς) ∈ D−
δuit(x¯
i
t(ξ)) + (1− δ)u
i
t(x¯
′i
t (ξ)) ≤ u
i
t(δx¯
i
t(ξ) + (1− δ)x¯
′i
t (ξ))
and thus
δE[uit(x¯
i
t)] + (1− δ)E[u
i
t(x¯
′i
t )] ≤ E[u
i
t(δx¯
i
t + (1− δ)x¯
′i
t )].
Definition 4.3 (sequentially strictly individually rational). An consump-
tion stream (x¯i)i∈N ∈ R
L·d·N
+ is said to be sequentially strictly individually
rational up to time T ∗, if
E[uit(x¯
i
t)] > E[u
i
t(w
i
t)]
for all i ∈ N and all t ≤ T ∗.
We obtain for our model an analogous Lemma as in Giraud and Weyers
(2004).
Lemma 4.1. If the initial allocations (wi(ξ))i ≫ 0 are Pareto-inefficient
in the L-good spot economy at each node ξ ∈ D then for every terminal
date T there exists a sequentially strictly individually rational and feasible,
affordable allocation.
The proof can be found in the Appendix 4.5.1. Analogously to Lemma
2 in Giraud and Weyers (2004) we obtain:
Lemma 4.2. Let (x¯i)i∈N ∈ R
L·d·N
+ be a feasible, affordable and sequen-
tially strictly individually rational consumption stream. Let (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N be
the according feasible and affordable allocation with the price system (p¯, π¯).
Then the following strategies result in (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N :
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For all ξ ∈ D, i ∈ N , ℓ ∈ L and j ∈ J let
qiℓ(ξ) = w
i
ℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ ,
biℓ(ξ) = p¯ℓ(ξ)
(
x¯iℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ)Cjℓ
)
,
γij(ξ) = ϕ¯
i
j(ξ),
βij(ξ) = π¯j(ξ)θ¯
i
j(ξ).
Moreover, the above strategies are almost full.
The proof can be found in the Appendix 4.5.2. The idea Lemma 4.2 is
that every feasible, affordable and sequentially strictly individually rational
consumption stream can be achieved through some trading strategies. The
individuals offer all their initial endowments plus the collaterals needed in
the previous period and bid exactly the value of the given feasible and af-
fordable allocation plus the collateral requirements using the price system
corresponding to this allocation. Similarly, on the asset markets the indi-
viduals offer their asset sales and bid the value of their purchases. Note that
we do not make an statement if the strategies defined in Lemma 4.2 form a
Nash equilibrium. Even if there is no trade on the asset markets, the one
stage actions are not necessarily Nash equilibrium actions.
Remark. Note that we cannot always use almost full strategies to induce
a given feasible, affordable and sequentially strictly individually rational
consumption stream. If there are no transactions on the asset markets
necessary to induce such a given allocation, then the strategies on the asset
markets are no longer full. Forcing individuals to offer some (even very
small) amount of financial assets in order to obtain full strategies will for
them have the consequence that they need to possess the required amount of
collateral and moreover this additional amount of collateral can no longer
be consumed, such that the utility of the actual period decreases. This
problem might be solved by imposing the collateral requirements only on
the net trades. In this case buying and selling the same amount of the same
financial asset does not require some additional collateral. Another point
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is that we assumed in (F3ξ) that assets can only be traded at their issuing
node. We decided to stay with the collateral requirement on the asset sales
and to have only almost full strategies to induce a given feasible, affordable
and sequentially strictly individually rational consumption stream. The
question of netting asset sales and purchases is for example for monetary
equilibria discussed in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003). In a model with
netting the asset sales are not constrained by the available amount of money
and hence very large short sales are possible. In our model we explicitly
constrain the asset sales by the collateral requirements.
If we consider an economy without trade on the financial markets or
without collateral requirements, the lower bound for the utility a player
can obtain in the whole T -period strategic market game is the utility from
his initial endowment. If we introduce collateral requirements and if there
is trade in financial markets, this situation might change. The following
lemma shows that this is not the case if we consider the whole T -period
strategic market game.
Lemma 4.3. There is no Nash equilibrium and hence no subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the T -period strategic market game at which at least
one player has strictly less utility from this allocation than from his initial
endowment.
The idea of the proof is to construct a strategy that insures a player
at least the utility from his initial endowment. This utility can always be
obtained using the no-trade equilibrium strategy by bidding zero for every
good and every asset. It turns out even with forcing all the players to
place strictly positive bids and offers on the goods markets, we can define
appropriate strategies. The proof can be found in the Appendix 4.5.3.
Remark. Due to the fact that the individuals consider expected utilities
the observation in Lemma 4.3 does not exclude that at single nodes the
utility obtained is less than the one from the according initial endowment.
In Lemma 4.3 we only consider the total utility from the T -period strategic
market game. It might happen that very low consumption in one state of
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nature is compensated by high consumption in an other state, such that in
expectation the individual is better off than consuming his initial endow-
ment. We discuss this issue again at the end of this section when we make
the comparison with the no default setting.
Definition 4.4 (approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). A con-
sumption stream (x¯i)i∈N is an approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the strategic market game (as defined above) with N players and time
horizon T if for every ε∗ > 0 there is a discount factor λ0 such that if
mini∈N λ
i ≥ λ0, then there is an almost full subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium with strategies σ such that
|ui(xi(σ))− ui(x¯i)| < ε∗
for all i ∈ N .
We can parametrize the T -period strategic market games by its time
horizon T , the discount rates λ = (λi)i∈N and the initial endowments
w = (wi)i∈N . Denote the associated economies by E(T, λ, w). Every strate-
gic market game with finite horizon and the associated economy E(T, λ, w)
can be as well considered as a truncation of an infinite horizon game with
the associated economy E∞(λ,w), that becomes stationary after time T .
Let Ω(N) denote the set of all allocations that redistribute the initial en-
dowments in the economy E∞(λ,w) somehow such that the market clearing
condition at every node is satisfied and let ΩT (N) be its restriction until
period T . Thus,
ΩT (N) =
{
w¯ ∈ RL·d·N
∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
w¯i =
N∑
i=1
wi
}
.
Theorem 4.1. For any N , there exists an open and dense subset Ω∗(N) of
initial endowments and an integer T 0(N) and R such that for every finite
horizon T ≥ T 0(N) ≥ R: if the initial endowments belong to Ω∗T (N) and if
the issuing nodes of all financial assets are in the first T − R − 1 periods,
then every consumption stream (x¯i)i∈N , that is feasible, affordable and se-
quentially strictly individually rational in the first T − T 0(N) periods, is an
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approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the strategic market game
with finite horizon T .
The proof of the above theorem is very similar to the one given in Gi-
raud and Weyers (2004). The main idea is to apply the Lemma 4.4 below to
obtain existence of equilibria in the one shot strategic market games (with
closed financial markets) and to use the previous results to construct strate-
gies that induce a given feasible and affordable allocation (Lemma 4.2).
For the proof of the above theorem we use the following lemma as stated
in Giraud and Weyers (2004) [Lemma 3], that was proven by Peck et al.
(1992).
Lemma 4.4. For each node ξ ∈ D there exists an open and dense subset
of initial allocations of the one-period economy at node ξ with closed asset
markets, such that the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of the one shot
strategic market game on the commodity markets with actions, where all
bids and offers are strictly positive, is a smooth sub-manifold of dimension
L(N − 1) of the set of allocations where markets clear exactly.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 can be found in the Appendix 4.5.4.
Remark. As already indicated in Remark 4.3.2 condition (F3ξ) together
with the assumption that there are no financial assets issued at the last
part of the T -period strategic market game, avoids “self trading” actions
and excludes with that storage possibilities of the collaterals at this part
of the game. Lemma 4.4 ensures the existence of one shot Nash equilibria
(with closed asset markets) for appropriately chosen initial endowments. So
far it remains an open question if this choice of the initial endowments is
compatible with storage possibilities of the collateral.
4.3.3 Comparison with the no Default Situation
Giraud and Weyers (2004) impose a no default condition on the sequentially
strictly individually rational allocations they consider. This condition im-
plies that the value of the consumption goods plus the changes in the asset
portfolio need to be financed by the initial endowments taking asset market
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obligations and dividends into consideration. Asset market obligations are
always met, even if the initial endowments might be used to fulfill them. We
argue that in this model without default there exists a sequentially strictly
individually rational and default free allocation in which there exists a state
where one consumer is driven out of the market. This means there exists
a state where the consumption of one consumer comes arbitrarily close to
zero. This is possible as the sequential strict individual rationality is defined
by taking the expectation over future states according to a fixed probabil-
ity distribution. Hence, using the folk theorem like result from Giraud and
Weyers (2004) there exist approximate subgame perfect equilibria of the fi-
nite horizon strategic market game without default with the property that
at least one consumer is driven out of the market.
The following example shows this claim:
Example. Suppose there are N = {1, ..., N} individuals and two future
states of nature. Assume that there is one future state, denoted by ξu, that
appears with a high probability of p close to one, and another one that
appears with a very low probability of 1− p, denoted by ξd. There are two
possible states of nature in the second period and afterwards there is only
one possible state of nature at each node. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
p
1− p
ξu
ξd
Figure 4.2: Example.
Moreover, assume that the time horizon T and the Pareto inefficient
initial endowments, denoted by (wi)i∈N , are chosen in such a way that the
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assumptions of Theorem 1 in Giraud and Weyers (2004) hold. Therefore,
every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free allocation is
an approximate subgame perfect equilibrium. Let (x¯i)i∈N be a sequentially
strictly individually rational and default-free allocation. In the following
we define a different sequential strictly individually rational and default-
free allocation starting from (x¯i)i∈N where one agent is driven out of the
market. Assume that individual 1 sells a huge amount of a a financial
asset such that he has to deliver only something in the unprobable state ξd.
He sells this amount split equally to the other players. Doing this leaves
individual 1 an amount of ε > 0 small in state ξd with w
1
2(ξd) ≫ ε after
the asset market obligations are fulfilled and x¯12(ξu) in state ξu. Accordingly
individuals j = 2, ..., N receive x¯j2(ξu) and x¯
j
2(ξd) +
1
N−1
(x¯12(ξd)− ε). This
allocation is sequentially strictly individually rational if p is close enough to
one as u12 (x¯
1
2(ξu))≫ u
1
2 (w
1
2(ξu)), and hence we obtain
p · u12
(
x¯12(ξu)
)
+ (1− p) · u12 (ε)
> p · u12
(
w12(ξu)
)
+ (1− p) · u12
(
w12(ξd)
)
,
p · uj2
(
x¯j2(ξu)
)
+ (1− p) · uj2
(
x¯j2(ξd) +
1
N − 1
(
x¯12(ξd)− ε
))
> p · uj2
(
wj2(ξu)
)
+ (1− p) · uj2
(
wj2(ξd)
)
for j = 2, ..., N . From period t ≥ 3 onwards the individuals are assumed
to receive (x¯it)i∈N .
This example shows that even without assuming heterogeneous beliefs
there are approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria with nodes where
at least one agent is driven out of the market. This cannot happen if we
introduce default and collateral requirements. Each time a financial asset is
sold the according collateral has to be put aside. If default appears, there
still remains the collateral to pay back at least part of the asset market obli-
gations. Hence, in the model with collateral future initial endowments are
not used to fulfill asset market obligations from previous periods. This fact
avoids the situation that individuals are driven out of the market because
of asset market obligations from past periods. This is a crucial difference
compared to the model with default.
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4.4 Further Research and Concluding Remarks
We model a strategic market game with finite horizon and default. The
main results are similar to Giraud and Weyers (2004). It turns out that
even if we change the structure of the financial market drastically and allow
for default while imposing at the same time a collateral structure for the
financial assets, we are still able to obtain an analogue of a perfect folk
theorem in a similar way as in Giraud andWeyers (2004). Almost everything
is possible as soon as people are sufficiently patient, since almost every
feasible, affordable, sequentially strictly individually rational consumption
stream can be obtained by means of some almost full approximate subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
In a setting with incomplete financial markets allowing for default and
introducing collateral requirements seems to have at a first glance a negative
influence on the economy. We no longer assume that individuals are obliged
to fulfill their obligations on the asset markets. Instead we impose that each
time a financial asset is sold the according collateral has to be put aside.
If an individual does not possess the required collateral, it cannot sell the
financial asset. The individuals buying the financial assets anticipate that
the seller might default and pay back only the value of the collateral and
not the promised amount. Having a closer look at the individual budget
restriction (in the definition of a feasible and affordable allocation) shows
that by introducing default and collateral there remains for the seller always
the collateral to fulfill at least part of his asset market obligations. If he
defaults, he has to sell the collateral and use the amount of money he obtains
to fulfill his asset market obligations. Thus, with collateral requirements
future initial endowments are not touched by asset market obligations from
previous periods. We have shown by means of an example that this is not
true in the model without default.
Our result in weaker than the one of Giraud and Weyers (2004) in the
sense that the strategies we use are only almost full. This means we do not
necessarily use full strategies on the asset markets. The collateral require-
ment makes it impossible to imitate the no-trade equilibrium by bidding
and offering at the same time small amounts of financial assets (for example
CHAPTER 4. FINITE HORIZON 139
in the punishment phase). The difficulty is that for every asset sale the ac-
cording collateral has to be put aside. Hence, even if this is possible, as the
initial endowments are strictly positive, putting some consumption goods
aside means that they cannot be consumed in the actual period. As a result
the desired level of utility from consumption cannot be reached exactly. For
this reason we decided to accept the fact that the strategies on the asset
markets might not be full and hence we obtain an analogue of a perfect folk
theorem only in almost full strategies. Another possibility is to take the
collateral requirement only on net trades. In this case it is possible to use
full strategies on the asset markets. To stay close to the existing literature
on collaterals, as for example Araujo et al. (2002) we decided to model the
collateral requirements using asset sales and not net trades.
A further feature incorporated in the competitive model with collateral
of Araujo et al. (2002) is the possibility to store commodities from one pe-
riod to an other. The individuals are free to decide if they are willing to
consume or to store their commodities. In addition durable goods are in-
cluded in their analysis. They use a depreciation structure to model the
amounts that remain after consumption or storage in the next period. The
competitive equilibrium concept is defined taking this into consideration.
Neither Giraud and Weyers (2004) nor our model here allows for storage
or durable goods. It remains an open question if and how the model can
be extended in this direction. Allowing the individuals to store their com-
modities changes the “initial” endowments over time as everything that was
stored is available, maybe depreciated, at the start of the next period. The
proof our finite horizon folk theorem like result is crucially relying on the
fact that the initial endowments in the reward phase are chosen in such
a way that there is an indeterminacy of Nash equilibria in the one shot
strategic market games. Applying a Transversality Theorem Peck et al.
(1992) obtain their result for a generic choice of initial endowments. They
are able to exclude Pareto optimal initial endowments and locally isolated
points in their indeterminacy result. Hence, for a model including storage
possibilities or durable goods, it remains unclear which assumptions are nec-
essary to ensure a certain dimensionality of the set of Nash equilibria of the
strategic market game. Pareto optimal initial endowments were excluded
CHAPTER 4. FINITE HORIZON 140
from our analysis here. Peck et al. (1992) show that if the initial endow-
ments are Pareto optimal the Nash equilibrium allocation is unique. For a
generic choice of initial endowments that are Pareto inefficient we showed
here in a model with collateral almost every feasible, affordable and sequen-
tially strictly individually rational consumption stream can be obtained as
an almost full approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the finite
horizon strategic market game if the individuals are patient enough.
Compared to Araujo et al. (2002) we drop the assumption of perfect
competition and model the price formation explicitly using strategic market
games based on Shapley and Shubik (1977) and obtain by that a huge
set of equilibria. Taking into consideration that in reality economies are
not always perfectly competitive explains why in certain market allocations
arise that are not a competitive equilibrium. For example given the initial
endowments in an imperfectly competitive setting modeled by a strategic
market game no trade is a Nash equilibrium and as we have seen there are
many more in the finite horizon case.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
To show Lemma 4.1 for our model, we modify the proof of Giraud and
Weyers (2004) slightly.
Proof. Fix a node ξ ∈ D at time t ≤ T . Since the allocation of initial
endowments (wi(ξ))i are Pareto-inefficient in the L-good spot economy there
exists a consumption stream (x¯i(ξ))i that Pareto dominates (w
i(ξ))i and
satisfies for every good ℓ ∈ L
N∑
i=1
x¯iℓ(ξ) =
N∑
i=1
wiℓ(ξ).
By the strict monotonicity of the preferences, there exists a consumption
stream (x¯′i(ξ))i such that
uit(x¯
′i(ξ)) > uit(x¯
i(ξ)) i = 1, ..., N
and
N∑
i=1
x¯′iℓ (ξ) =
N∑
i=1
wiℓ(ξ).
Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, there exists a hyper-
plane containing (x¯′i(ξ))i and (w
i(ξ))i with a strictly positive price vector
(pℓ(ξ))ℓ∈L. Thus the individual budget restriction
L∑
ℓ=1
pℓ(ξ)x¯
′i
ℓ (ξ) =
L∑
ℓ=1
pℓ(ξ)w
i
ℓ(ξ)
is satisfied and furthermore
E[uit(x¯
′i)] > E[uit(x¯
i
t)] ≥ E[u
i
t(w
i
t)]
for all i ∈ N and t ≤ T .
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4.5.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
To show Lemma 4.2 for our model, we modify the proof of Giraud and
Weyers (2004).
Proof. The final allocation of good ℓ ∈ L available for consumption after
trading at node ξ ∈ D is given by
xiℓ(ξ) = w
i
ℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ − q
i
ℓ(ξ) +
biℓ(ξ)
pℓ(ξ)
−
J∑
j=1
γij(ξ)Cjℓ
Since (x¯i)i∈N is a feasible and affordable consumption stream there exists
a feasible and affordable allocation (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N such that the asset markets
clear at every node ξ ∈ D. For all j ∈ J we have
N∑
i=1
θ¯ij(ξ) =
N∑
i=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ).
Using the market clearing condition on the goods markets we obtain
from the definition of the strategies
N∑
i=1
qiℓ(ξ) =
N∑
i=1
(
wiℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ
−) (YξCj)ℓ
)
=
N∑
i=1
(
x¯iℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ)Cjℓ
)
,
N∑
i=1
biℓ(ξ) = pℓ(ξ)
N∑
i=1
(
x¯iℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ)Cjℓ
)
.
Hence,
p¯ℓ(ξ) =
∑n
i=1 b
i
ℓ(ξ)∑n
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
= pℓ(ξ).
The final allocation of sales and of purchases for asset j ∈ J are given
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by
ϕij(ξ) = γ
i
j(ξ)
θij(ξ) =
βij(ξ)
πj(ξ)
.
Hence from the definition of the strategies using the market clearing
condition on the asset markets we obtain for the asset prices
πj(ξ) =
∑N
i=1 β
i
j(ξ)∑N
i=1 γ
i
j(ξ)
=
π¯j(ξ)
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
j(ξ)∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
j(ξ)
= π¯j(ξ).
Therefore,
xiℓ(ξ) = x¯
i
ℓ(ξ),
ϕij(ξ) = ϕ¯
i
j(ξ)
θij(ξ) = θ¯
i
j(ξ).
It remains to check that the budget constraint (∗iξ) for the bids and offers
is satisfied.
L∑
ℓ=1
biℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
βij(ξ) ≤
L∑
ℓ=1
pℓ(ξ)q
i
ℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
πjγ
i
j(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
(
βij(ξ
−)
πj(ξ−)
− γij(ξ
−)
)
Dj(ξ)
Inserting the assumed strategies for bil(ξ), q
i
l(ξ), γ
i
j(ξ) and β
i
j(ξ) we obtain
for (∗iξ)
L∑
ℓ=1
p¯ℓ(ξ)
(
x¯iℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ)Cjℓ
)
+
J∑
j=1
π¯j(ξ)
(
θ¯ij(ξ)− ϕ¯
i
j(ξ)
)
≤
L∑
ℓ=1
p¯ℓ(ξ)
(
wiℓ(ξ) +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯ij(ξ
−)Cjℓ
)
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+
J∑
j=1
(
θ¯ij(ξ
−)− ϕ¯ij(ξ
−)
)
Dj(ξ)
which holds since (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N was assumed to be a feasible and afford-
able allocation. As (wi(ξ))i ≫ 0, this strategy profile is almost full. This
completes the proof.
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4.5.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. We show that there does not even exist a Nash equilibrium that gives
at least one player less utility than he can obtain from his initial endowment.
This implies that there will not be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with
this property.
Recall that the utility functions of the players are given by
ui(x¯i) = (1− λi)
T∑
t=1
(λi)t−1E[uit(x¯
i
t)].
Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium consumption stream (x¯′i)i∈N of the
T -period strategic market game such that for at least one player i ∈ N we
have
ui(x¯′i) < ui(wi).
Denote by σ = (σ1, ..., σN ) the according strategies. If player i now deviates
and plays the strategy σ¯i = 0, then the resulting allocation for i is
xiℓ(ξ) = w
i
ℓ(ξ) for all ℓ ∈ L,
ϕij(ξ) = θ
i
j(ξ) = 0 for all j ∈ J
for all nodes ξ ∈ D. Thus, by deviation player i can ensure himself always
a utility of ui(wi) which contradicts the assumption that (x¯′i)i∈N is a Nash
equilibrium allocation of the T -period strategic market game.
For almost full strategies we obtain the following: If we want player i
to bid or offer at least ε > 0 (small) on the goods markets where the price
pℓ(ξ) of good ℓ ∈ L is strictly positive, then his bids and offers for good
ℓ ∈ L need to satisfy
qiℓ(ξ) ·
∑
k 6=i
bkℓ (ξ) = b
i
ℓ(ξ) ·
∑
k 6=i
qkℓ (ξ)
to have the same utility as from his initial endowment.
We distinguish between open and closed markets: If
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) > 0 and∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ) > 0, the above relation ensures, that if we look at the price pℓ(ξ)
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of good ℓ ∈ L, we have
pℓ(ξ) =
∑N
i=1 b
i
ℓ(ξ)∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
=
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) + b
i
ℓ(ξ)∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
=
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) + q
i
ℓ(ξ) ·
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ
(ξ)
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ
(ξ)∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
=
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ)
(
1 +
qi
ℓ
(ξ)
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ
(ξ)
)
∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
=
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ)
(∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ
(ξ)
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ
(ξ)
)
∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
=
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ)∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ)
.
Thus, this action does not influence the price of good ℓ ∈ L. The strategies
on the goods markets are
biℓ(ξ) =
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ
(ξ)
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ
(ξ)
· ε,
qiℓ(ξ) = ε.
We have
−qiℓ(ξ) +
biℓ(ξ)
pℓ(ξ)
= −ε+
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ
(ξ)
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ
(ξ)
· ε
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ
(ξ)
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ
(ξ)
= 0
and thus xiℓ(ξ) = w
i
ℓ(ξ). These strategies are budget feasible for player i
since
biℓ(ξ) =
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ)∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ)
· ε
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=
∑N
i=1 b
i
ℓ(ξ)∑N
i=1 q
i
ℓ(ξ)
· ε
= pℓ(ξ)q
i
ℓ(ξ).
A crucial assumption for the arguments from before is that the markets
are open.
For closed markets with
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0 or/and
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0 we dis-
tinguish different cases.
•
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0 and
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0
In this case by bidding and offering ε on the goods markets and 0
on the asset markets player i opens the goods markets and the price
is equal to 1. As the other individuals do not bid or offer in these
markets, player i is only trading with himself and keeps his initial
endowment.
•
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) > 0 and
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0 or
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0 and
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ) >
0
In this case the markets are closed, but in each of the two above cases
there players that want to trade on one side of the market. If player
i places strictly positive offers and bids, then he induces a positive
price and opens the markets. If he is alone on the bidding side, then
bidding a very small amount will necessarily lead to a strictly positive
trade with the other players independently from the amount he might
offer. In this case he has strictly more of that good than his initial
endowment. The case is different if he is alone on the offer side, then
offering a very small amount will necessarily lead to a strictly positive
trade with the other players independently from the amount he might
to bid.
The case
∑
k 6=i b
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0 or/and
∑
k 6=i q
k
ℓ (ξ) = 0, meaning that just
player i places a bid or an offer, does not seem to be reasonable. If we
demand from player i to place a bid and an offer of at least ε, the other
players should be obliged to bid and offer ε at least as well.
Hence, even if we force all the players to play almost full strategies, by
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deviation every player can ensure himself always a utility of ui(wi) which
contradicts the assumption that (x¯′i)i∈N is a Nash equilibrium allocation of
the T -period strategic market game.
This completes the proof.
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4.5.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. To show Theorem 4.1 for our model, we use the idea of Giraud and
Weyers (2004).
Note that if the players play the following actions
βij(ξ) = γ
i
j(ξ) = 0
on the asset markets at node ξ ∈ D, the collateral requirement is 0.
The existence of a generic choice of initial endowments Ω∗(N) at ev-
ery node ξ ∈ D is ensured by Lemma 4.4 assuming that the asset markets
are closed. The markets clear at a Nash equilibrium and the budget con-
straints are binding. For every interior Nash equilibrium of the strategic
market game with closed asset markets at node ξ we can find by Lemma
4.4 an interior Nash equilibrium, denoted by (xi(ξ,N))i∈N , that strictly
Pareto-dominates the initial allocations (wi(ξ))i∈N . At every node ξ ∈ D
we construct a sequence of N(T − 1) Pareto ranked Nash equilibria us-
ing Lemma 4.4. This sequence is denoted by (xn(ξ,N))
N(T−1)
n=1 . Denote by
biℓ(ξ,N, n) and q
i
ℓ(ξ,N, n) the to (x
i
n(ξ,N))i∈N corresponding bids and offers
for commodity ℓ ∈ L for player i ∈ N . Define εin(ξ,N) as the utility loss of
agent i by changing from from the n-th to the (n+ 1)-th Nash equilibrium
and ε(N) is the minimal loss considering all players and all Pareto ranked
Nash equilibria.
εin(ξ,N) = u
i
t
(
xin(ξ,N)
)
− uit
(
xin+1(ξ,N)
)
for all i, n, ξ = (t, ς)
εn(N) = min
i∈N , ξ:t≤τ
εin(ξ,N)
ε(N) = min
n
εn(N)
Assume that the utilities from feasible and affordable allocations are bounded
above by αit for all t and for every player i ∈ N .
4
4An upper bound for the utility an individual can reach having a given amount of ag-
gregate initial endowments is the utility he obtains if we allocate all the endowments to
him.
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Define
αi = max
t≤τ
αit,
α(N) = max
i∈N
αi
and
T 0(N) = ⌊
α(N)
ε(N)
+ 1⌋.
We consider only T ≥ T 0(N) and α(N)
ε(N)
< R ≤ T .
Let (x¯i)i∈N be a consumption stream, that is feasible, affordable and se-
quentially strictly individually rational (with respect to initial endowments)
in the first T −T 0(N) periods. Denote its associated feasible and affordable
allocation by (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N .
Define the strategies as follows:
• for t ≤ T −R: Predefined Play
Use Lemma 4.2 to construct almost full strategies that exactly achieve
(x¯i)i∈N in the first T −R periods.
• for t > T −R: Punishment and Reward
– If there was no deviation from the equilibrium path in the first
T −R periods, then traders play some actions on the goods mar-
kets that yield x1(ξ,N) and on the asset markets
βij(ξ) = γ
i
j(ξ) = 0 for all j ∈ J , i ∈ N .
– If there was at least one deviation from the equilibrium path in
the first T − R periods, say at time t˜, then the punishment for
everyone is to play on the goods markets
biℓ(ξ) = q
i
ℓ(ξ) =
δ
N
for all ℓ ∈ L, i ∈ N .5
5Note that it is possible to choose such a δ > 0 (small enough) since the initial endow-
ments are assumed to be strictly positive.
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and on the asset markets
βij(ξ) = γ
i
j(ξ) = 0 for all j ∈ J , i ∈ N
until period T − R included. Afterwards, if for t > T − R n
deviations have been observed, then the further punishment is to
play xn+1(ξ,N) on the goods markets and to keep the strategy
on the asset markets. Hence, every player occurs at least a utility
loss of εn(N) in each subsequent period of the reward phase after
the n-th deviation was detected.
We now show that this is an approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
if T is big enough. For the ε-perfection observe that
|ui(xi(σ))− ui(x¯i)| ≤ (1− λi)
T∑
t=T−R+1
(λi)t−1|E[uit(x
i
t)]− E[u
i
t(x¯
i
t)]|
≤ 2αi(1− λi)
T∑
t=T−R+1
(λi)t−1
= 2αi(λi)T−R(1− (λi)R)
If we choose λi appropriately (sufficiently close to 1) this inequality can be
made less than ε∗ > 0. Thus, there exists λ1(R,N) such that for mini∈N λ
i ≥
λ1(R,N) we have for every i ∈ N
|ui(xi(σ))− ui(x¯i)| < ε∗.
We further show that nobody has an interest to deviate from the prede-
fined strategies.
Suppose there is a player who deviates in the last R time periods.
• Can a player profitable deviate on the asset markets?
Each date the bids and offers on the financial markets are equal to
0. Thus, a profitable deviation that includes trading assets with other
individuals on the asset markets in the last R time periods is not
possible. The only possible deviation on the asset markets a player
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can make is to trade with “himself”. As a consequence of this action
he has to put up the collateral needed which will be stored for the
next period. Since we assumed that all assets were issued in the first
T −R− 1 periods and since assets can only be traded in their issuing
period, these strategies are not feasible according to condition (F3ξ).
• What is the gain from a deviation on the goods markets?
According to the prescribed strategies, in the last R time periods they
play a Nash equilibrium on the goods markets. Thus no player can
profitably deviate.
Suppose player i wants to deviate before the last R periods. Assume he
deviates in period t¯ ≤ T −R at node ξ. Maximally he can reach the upper
bound of his utility given by αi in the period of his deviation. Moreover, the
maximal amount of each good he can get in each period afterwards is δ. If
he deviates then according to the definition of the strategies above he keeps
his initial endowment in every period after the deviation until including
T − R and obtains additionally maximally δ (from further deviations) for
the periods in between his deviation and the period T − R. Therefore his
maximal gain, considering that a deviation after period T − R cannot be
profitable is
di = (1−λi)
(
(λi)t¯−1(αi − ui(x¯it(ξ)) +
T−R∑
t=t¯+1
(λi)t−1
(
E[uit(w
i
t + δ1)]− E[u
i
t(x¯
i
t)]
))
.
We can choose δ small enough such that
di ≤ (1− λi)(λi)t¯−1αi.
Moreover, his minimal loss, assuming that his is the n-th deviation, is given
by
(1− λi)
T∑
t=T−R+1
(λi)t−1εn(N) ≥ (1− λ
i)R(λi)T ε(N).
Thus if
di ≤ (1− λi)(λi)t¯−1αi < (1− λi)R(λi)T ε(N),
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player i has no incentive to deviate. It remains to show that
(λi)t¯−1αi ≤ R(λi)T ε(N).
For this note that
(λi)t¯−1αi < αi ≤ α(N)
and
α(N) < Rε(N)(λi)T
⇔
α(N)
Rε(N)
< (λi)T
Per assumption we have chosen R such that R > α(N)
ε(N)
and hence the left
hand side is smaller than one,
1
R
α(N)
ε(N)
<
1
R
R = 1.
Therefore, for any T (big enough) we can find R and λ2(R,N) < 1 such
that
(λ2(R,N))
T >
α(N)
ε(N)
.
If mini∈N λ
i ≥ λ2(R,N), then no player has an interest to deviate in the
first T −R periods.
Hence define λ(R,N) := max {λ1(R,N), λ2(R,N)} and choose mini∈N λ
i ≥
λ(R,N). The proposed strategy profile is an almost full subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium that ε∗-approximates (x¯i)i∈N .
Chapter 5
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5.1 Introduction
The events leading to the financial crisis 2007-2008 have highlighted the
importance of belief heterogeneity and how financial markets also create
opportunities for agents with different beliefs to leverage up and speculate.
Several investment and commercial banks invested heavily in mortgage-
backed securities, which subsequently suffered large declines in value. At
the same time, some hedge funds profited from the securities by short-selling
them. One reason for why there has been relatively little attention, in eco-
nomic theory, paid to heterogeneity of beliefs and how these interact with
financial markets is the market selection hypothesis. The hypothesis, orig-
inally formulated by Friedman (1953), claims that in the long run, there
should be limited differences in beliefs because agents with incorrect beliefs
will be taken advantage of, and eventually be driven out of the markets by
those with the correct belief. Therefore, agents with incorrect beliefs will
have no influence on the economic activity in the long run. This hypothe-
sis has been formalized and extended in recent work by Blume and Easley
(2006) and Sandroni (2000). However these authors assume that financial
markets are complete, an assumption which plays a central role in allowing
agents to pledge all their wealth. By contrast, Cao (2010) presents a dy-
namic general equilibrium framework in which agents differ in their beliefs
but markets are endogenously incomplete because of collateral constraints.
Collateral constraints limit the extent to which agents can pledge their fu-
ture wealth and ensure that agents with incorrect beliefs never lose so much
as to be driven out of the market. Consequently all agents, regardless of
their beliefs, survive in the long run and continue to trade on the basis
of those heterogeneous beliefs. This leads to additional leverage and asset
price volatility (relative to a model with homogeneous beliefs or relative to
the complete markets economy).
In this paper, we explore a middle ground between these two strands
of literature, where traders have heterogeneous beliefs, cannot be simply
driven out of the market (thanks to the collateral constraints, as in Cao
2010) but strategically learn the true state of the world. The uncertain
state of the world is a transition matrix that gives the probabilities with
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which a succeeding node in a tree-like time structure is reached. The sets
of players and actions are common knowledge, but the distribution of ini-
tial endowments and one-period utility levels conditional on action profiles
is chosen randomly in each period, and the players do not observe nature’s
choice. Neither do they observe any player’s action —hence, markets are as-
sumed to allow anonymous trading. The probability distribution according
to which uncertainty realizes in each period is a (stationary) Markov chain.
This Markov distribution itself is chosen at random once and for all at the
start of play, and, again, the investors do not observe nature’s choice. The
players have a common prior1 over the finite set of possible Markov chains
(states of the world), and they have various ways of learning the state of
the world over time. First, each player observes her own initial endowment
and realized payoff in each period —both are realizations of random vari-
ables whose distribution depends on the state. Furthermore, each player
observes the return of each financial asset she owns in her portfolio (either
as a creditor or a debtor) unless this asset defaults on its promise. In the
latter case, the collateral is forfeit but the precise delivery of the return
remains unknown.
For investors to be able to learn the state, we flesh-out the general equi-
librium skeleton with a strategic market game.2 More precisely, we study a
strategic market game with infinite horizon, finitely many long-lived traders,
and short-lived real assets. Collateral requirements for financial assets are
introduced as in Geanakoplos and Zame (2007) and the subsequent liter-
ature. Investors’ actions are not observable, so that we stick to the basic
anonymity property of large markets. Nevertheless, players can manipu-
late their opponents’ information by influencing publicly announced prices.
Despite the risk of information manipulation, however, those traders with
incorrect beliefs can realize their mistake along the play of the game, and
strategically learn the state of the world. We therefore focus on learning
equilibria, at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs — not be-
cause they were eliminated from the market (although default is possible
at equilibrium) but because they have taken time to cleverly update their
1See the footnote on page 177 for an argument of this assumption.
2See Giraud (2003) for an introduction.
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prior belief. Our main result is a partial Folk theorem a` la Wiseman (2011):
For any function that maps each state of the world to a sequence of feasible
and sequentially strictly individually rational allocations (precise definitions
are given in section 5.3), and for any degree of precision, there is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which patient players learn the realized state with
this degree of precision and achieve a payoff close to the one specified for
each state. Hence, within this class of equilibria, no player with incorrect
belief stays on the market in the long-run, provided she is patient enough
—thus confirming Friedman’s (1953) hypothesis but with a completely dif-
ferent argument.
The double role of financial assets
Our model extends the finite horizon case without default considered in
Giraud and Weyers (2004) and the finite horizon with default examined in
Brangewitz (2011). In both papers, uncertainty is only on future endow-
ments while, here, we allow for uncertainty on endowments, utilities and
asset returns.3 Moreover, the authors restricted themselves to a very spe-
cific game-theoretic set-up: one with partial monitoring (players condition
their actions on the public history of prices but not on traded quantities, and
on the private history of their own individual trades) and ex ante evaluation
of each player’s payoff — that is, when contemplating a counterfactual, a
player considers only the ex ante impact of her deviation with respect to the
expectation operator computed thanks to some prior belief over the whole
event-tree. Everything being computed ex ante, there was no learning pro-
cess during the play of the game, and the authors proved the analogue of a
perfect Folk theorem.
By contrast, we consider perfect Bayesian equilibria where players can
update their belief along the play of the game. This deeply changes the
strategic challenges at stake: Players with incorrect beliefs can now learn
the state of the world (hence better forecast their future payoffs) through
coordinated experimentation, by trying different action profiles, observing
the resulting payoff realizations, and updating their beliefs about the region
3See Thomas (1995) for an example of general equilibrium model where uncertainty
affects consumer’s future utilities.
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of the event-tree where they are currently located. Financial assets, now,
play a double role: On the one hand, they serve as means for reallocating
one’s resources in face of risky events, on the other they can have a function
analogous to that of “arms” in the multiarmed bandit problem (Rothschild,
1974). Since a buyer and a seller of an asset do not know exactly at which
node of the tree they are, for each asset, there is a separate unknown proba-
bility distribution over returns. Each player’s prior beliefs about the return
distribution induce subjective payoff expectations for each asset, but the
asset with the highest subjective expected payoff may not be the best one
to choose: A trader may prefer to sacrifice expected return in the short run
to gain some information that will help her in the long run. Since there are
several traders meeting on the same market, however, the situation becomes
more complicated: Experimentation has to be somehow coordinated to be
effective, since each trader must deliver information through a specified ac-
tion and strategic considerations may interfere with learning.
As an example, suppose that two traders must decide repeatedly whether
or not to exchange some given financial asset. In each period, the buyer
incurs a cost π (the security’s price) but, the next period, the seller incurs
the risk of having to pay a return a > 0 (“bad state”) to the buyer, or
to receive b > 0 from her (“good state” from the seller’s viewpoint). It is
worthwhile for the players to trade only if the discounted mean value of
the payoff is greater than π for the buyer and the mean value of losses is
smaller than π for the seller. But the only way to find out the mean value is
to experiment by effectively trading in order to learn across time what the
next return of this very asset will be.
The piece of good news provided here is that, as long as it is compatible
with our key Informativeness Assumption (IA, to be described in section 5.5
below), market incompleteness does not prevent investors from learning the
state. We show, indeed, that, despite price manipulation, infinite-horizon
incomplete markets may be fully revealing. This is in the line with the
static general equilibrium literature with real assets, where generically, every
equilibrium is fully revealing (Radner 1979, Duffie and Shafer 1985). Beyond
the difference between our imperfectly competitive approach and the perfect
competition hypothesis, the interpretation of our result, however, strongly
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differs from that of the literature just mentioned. First, we focus only on
fully-revealing equilibria where learning enables players to guess the state in
the long-run with an arbitrary accuracy: There might exist plenty other —
partially revealing or even non-informative— equilibria. Second, we restrict
ourselves to real assets for the sake of clarity. A careful reading of our proof,
however, shows that our result goes through in the nominal asset case, as
well.4 Therefore, from the point of view adopted in this paper, there is no
essential difference between real and nominal assets. This contrasts with the
negative results obtained in the perfectly competitive general equilibrium
literature with incomplete markets of nominal assets (see Rahi 1995 and
the references therein). Third, our (partial) Folk theorem implies a huge
indeterminacy of the set of strategic equilibria which also contrasts with the
generic determinacy obtained by Duffie and Shafer (1985) in the perfectly
competitive set-up with incomplete markets of real assets. Fourth, this
indeterminacy delivers an ambivalent message in terms of welfare: Many
learning equilibria, although they are fully-revealing, are Pareto-dominated
by competitive (Radner) equilibria, while many others Pareto-dominate the
perfectly competitive benchmark with incomplete markets.5
A last point is worth emphasizing before turning to the strategic aspects
of our work. Perfect competition with infinite horizon and incomplete mar-
kets faces an important stumbling block for existence, due to the possibility
of Ponzi schemes at equilibrium. As a consequence, the literature devoted
to this setting usually relies on some transversal budget constraint in or-
der to forbid such Ponzi schemes (see, e.g., Florenzano and Gourdel 1996).
On the other hand, when collateral requirements are added, Araujo et al.
(2002) show that no Ponzi scheme arises at equilibrium. In our imperfectly
competitive set-up, there is no need for such any extra transversal budget
4The proof is actually even simpler. This is why we have treated the real asset case.
5As a side-consideration, our approach may shed some light on the current debate about
dark pools (see Zhu 2011). Dark pools are trading systems that do not display their
orders to the public markets. A recent literature investigates whether dark pools harm
price discovery. In light of our anonymous trading assumption, our result can be inter-
preted as showing that, as long as only market orders are allowed, dark pools do not
prevent intermediaries from correctly learning the state of the world. Further investi-
gation in this direction would require to refine the market micro-structure and to allow
players to send limit-price (not just market) orders to the clearing house.
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constraint, even when markets are complete. Due to the finite number of in-
vestors, indeed, a Ponzi scheme would require at least one player to borrow
money from at least one other player during an infinite number of periods.
The lender would clearly better do not to lend her money so many times
—hence, participating to a Ponzi scheme cannot be part of everyone’s best
reply (see, e.g., O’Connell and Zeldes 1988). This is true with and without
collateral constraints.
Asymmetric information and markets
The kind of uncertainty under scrutiny in this paper affects each investor’s
initial endowments, her utility function, and the returns of financial assets.
This setting captures many aspects extensively studied in the literature in
terms of adverse selection. One key assumption in our approach (the In-
formativeness Assumption, (IA)) can be stated as follows: Observing the
realization of one’s (random) initial endowments, one-period (random) util-
ity levels and (strategically determined) final allocations together with all
the assets’ returns suffices for every single trader to learn the true state of
the world in the long-run with probability arbitrarily close to 1. Needless to
say, this assumption is far from being sufficient to guarantee a priori that
every player will always learn the true state with arbitrary accuracy: for
that purpose, she needs to be able to keep every asset in her portfolio in
every period; she may be diverted by the strategic signaling of her oppo-
nents; the learning process must remain compatible with the equilibrium
conditions, hence should not involve too deep losses. On the other hand,
(IA) is verified in a number of important instances:
Arrow securities
(IA) is clearly satisfied when the asset structure is that of Arrow securi-
ties, where each security pays off 1 in one single state. In this case, observing
assets’ returns suffices to identify the Markov chains’ realization after each
round of trade (even without taking account of prices or of one’s private
knowledge gained by observing endowments and stage-payoffs). After a suf-
ficiently long time, if every trader succeeds in observing every asset’s return,
the true state of the world will become common knowledge. Notice, how-
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ever, that, even in this polar case, full revelation at a strategic equilibrium
is not straightforward, and there is something to be proven: Indeed, our
argument requires that every trader be able to trade every Arrow security
in every period. If one of them fails to observe all the assets’ returns in
certain periods, then she might not draw the right conclusion about which
Markov chain is driving uncertainty, so that players cannot coordinate on
any state-dependent equilibrium path. On the other hand, if, say, only the
riskless asset (delivering the same return in every state) is marketed, then
observing assets’ returns does not provide any information.
Akerlof ’s model
Akerlof’s (1970) model of used cars is a static one. Its extension to our
intertemporal framework can easily be interpreted as verifying (IA). Sup-
pose, indeed, that the quality index, s, of a car is an integer belonging to
[1, 10]. s is distributed according to the Markov chain ω. As quality of a
car is undistinguishable beforehand by the buyer (due to the asymmetry of
information), incentives exist for the seller to pass off low-quality goods as
higher-quality ones. The buyer, however, takes this incentive into consider-
ation, and takes the quality of the goods to be uncertain. Only the average
quality of the goods will be considered, which, in a one-shot-set-up, will
have the side effect that goods that are above average in terms of quality
will be driven out of the market. In our multi-period setting, however, this
need not occur: Each time t, the seller receives a new (random) endow-
ment of used cars. Each period, the buyers are informed ex post (through
their stage-payoff) about the actual quality, s, of the car they have bought.
Across time, they may learn the transition matrix ω, hence anticipate the
distribution of s in the future. Our main result then says that the observa-
tion of prices and private knowledge enables actors on the market for used
cars to enforce a large set of effective trades. This sharply contrasts with
Akerlof’s conclusion that the market for used cars should collapse.
Moral hazard.
Since investors take privately observed actions affecting their initial en-
dowments and portfolios, our paper is also linked to the literature on moral
hazard. The differences in information and the signaling aspects of the
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present work are related to, for example, job market signaling model of
Spence (1973) or the competitive insurance market considered in Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976). However, we do not consider a classical principal agent
model. Every individual may act as a seller or a buyer (or both simulta-
neously), and this on commodity as well as asset markets. Therefore, we
cannot impose, for example, that a seller is always less informed than a
buyer or vice versa. Finally, we consider only finitely many players. Our
set-up therefore sharply differs from the perfectly competitive case studied
in the seminal papers by Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b) or, more re-
cently, by Acemoglu and Simsek (2010). In particular, we get a wide range
of equilibria including allocation streams that are Pareto-optimal and oth-
ers that are dominated. Thus, our result stands at distance both from the
generic inefficiency obtained by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1984) or Arnott
and Stiglitz (1986, 1990, 1991), and from the more positive results obtained
by Acemoglu and Simsek (2010).
The paper is organized as follows: First we describe the infinite horizon
economy and its associated strategic market game. Section 5.3 focuses on
a particularly important subclass of allocations that plays a key role in the
sequel. The next section proves a first (partial) Folk theorem under the
simplifying assumption of complete information. Section 5.5 extends the
later result to the incomplete information case. The last section concludes.
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5.2 The Markov Strategic Market Game with
Collateral
5.2.1 The Markov Economy
The environment
Uncertainty about future states is modeled in a Markov set up, following
Cao (2010). We assume that in each period, t, the state of nature in the
next period is chosen using a Markov transition matrix with a finite set of
possible states of nature S = {1, ..., S}. Therefore, the state tomorrow only
depends on the state today and not the whole history of states that were
realized in the past. Nevertheless as in Magill and Quinzii (1994) and the
subsequent literature, time, uncertainty and the revelation of information
can be described by an event tree, i.e., a directed graph (D,A) consisting
of a set D of vertices and a set A ⊂ D × D of (oriented) arcs.6 In our
Markov set-up, we assume that each node ξ has the same outdegree S > 1,
and the choice of nodes adjacent from ξ is governed by a Markov chain.
A node ξ can be interpreted as a date-event pair (t, st−1, s), where t ≥ 1
is the minimal length of a walk between ξ0 and ξ, st−1 ∈
t−1∏
t′=1
S is the
sequence of realizations of the state of nature up to t − 1 and s ∈ S is
the last state in t. Let τ(ξ) be the time at which node ξ is reached, i.e.
τ : D→ N such that ξ = (t, st−1, s) 7→ t. Define a partial order ≥ on D by
ξ = (t, st−1, s) ≥ ξ
′ = (t′, st′−1, s
′) if, and only if, there is a walk from ξ′ to
ξ. Of course, if ξ 6= ξ′ and ξ ≥ ξ′, then ξ > ξ′. The unique predecessor of ξ
is denoted by ξ− = (t − 1, st−2, s
′).7 The set of immediate successors of ξ,
denoted by ξ+, is the set of nodes that are adjacent from ξ. For any node
6The vertex (or node) ξ can be thought of as a particular state of nature and time. If
(ξ, η) is an arc, η is a node that directly follows ξ. Formally, ξ is adjacent to η and η
is adjacent from ξ. The number of nodes adjacent to a given vertex ξ is the indegree of
ξ, i.e. the number of immediate (or direct) predecessors; the number of nodes adjacent
from ξ, its outdegree, i.e. the number of direct followers. A walk from ξ1 to ξk is a
sequence (ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξk) in D such that ξi is adjacent to ξi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. There
is a unique root ξ0 (whose indegree is zero). Each node, except the root, has indegree
equal to 1, and there is no cycle in D.
7We define s−1 = ∅.
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ξ ∈ D, the set of all nodes with ξ′ ≥ (>)ξ is denoted by D(ξ) (D(ξ)+) and
is itself a tree with root ξ.
A state of the world corresponds to a transition matrix, ω, that is chosen
once and for all at time 0, before the start of the play. We assume that there
are finitely many states of the world, ω ∈ Ω.
Consumption goods and financial assets
We consider a pure exchange economy E with a finite set, N = {1, ..., N},
of individuals, L consumption goods, usually indexed by ℓ, and J short-
term real assets, indexed by j. The possibility of default is introduced
by a collateral requirement as in Araujo et al. (2002). A financial asset
j ∈ J := {1, ..., J} is characterized by a tuple (ξj, Aj , Cj) consisting of three
elements: an issuing node, promised deliveries and collateral requirements.
The issuing node (a node in the tree D) is denoted by ξj. The promised
amount of goods is described by a function Aj : D→ R
L
+ such that Aj(ξ) = 0
for all ξ ∈ D \ (ξj)
+
. For ξ′ ∈ (ξj)
+
, the promises Aj(ξ
′) are the amounts
of goods that a seller of asset j promises to deliver to a buyer of asset j
in the next period following the issuing node ξj. The delivery, pξ · Aj(ξ),
is assumed to be made in fiat money using spot prices, pξ ∈ R
L
+. We only
consider short-term assets. Therefore, for other nodes before the issuing
node and at least two periods after the asset was issued, we assume that the
promised amounts are zero. The vector Cj ∈ R
L
+ is the amount of collateral
needed at the issuing node, ξj, in order to back up the promised delivery
Aj. Only consumption goods can serve as collateral.
8 Commodities are
assumed to be perishable. Thus, they have to be consumed at the very
date they enter the economy (as initial endowment), unless they are stored
as collateral. Individuals are not allowed to consume a collateral, which is
stored in a warehouse for one period. For simplicity, after having been stored
one period, a collateral must be consumed, otherwise it gets lost.9 For our
Markov environment, we assume that at each node ξ ∈ D the “same” finite
8i.e., we do not introduce securities that are backed by other securities: Pyramiding is
not allowed.
9We could allow for a longer life expectancy of a collateral, of length, say, K, but at the
cost of cumbersome notations. We thus take K = 1.
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number of financial assets is issued. As the time horizon is infinite there
will be infinitely many assets in total.
The players
Every player i ∈ N is characterized by a twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing and concave utility function uiξ : R
L
+ → R and a strictly
positive initial endowment in consumption goods wiξ ∈ R
L
++ at every node
ξ ∈ D. We assume that
(
uiξ(·)
)
ξ
are uniformly bounded below for all indi-
viduals i. Therefore, without loss of generality suppose uiξ(0) = 0. More-
over, we assume that individual endowments are uniformly bounded above
by some w, across individuals and periods. Initial holdings of assets are
0. Player i maximizes her expected, discounted utility from consumption.
This expectation depends on her subjective beliefs on the state of the world
ω ∈ Ω, which may themselves vary across time, depending upon the signals
sent by other players during the play of the game. We shall therefore define
player’s i objective function after having recalled the basic structure of the
strategic market game.
We also denote by Eξ = 〈w
i
ξ, u
i
ξ(·), (ξ
j, Aj , Cj)j | ξj=ξ〉 the finite-dimensional
one-shot economy at node ξ. We denote the infinite horizon economy start-
ing from a certain node ξ, that is not necessarily the root ξ0, for short the
economy after ξ, by
⋃
ξ′>ξ Eξ′ .
5.2.2 The Strategic Market Game with Collateral
At each period, players take part to a strategic market game a` la Shapley and
Shubik (1977): Each individual places for every consumption good ℓ ∈ L
at every node ξ ∈ D a bid biξ,ℓ and an offer q
i
ξ,ℓ. The bid b
i
ξ,ℓ signals how
much (in terms of fiat money) player i is willing to pay for the purchase of
good ℓ and the offer qiξ,ℓ (in terms of physical commodities) is the amount
she wants to sell. The price of good ℓ is then computed as the ratio of the
total bid to the total offer, that is
CHAPTER 5. INFINITE HORIZON 166
pξ,ℓ =


∑N
i=1 b
i
ξ,ℓ
∑N
i=1 q
i
ξ,ℓ
if
∑N
i=1 q
i
ξ,ℓ > 0
0 otherwise
A market without trade is said to be closed.10
Similarly, at every node ξ ∈ D each player places a bid βiξ,j stipulating
the amount of money she is ready to spend in buying asset j and offers for
sale γiξ,j units of this very asset. The asset’s price is given by:
πξ,j =


∑N
i=1 β
i
ξ,j
∑N
i=1 γ
i
ξ,j
if
∑N
i=1 γ
i
j(ξ) > 0
0 otherwise
When the promises are settled, a seller of the financial asset j ∈ J
compares the value of the promise with the value of the collateral and pays
back the minimal value:
Dξ′,j = min {pξ′ · Aj(ξ
′), pξ′ · Cj} (D)
at node ξ′ ∈ (ξj)+. Hence, whether default appears or not is not the outcome
of a strategic decision but depends upon the commodity price pξ′ , which is
strategically determined by bids and offers posted at node ξ′ ∈ (ξj)+.
Feasible bids and offers
Some physical and budgetary restrictions are put on the bids and offers
individuals can choose. At every node ξ ∈ D and for every financial asset,
player i needs to own the required amount of collateral, which depends on
the quantity of asset offered for sales and not on the net trades.11 Assuming
player i offers to sell γiξ,j units of asset j at node ξ, then she needs to store
10Defining the price as zero when there are no offers on the market we follow here for
example Amir et al. (1990, p.128). Similar assumptions can be found in Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1978, p.128), Peck et al. (1992, p.275) or Giraud and Weyers (2004,
p.474).
11As discussed in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), netting before imposing the collateral
requirement would suppress any constraint on the size of short sales. This would make
the proof of our partial Folk theorem only easier.
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γiξ,jCj ∈ R
L
+ as collateral.
12
Feasible bids and offers must satisfy the following two constraints for all
commodities ℓ:
J∑
j=1
γiξ,jCjℓ ≤ w
i
ξ,ℓ (F1ξ)
and
qiξ,ℓ ≤
J∑
j=1
γiξ−,jCjℓ +∆(F1ξ), (F2ξ)
where ∆(F1ξ) stands for the difference between the right-hand side and
the left-hand side of (F1ξ). Inequality (F1ξ) says that the collateral that
can be stored by i at node ξ must be taken out of initial endowments. In
particular, it cannot consist of commodities that are already inherited from
the past as collaterals. This is a way to capture our assumption that every
collateral lives at most one period. Either it is consumed at the period it
enters into the economy (as initial endowment) or it is stored and consumed
one period later. Notice that, in the second period of a collateral’s life, it
may be traded by its owner, and consumed by another player. Condition
(F2ξ) says that the offered amount of goods plus the amount of goods that
must be stored as a collateral cannot exceed the initial endowment of player
i at node ξ ∈ D plus the collateral that was put aside in the previous period.
Of course, we impose:
qiξ,ℓ, b
i
ξ,ℓ, β
i
ξ,j, γ
i
ξ,j ≥ 0 (F3ξ)
for all ℓ ∈ L, j ∈ J .
12Later, on page 169 when defining the final allocation in consumption goods, the collat-
eral requirement is taken using the final asset sales, denoted by ϕiξ,j and not directly
on the offers γiξ,j .
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The budget constraint
Player i also faces the following budget constraint on fiat money when plac-
ing bids and offers:
L∑
ℓ=1
biζ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
βiζ,j
≤
L∑
ℓ=1
pζ,ℓq
i
ζ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
πζ,jγ
i
ζ,j +
J∑
j=1
(
θiζ−,j − ϕ
i
ζ−,j
)
Dζ,j (∗
i
ξ1)
for all ζ ≤ ξ where θiζ−,j denotes the final asset purchases and ϕ
i
ζ−,j the asset
sales at node ζ− (as it will be defined below). Thus, by condition (∗iξ1) the
total value of bids cannot exceed the amount of money player i can get given
her sales and given the dividends received from her portfolio, θiζ−,j − ϕ
i
ζ−,j.
As soon as (∗iξ1) is violated, say at node ξ, individual i is removed from
the game for all subsequent nodes D+(ξ), and all her goods are confiscated
forever.
We shall also need the following condition, for every i:
Either
∑
k 6=i
γkξ,j 6= 0 or
∑
k 6=i
βkξ,j 6= 0, (∗
i
ξ2)
which says that there is at least one other individual on the bidding or on
the offering side of the financial markets to trade with i.
Final allocations
After trading took place, player i’s holdings of asset j ∈ J are given by her
sales
ϕiξ,j =
{
γiξ,j if (∗
i
ξ1) and (∗
i
ξ2) holds
0 otherwise
and her purchases
θiξ,j =
{
βi
ξ,j
πξ,j
if (∗iξ1) and (∗
i
ξ2) hold and πξ,j > 0
0 otherwise.
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Note that if θiξ,j − ϕ
i
ξ,j < 0 then player i sold more of the financial asset
j ∈ J than she bought. Analogously for θiξ,j − ϕ
i
ξ,j > 0 she is a net buyer.
Moreover, player i’s allocation of good ℓ ∈ L available for consumption
at the end of the current period at node ξ, is
xiξ,ℓ =


wiξ,ℓ +
∑J
j=1 ϕ
i
ξ−,jCjℓ − q
i
ξ,ℓ +
bi
ξ,ℓ
pξ,ℓ
−
∑J
j=1 ϕ
i
ξ,jCjℓ if (∗
i
ξ1) holds and pξ,ℓ > 0
wiξ,ℓ +
∑J
j=1 ϕ
i
ξ−,jCjℓ − q
i
ξ,ℓ −
∑J
j=1 ϕ
i
ξ,jCjℓ if (∗
i
ξ1) holds and pξ,ℓ = 0
0 otherwise.
Remark. To the best of our knowledge, condition (∗iξ2) is new in the strate-
gic market game literature. It seems to us natural once collateral require-
ments are introduced. Suppose, indeed, that individual i is the only one who
wants to trade on the financial markets, i.e.,
∑
k 6=i γ
k
ξ,j =
∑
k 6=i β
k
ξ,j = 0. Ab-
sent condition (∗iξ2), this individual could open the markets by bidding and
offering strictly positive amounts of assets. By doing so, every player could
store some collateral until next period just by trading “with herself” today.
If for several periods such a strategy is played, while the other players play
zero strategies, this would conflict with our assumption that commodities
are perishable.
5.3 Feasibility and interim individual ratio-
nality
Allowable strategies
The action set of player i at node ξ consists in feasible bids and offers:
Aiξ =
{(
qiξ,ℓ, b
i
ξ,ℓ
)
ℓ∈L
,
(
γiξ,j, β
i
ξ,j
)
j∈J
∈ R2L+ × R
2J
+
∣∣(F1ξ), (F2ξ) and (F3ξ) are satisfied} .
Notice that Aiξ depends upon ξ but not upon ω. Let Aξ :=
∏N
i=1A
i
ξ. Note
that the definition of an action set includes actions that possibly violate
the budget constraint (∗iξ1) or (∗
i
ξ2).
13 The stage-payoff of player i at node
13An alternative would consist in incorporating these constraints into the very definition
of a player’s strategy set but this would lead to a generalized game as introduced by
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ξ = (t, st−1, s) is given by the utility, u
i
ξ(x
i
ξ), she obtains from consumption.
Prices are publicly observed by every player. The information transmit-
ted through prices is therefore common knowledge. However, at each node,
every player also observes her own initial endowment, her final stage-payoff,
her final allocation as well as the returns of the assets present in her portfo-
lio. These observations constitute the private history of player i. A strategy
of player i consists in choosing an action at every node ξ ∈ D as a function
of her own private history. Let H iξ denote the set of possible private histories
for individual i at node ξ, given by
H iξ :=
{(
pξ′ , πξ′ , ϕ
i
ξ′ , θ
i
ξ′ , x
i
ξ′ , u
i
ξ′(x
i
ξ′), w
i
ξ′ , w
i
ξ
)∣∣∀ξ′ < ξ}.
The history at the root ξ0 is given by H
i
ξ0
=
{
wiξ0
}
. Formally, a strategy of
player i is a map
σi :
⋃
ξ∈D
H iξ →
(
RL+
)2
×
(
RJ+
)2
such that σi(h) ∈ Aiξ for all ξ ∈ D and for all h ∈ H
i
ξ. Actions are not
observed along the play of the game, which contrasts with the setting con-
sidered, e.g., by Wiseman (2011).
Remark. As is well-known, strategic market games exhibit no-trade as a
one-shot Nash equilibrium.14 As we want to prove the analogue of a Folk
theorem, we shall therefore need some threats that enforce the equilibrium
path. Allowing for punishment phases that consist in playing the autar-
kic Nash one-shot equilibrium ad libitum would make the task rather easy.
In order to prove that our result does not depend upon this kind of trick
(hence is robust to whatever refinement that would allow to get rid of the
autarkic one-shot equilibrium15), we shall focus on out-of-equilibrium strate-
gies where players effectively trade. A second reason for not relying on the
Debreu (1952) (see also Harker (1991) or Facchinei and Kanzow (2010)).
14See Weyers (2004) for the elimination of this autarkic equilibrium after two rounds of
elimination of dominated strategies.
15Such a refinement has been proposed, e.g. by Weyers (2004). As a consequence, Giraud
and Weyers (2004) Folk theorem with complete information was already formulated so
as not to rely on the autarkic threat.
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heavy hammer of autarkic Nash equilibria is that, as already said, in ad-
verse selection problems, the market collapse has been sometimes predicted
as being the unique rational consequence of differential information. Our
proof does not depend upon such a global market collapse, even as an out-
of-equilibrium threat, and even though default is explicitly allowed along
the equilibrium path.
Definition 5.1 (Full strategy profile). A strategy profile σ := (σi)i is
called full if, the following holds
N∑
i=1
qiξ,ℓ > 0,
N∑
i=1
biξ,ℓ > 0,
N∑
i=1
γiξ,j > 0,
N∑
i=1
βiξ,j > 0
for all ℓ ∈ L, j ∈ J , ξ ∈ D.
Private interim beliefs
At each node ξ, payoffs are determined as follows: action profile aξ ∈ Aξ is
played; it induces, say, xiξ as a final allocation for player i—which is observed
by i only. Then player i’s random payoff, uiξ(x
i
ξ), which is also observed by
player i only, is drawn according to ω. Notice that, when entering at node
ξ, player i may not know for sure that the current node is ξ. Thus, when she
takes her action, she considers the expectation of her next payoffs according
to her current private belief.
At each time period t, every player i updates her private belief in a
Bayesian way, according to her private history. We allow for arbitrary cor-
relation of payoffs in each state across players’ utilities, endowments, assets’
returns. So player i’s belief about player j’s private payoff and other higher-
order beliefs are unrestricted. Let Piξ(h
i
ξ) ∈ ∆(Ω) denote player i’s private
belief at node ξ.16 Together with a strategy profile, σ, such a probability
Piξ(h
i
ξ) induces a distribution P
i
ξ(h
i
ξ, σ) (or P
i
ξ(σ) in short) over the random
characteristics of the economy to be selected after ξ, i.e., over
⋃
ξ′>ξ Eξ′ .
In particular, it provides a distribution over i’s future payoffs which, by a
16Hereby, ∆(Ω) is the set of all probability distributions over the finite set of states of
the world.
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slight abuse of notations, is also denoted Piξ(σ). At each node, whatever
being the past history, individuals are supposed to maximize her expected,
discounted utility using their private interim belief and a common discount
factor λ ∈ [0, 1].17 The objective function of player i is therefore of the form
U i
D(ξ)(x
i, σ, ω) := (1− λ)EPi
ξ
(σ)
∑
ξ′=(t,st−1,s)>ξ
λt−1uiξ′(x
i
ξ′)
= (1− λ)
∑
ξ′=(t,st−1,s)>ξ
λt−1EPi
ξ
(σ)
[
uiξ′(x
i
ξ′)
]
for each node ξ. (Given the boundedness of the utility function, the last
equality is a consequence of Fubini’s theorem.)
Feasible allocations and interim individual rationality
Without considering explicitly actions or strategies we define feasible allo-
cation as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Feasible allocation). An allocation (x¯i)i∈N in consump-
tion goods is said to be feasible, if there exists a portfolio (ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N and a
price system (p¯, π¯) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• Individual budget restriction for every player i and every node ξ ∈ D:18
∑L
ℓ=1 p¯ξ,ℓ
(
x¯iξ,ℓ +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,jCjℓ
)
+
∑J
j=1 π¯ξ,j
(
θ¯iξ,j − ϕ¯
i
ξ,j
)
=
∑L
ℓ=1 p¯ξ,ℓ
(
wiξ,ℓ +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ−,jCjℓ
)
+
∑J
j=1
(
θ¯iξ−,j − ϕ¯
i
ξ−,j
)
Dj(ξ)
• market clearing on spot markets for every good ℓ ∈ L and every node:
∑N
i=1
(
x¯iξ,ℓ +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,jCjℓ
)
=
∑N
i=1
(
wiξ,ℓ +
∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ−,jCjℓ
)
• market clearing on financial markets for every asset j ∈ J and every
node:∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j =
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j
17Allowing for idiosyncratic discount factors would only require notational changes.
18We define ϕ¯i
ξ
−
0
,j
= θ¯i
ξ
−
0
,j
= 0.
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• and feasible trade in financial assets for every good ℓ ∈ L, every node
and every player i:∑J
j=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,jCjℓ ≤ w
i
ξ,ℓ
Clearly, for every individual i, the sequence of payoffs resulting from the
consumption of initial endowments is bounded from below by a constant,
say, ui. Define u := mini∈N u
i. Since initial endowments are uniformly
bounded, the stage-game payoff, uiξ(·), induced by a feasible allocation is
also uniformly bounded above by some ui across all action profiles, all states
and all periods. Define u := maxi∈N u
i.
In the next definition, individual rationality is understood according to
the interim private beliefs shared by players along the play of the game.
It is therefore defined given some state of the world, ω, and some strategy
profile, σ.
Definition 5.3 (Sequentially strictly individually rational alloca-
tion).
A feasible allocation (x¯i)i∈N is said to be sequentially strictly individually
rational (ssir) given ω, if
U i
D(ξ)(x
i, σ, ω) > (1− λ)EPi
ξ
(σ)
∑
ξ′=(t,st−1,s)>ξ
λt−1uiξ′(w
i
ξ′).
The following Lemma says that our last two definitions generically de-
scribe a non-vacuous subset of allocations in the economy E , on which, from
now on, we shall focus.
Lemma 5.1. If the initial allocations (wiξ)i ≫ 0 are Pareto-inefficient in
the L-good spot economy at each node ξ ∈ D, then the economy E admits
a sequentially strictly individually rational and feasible (ssirf, for short)
allocation.
The next Lemma will prove useful for our main result. It shows that
every ssirf allocation can be enforced by means of some adequate strategy.
Such a strategy, however, need not fulfill any equilibrium requirement.
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Lemma 5.2. Let (x¯i)i∈N be a ssirf allocation. Let (ϕ¯
i, θ¯i)i∈N and (p¯, π¯)
be the corresponding portfolio and price system. Then (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N can be
implemented through the following strategy profile in the sense that, node-
wise, the utility of this strategy profile is arbitrarily close to the node-wise
utility of (x¯i)i∈N . Whatever being the past history, play
for all ξ ∈ D, i ∈ N , ℓ ∈ L and j ∈ J
qiξ,ℓ = w
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ−,jCjℓ
biξ,ℓ = p¯ξ,ℓ
(
x¯iξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ,jCjℓ
)
γiξ,j =
{
ϕ¯iξ,j if
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
δ
N
otherwise
βiξ,j =
{
π¯ξ,j θ¯
i
ξ,j if
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
δ
N
otherwise
with δ > 0 small. Clearly, the above strategies are full.
If we target a given allocation using the full strategies as defined in
Lemma 5.2 and this allocation does not always require trade on the asset
markets, then we cannot target the allocation exactly. For the details we
refer to the proof in Appendix 5.7.2. This is due to the presence of the
collateral constraints. Nevertheless choosing δ > 0 arbitrarily small we
reach an allocation that is close to the target allocation.
5.4 Complete Information
We first state our result in the simpler case where information is complete,
i.e., the Markov chain ω is known from the beginning by every player.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that #Ω = 1. Every allocation that is ssirf can be
approximately enforced as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
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Proof. Let (x∗iξ )i,ξ be a ssirf allocation for the transition matrix ω with
stage-payoffs (v∗iξ )i,ξ :=
(
uiξ(x
∗i
ξ )
)
i,ξ
. We denote by Eω the expectation op-
erator with respect to the beliefs that the state of the world is given by ω.
The utility for player i resulting from x∗i is then given by
U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, σ, ω) = (1− λ)
∑
ξ′=(t,st−1,s)>ξ0
λt−1Eω
[
uiξ′(x
∗i
ξ′ )
]
.
We construct a sequence of payoff vectors
(
(vi,ndev)i
)
n∈N
that result from
ssirf allocations, and such that: v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ < v
i,ndev
ξ for every integer n ∈ N
and every node ξ — with vi,0dev = v∗i for each i. These payoffs will be the
long-run payoffs after n deviations. They are constructed as follows:
vi,ndevξ := u
i
ξ
(
xi,ndevξ
)
with xi,ndevξ := ρnx
∗i
ξ + (1− ρn)w
i
ξ, ρn ∈ (0, 1).
Assume that, for every n ∈ N and ξ = (t, st−1, s) ∈ D:
0 < εn < v
i,ndev
ξ − v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ (5.1)
Using Lemma 5.2 we construct full strategies that result approximately
in the target allocation (x∗i)i∈N . If there is no deviation from these strate-
gies, then every individual continues to play these strategies. The punish-
ment, if one individual deviates, is to play the following strategies: Every
individual bids and offers δ
N
with δ > 0 small on the goods and on the
assets markets for the next Tn periods, if the nth deviation had been ob-
served. As all individuals bid and offer the same quantities, these strategies
mimic the no trade equilibrium and everybody keeps her initial endowment.
On the asset markets however every individual sells δ
N
of every asset and
hence needs to have a collateral of δ
N
Cjℓ. As there is no trade on the goods
markets, this additional collateral needs to be established from the initial
endowments, which are strictly positive. Thus, δ needs to be small enough
such that this is can be done.
After the punishment phase dedicated to the nth deviation there is a
reward phase, if no further deviation has occurred. As soon as another
deviation occurs, a new punishment phase of length Tn+1 starts immediately.
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Suppose the nth deviation has occurred and there was no further deviation
during the punishment phase. Then in the reward phase the individuals
play some actions, as defined in Lemma 5.2, leading approximately to a
ssirf allocation with a stage payoff of vi,ndevξ . Notice that in order to settle
the asset market obligations from the punishment phase and to establish the
right asset holdings to reach vi,ndevξ two periods of transition are required to
ensure that the individual budget constraint (∗iξ1) is not violated. For the
details concerning the transition periods we refer to the proof of Theorem
5.2, page 190. Taking this punishment behavior into consideration we show
that there is no incentive to deviate.
Suppose individual i deviates at node ξ = (t′, st′−1, s) and this was the
(n+1)th deviation observed. We need to compare the gains and losses from
the deviation. Individual i can by deviating maximally reach the upper
bound of her utility given by u¯i in the period of her deviation. In the
succeeding Tn+1 periods after the deviation: According to the definition of
the strategies above she stays close her initial endowment. The (n + 1)th
deviation payoff is arbitrarily close to
(1− λ)
[
λt
′−1ui +
t′+Tn+1∑
t=t′+1
λt−1Eω[u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
]
+
Tn+1+t′+2∑
t=Tn+1+t′+1
λt−1u
+
∑
t≥Tn+1+t′+3
λt−1Eω[v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ ]
]
. (5.2)
The long-run discounted payoff after the (n + 1)th deviation consists of
once a (maybe) very high payoff from deviating, then the payoff from a
punishment phase lasting Tn+1 periods, two periods of transition with a
payoff of maximally u and finally the (n+ 1)th reward payoff.
By contrast, if the (n + 1)th deviation did not take place, i’s long-run
payoff starting at time t′ would be arbitrarily close to:
(1− λ)
[∑
t≥t′
λt−1Eω[v
i,ndev
ξ ]
]
. (5.3)
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Therefore to show that (5.3) - (5.2) is positive it is enough to ensure that:
u− 3u+
t′+Tn+1∑
t=t′+1
λt−t
′−1Eω[v
i,ndev
ξ − u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
] + εn
[ ∑
t≥Tn+1+t′+3
λt−t
′−1
]
> 0.
Note that since vi,ndev was assumed to be a payoff that results from a sequen-
tially strictly individually rational allocation we have Eω[v
i,ndev
ξ −u
i
ξ(w
i
ξ)] > 0
for every t ∈ N, for every individual i ∈ N . Therefore define
gξ := min
i∈N
Eω[v
i,ndev
ξ − u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
]
Therefore, it is sufficient to require that:
u− 3u+
t′+Tn+1∑
t=t′+1
λt−t
′−1gξ + εn
λTn+1+2
1− λ
> 0.
It is easy to see that, whatever being the distance, u − 3u, and for every
εn > 0, there exists some Tn+1 big enough so that this last inequality is
satisfied. Hence, deviating behavior is not profitable. This completes the
proof.
5.5 Incomplete Information
In this section, we turn to the general case where #Ω ≥ 1. Players observe
neither the choice of ω, nor that of ξ. They start with the same prior, P, over
Ω, but, along the play, they may (and, in general, they will) have different
interim beliefs, depending upon the private information they receive.19 Each
household has five ways of updating its beliefs about the state ω over time.
• First, at node ξ, each player privately observes her own (random) spot
endowment, wiξ, which is chosen by nature according to the transition
matrix ω.
19This is in accordance with the arguments provided by Heifetz (2006) showing that it
makes hardly sense, within a game-theoretic setting, to assume that players start with
distinct priors. Of course, Aumann’s theorem implies that, along a play of the game it
will not be common knowledge that traders have distinct interim beliefs.
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• Second and third, at every node, after having played her action, each
player observes public prices, pξ and πξ, together with her final alloca-
tion, xiξ. Prices and final allocations depend upon the players’ actions
and vary in informativeness across action profiles: they only reveal
the part of the privately hold information that players are ready to
transmit through their bids and offers.
• Fourth, a trader may also learn about the state by observing her final
stage-payoff, uiξ(x
i
ξ), which is selected according to ξ —given x
i
ξ.
• Finally, the return of the assets she owns in her portfolio (either as a
creditor or as a debtor) also provide information about the realization
of ξ, hence, about ω.
In order to cope with this differential information set-up, we shall need
two key restrictions —Assumptions G and IA.
Assumption G. The set of L consumption goods is partitioned
into two subsets, L = La∪Lc with La∩Lc = ∅. Only commodi-
ties in Lc can be used as collateral, and assets’ promises deliver
only in commodities that belong to La.
In other words, a commodity cannot serve both as a collateral and as a
promise. We use this partition of the commodities to ensure that, during
the play of the game, a single player cannot prevent the other individuals
from learning the true state of the world, ω.
Along a play of the game, while endowments, utility payoffs and as-
set payoffs are observed privately, prices are publicly revealed. Notice that,
given actions aξ, prices are entirely determined — i.e., there is no additional
randomness on public signals, by contrast with Wiseman (2011) where pub-
lic signals are random. Of course, the distribution matrix, ω, might be
degenerate so that payoffs or returns are non-stochastic conditional on ω.
In this case, the realization of payoffs and/or returns perfectly reveals the
state of the world. On the contrary, if two distributions do have the same
support, players may never be able to learn the true state for sure by just
observing their private characteristics and the assets’ returns.
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Given the state of the world, ω, a strategy profile, σ = (σi), induces a
unique probability distribution on the space of sequences (uiξ(x
i
ξ(σ)), x
i
ξ(σ),
wiξ, Aj(ξ))i,j,ξ. Let us call this distribution, Pω,σ. This is the distribu-
tion over signals from which players try to infer ω. For any two states
ω 6= ω′, there must be at least some player i and some strategy profile
σ = (σi)i such that the distributions induced by (ω, σ) and (ω
′, σ) over
(uiξ(x
i
ξ(σ)), x
i
ξ(σ), w
i
ξ, Aj(ξ))i,j,ξ differ on a set of positive measure. Two
states of the world that yield almost surely the same payoff, final allocation,
endowment and return distributions to every agent and whatever being the
strategy played, can be treated as a single state. Therefore, there is no loss
of generality in assuming that a complete sequence of stage-payoff profiles,
(uiξ(·))i,ξ, final allocations, (x
i
ξ(σ))i,ξ, endowments, (w
i
ξ)i,ξ, and asset returns,
(Aj(ξ))j,ξ, jointly identify the state statistically for at least one well-chosen
strategy profile, σ. This does not mean, however, that, by observing her
own private sequence of realized individual payoffs, endowments and asset
returns, a single trader is able to learn the state of the world whatever being
the strategy played. Neither need prices suffice to identify by themselves the
state.20 The following assumption is therefore, admittedly, a restriction: it
says that, for every “reasonable” strategy profile, stage-payoffs, final alloca-
tions and asset returns plus individual endowments contain all the relevant
information about ω. Illustrations of textbook models that satisfy this as-
sumption were given in the Introduction of the paper.
Recall that, given some Markov chain ω, µω ∈ ∆(S) is an invariant
measure of ω if
µω(s) =
∑
s′
ωs′sµω(s
′) ∀s ∈ S.
Suppose that the Markov chain ω is irreducible and aperiodic.21 Then,
it admits an invariant measure if, and only if, every state of nature s ∈ S is
20When prices are interpreted as public signals, this generality contrasts with Wiseman
(2005) where the sole observation of public signals suffices to identify the state with no
ambiguity.
21A state s ∈ S has period k if any return to state s must occur in multiples of k steps.
If k = 1, state s is said aperiodic. If every state s ∈ S is aperiodic, ω is said aperiodic.
The Markov chain ω is irreducible if it is possible to connect every state s ∈ S with any
other state s′ ∈ S with positive probability.
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positive recurrent.22 In this case, µω is unique.
Informativeness Assumption (IA)
(1) For any pair of nodes (t, st−1, s) = ξ 6= ξ
′ = (t, st−1, s
′), any
player i, and any strategy profile, σ, that induces an ssirf alloca-
tion at both states, the vectors of signals, (uiξ(x
i
ξ(σ)), x
i
ξ(σ), w
i
ξ, Aj(ξ))
and (uiξ′(x
i
ξ′(σ)), x
i
ξ′(σ), w
i
ξ′ , Aj(ξ
′)) differ.
(2) Every ω is irreducible, aperiodic and admits an invariant
measure, µω. Moreover, for any pair ω, ω
′, if µω and µω′ are two
corresponding invariant measures, then µω = µω′ ⇒ ω 6= ω
′.
(IA-1) says that, for a reasonable strategy profile, at the end of each
period t, each player knows for sure at which node, ξ = (t, st−1, s), she
was playing. Of course, this is far from sufficient in order, for player i, to
learn ω. (IA-2) is one way of saying that two states of the world induce
different distributions over states of nature in the long-run. Since we are
going to consider patient players, two Markov chains ω, ω′ that would induce
the same asymptotic distribution over signals on the long-run should be
identified. The last section of the paper provides some hints about how this
assumption can be weakened.
Definition 5.4 (Perfect Bayesian equilibrium). A pair
(
(σ)i∈N ,
(
Piξ(h
i
ξ)
)
i∈N
)
consisting of a feasible allocation and a system of private beliefs is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (pbe) if
• (σ)i∈N is sequentially rational given the private beliefs
(
Piξ(h
i
ξ)
)
i∈N
,
i.e., starting at any arbitrary node, given the continuation strategies
of the other individuals, no individual can improve her utility by uni-
laterally changing her strategy profile given her private beliefs Piξ(h
i
ξ),
22A state s is recurrent if, given that the chain starts in s, it will return to s in finite
time with probability 1. s is positive recurrent if, in addition, the expectation of this
hitting time is finite.
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• and the private beliefs
(
Piξ(h
i
ξ)
)
i∈N
are updated via Bayes rule when-
ever it is possible.23
Our main result is that, for any strategy profile that yields an allocation
of commodities, assets and collaterals that is ssirf, there is a pbe in which,
with arbitrarily high probability, every player achieves arbitrarily close to
the allocation specified for the realized path, as long as households are
patient enough. Moreover, along such an equilibrium path, every player
learns the realized state with arbitrary precision.
Theorem 5.2. Under (G) and (IA), let ε > 0 and (x∗i[ω])i∈N ,ω∈Ω be a ssirf
allocation in consumption goods, and let P be a prior belief that assigns
strictly positive probability to each state of the world. Then there exists
λ(P) < 1 such that for all λ > λ(P), there is a pbe that with probability at
least 1− ε, conditional on any state ω being realized, yields a payoff vector
within ε of
(
U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, σ, ω)
)
i
. In equilibrium, conditional on ω, each player
i’s interim private belief converges to the truth: limt→∞ P
i
ξ=(t,st−1,s)
(hiξ)[ω] =
1 with probability 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
Outline of the proof
The following sketch of the proof may serve as a lighthouse before plunging
into the details.
The equilibrium path uses “blocks” of M + T periods each. An equilib-
rium block has a “target allocation” in commodities, denoted by
(
(x∗iξ [ω])i
)
τ(ξ)=1,...,M+T
23Due to our assumptions on the Markov chain, every state of nature is reached with a
strictly positive probability. Therefore, given the current state, Bayesian updating is al-
ways unambiguous. Gonza´lez-Dı´az and Mele´ndez-Jime´nez (2011) discuss the meaning
of “whenever it is possible” for general extensive form games with incomplete informa-
tion. In our special case their notion of a simple perfect Bayesian equilibrium coincides
with usual perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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for each state ω. Note that, by definition, there exists a corresponding
portfolio ((
ϕiξ[ω], θ
i
ξ[ω]
)
i
)
τ(ξ)=1,...,M+T
.
Within each equilibrium block, traders follow strategies that rely only on the
history since the start of the block. In particular, they do not care about the
history that happened before the beginning of the block. Rather, they rely
on a truncated belief, Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(hiξ) ∈ ∆(Ω), defined as follows: Suppose that the
block under scrutiny started at node ξ¯ ≤ ξ. Given some history, hiξ, consider
the truncated history, hi
ξ\ξ¯
, containing only the information delivered from
ξ¯ to ξ−. The truncated belief, Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(
hiξ
)
∈ ∆(Ω), is the resulting updated
belief starting with prior P at node ξ¯.
The firstM periods are used in experimentation to learn the state of the
world through assets’ returns, initial endowments, final allocations, prices
and individual stage-payoffs. The most likely state, ωˆ, is identified according
to Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(
hiξ
)
, and, in the remaining T periods, households choose a full action
profile that yields a stream of final allocations close to the target,
(
(x∗iξ [ωˆ])i
)
τ(ξ)=M+1,...,M+T
,
with utility payoffs close to
(
uiξ
(
x∗iξ [ωˆ]
)
i
)
τ(ξ)=M+1,...,M+T
.
If M is large enough to identify the true state with high probability,
if T/(M + T ) is close to one, so that nearly all of the periods within the
block are spent playing (close to) the target action profile, and if players
are patient enough, then the expected allocation from the block when the
realized state of the world is ω will be very close to the target allocation.
There are 3 types of blocks: an equilibrium block, a punishment block,
and a post-deviation block. The initial block is equilibrium, as are all the
subsequent blocks until the first deviation. If some deviation occurs during
a block, it must impact prices to be profitable. Indeed, deviations that leave
prices unchanged cannot modify the final allocation of goods at the end of
the period, and hence cannot be profitable —a property which is specific to
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Shapley-Shubik games. Since prices are public signals, however, profitable
deviations are immediately noticed by all the investors. Of course, a player
may also want to deviate not in order to improve her current payoff but
with the purpose of modifying the beliefs of her opponents. It turns out
that the unique way to achieve this second goal consists in preventing the
players from observing the assets’ returns by provoking some default. Recall
that default is not strategic in this paper. It happens as soon as the value
of the collateral falls down below that of the promise (cf. equation (D)).
Hence, prices must be (strategically) perturbed by the deviator in order to
induce a default that was not agreed upon. We shall see in the proof how
to circumvent this difficulty.
As it can be only noticed via prices, in any case, a deviation remains
anonymous, even when observed. Hence, punishment blocks cannot be
player-specific. The next block starting after a deviation is therefore a collec-
tive punishment block. All subsequent blocks are post-deviation blocks, un-
til a new deviation occurs. A deviation is immediately punished by switching
to a punishment block.
The target allocation for each player in a punishment block, at node
ξ = (t, st−1, s), is made arbitrarily close to the initial endowment, w
i
ξ, in
commodities and no-trade in financial assets. The stage-payoffs of the target
allocations in the post-deviation blocks are chosen to be decreasing in the
number of deviations so that uiξ
(
xi,ndevξ [ω]
)
< uiξ
(
x
i,(n−1)dev
ξ [ω]
)
for each
node ξ = (t, st−1, s) of the post-deviation block and each state of the world,
ω —where n is the number of deviations already observed.24 That is, the
payoff to a deviator is lower than she would get in equilibrium, regardless
of the state. A patient player, therefore, will not deviate, neither on, nor
off the equilibrium path, regardless of her private beliefs.
In order to understand the need for such a block-decomposition, let us
draw on an example (inspired from Wiseman, 2011). Suppose that the
signals (endowments plus returns, prices, allocations and stage-payoffs) ob-
served by the traders strongly suggest that the state of the world is A; but
player’s 1 private information at node ξ indicates state B more strongly.
24Of course, uiξ
(
x
i,0dev
ξ [ω]
)
= uiξ
(
x∗iξ [ω]
)
.
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Player 1 believes that eventually everybody’s belief will converge to a Dirac
mass on state B if players continue to experiment and to learn but:
1) in the future, variables selected by equilibrium strategies turn
out to yield the same signals in every state, so that no further
learning occurs. This happens, for example, if, from ξ on, in-
dividual endowments no more depend upon the state, ξ′ > ξ,
selected by nature, while the equilibrium strategy asks traders
to trade only, say, a riskless asset whose return does not provide
any information at all.
2) The current market belief may put so little weight on state
B that the expected time before convergence is very long, even
whenever the equilibrium path does call for further experimen-
tation.
Further, in state B, the equilibrium actions specified for state A may yield
a lower stage-payoff to player 1 than her initial endowments in state B,
i.e., than the actions designed to punish player 1 for a deviation in state A.
And so, player 1 will deviate. In response, however, the other traders may
conclude from observing unexpected prices that someone must have believed
in state B, so that the market belief may adjust toward state B. Then, such
a deviation may be profitable for player 1 even when her private information
is consistent with state A, provided the punishment profile specified in state
B gives her a higher payoff when the actual state is A than does the on-path
profile specified in state A. This can occur, again, if player 1’s post-deviation
payoff in B is higher than the final allocation induced by the equilibrium
strategy profile corresponding to state A. So, why should players different
from 1 believe the anonymous deviator when she implicitly claims that the
state is B by altering prices? Mimicking the colorful argument given by
Aumann (1990, p.202) in an analogous context, players different from 1
could say: “Wait; we have a few minutes; let us think this over. Suppose
that the deviator —whoever it is— doesn’t trust her own claim, and so
believes in state A. Then she would still want us to play as if we were in
B, because that way she will get a better payoff. And of course, also if she
does believe in B, it is better for him that we play as if we were in B. Thus
CHAPTER 5. INFINITE HORIZON 185
she wants us to believe in B no matter what. It is as if there were no signal
that 1 does not believe in A. So we will choose now what we would have
chosen without any deviation from him.”
The block-construction (borrowed from Wiseman 2011) aims at circum-
venting this kind of complications. Here are the details.
Proof
The proof consists in total of 8 steps. To give a quick overview, these are:
• Step 1: Given a target allocation we construct a sequence of allocations
with utility payoffs below this allocation that will be used to construct
a post-deviation payoff.
• Step 2: We define the δ-action profiles for the learning and punishment
phase.
• Step 3: In order to start a learning phase, we define pre-M -transition
action profiles.
• Step 4: To end a learning phase we define post-M -transition action
profiles.
• Step 5: The block construction and the according action profiles are
described.
• Step 6: The use of truncated beliefs is described and the choice of the
length of the learning phase M is defined.
• Step 7: The length of the targeting period is chosen. In addition it is
shown that the actual payoff is close to the target payoff.
• Step 8: It is shown that a deviation from the predescribed strategies
is not profitable.
The details are following.
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Step 1.
For each state ω ∈ Ω, let (x∗iξ [ω])i,ξ be a ssirf target allocation with
stage-payoffs (v∗iξ [ω])i,ξ :=
(
uiξ(x
∗i
ξ [ω])
)
i,ξ
. Choose a sequence of payoff vec-
tors
(
(vi,ndev[ω])i
)
n∈N
that result from ssirf allocations, and such that:
v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ [ω] < v
i,ndev
ξ [ω] for every integer n ∈ N, and every ξ —with
vi,0dev[ω] = v∗i[ω] for each i. These utility levels will be the long-run payoffs
after n deviations and can be constructed as:
vi,ndevξ [ω] := u
i
ξ
(
xi,ndevξ [ω]
)
with xi,ndevξ [ω] := ρnx
∗i
ξ [ω]+(1−ρn)w
i
ξ, ρn ∈ (0, 1).
Assume that, for every n ∈ N and ξ = (t, st−1, s) ∈ D :
0 < εn < v
i,ndev
ξ [ω]− v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ [ω] (5.4)
for every player i and every state ω ∈ Ω. Notice that εn does not depend
upon ξ, while the payoff vi,ndevξ [ω] does. The sequences (ρn)n and (εn)n need
to be chosen so as to converge sufficiently rapidly towards 0+ (as n→ +∞)
for (5.4) to hold.
Step 2.
Let us now define a δ-action profile as follows.
Every player plays some action on the financial markets, so that every-
body gets and sells a small quantity, δ > 0, of every security. Consequently,
all the commodities that are eligible as collaterals will have to be partially
stored. Meanwhile, on the market for consumption goods that serve as a
collateral, investors bid very large quantities and offer very small quantities.
As a consequence, collateral commodity prices will be large. Let us choose
them sufficiently large so that there will be no default along this part of the
play. And still, the quantities of commodities that are going to be effectively
trade can be made arbitrarily small, as well as the quantities of collaterals
they have to put aside because of their trading in securities.
The δ-actions.
Formally, for node ξ = (t, st−1, s) ∈ D in period τ(ξ) = t ∈ N, a δ-action
is defined as follows: Let δ > 0 be small. Define the actions on the goods
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markets by
biξ,ℓ :=
{
b¯ℓ > 0 large, for ℓ ∈ Lc
δ
N
for ℓ ∈ La
qiξ,ℓ :=
δ
N
for ℓ ∈ L,
for all i ∈ N and on the asset markets by
βiξ,j :=
δ
N
,
γiξ,j :=
δ
N
for all j ∈ J , i ∈ N .
It can easily be seen that these actions define feasible bids and offers and
that the individual budget constraint is satisfied. The collateral requirement
is equal to δ
N
Cjℓ, and hence as δ > 0 is small, condition (F1ξ) and (F2ξ)
are satisfied. Condition (F3ξ) is trivially satisfied as well. For the budget
feasibility note that, if in period t− 1, everybody already played a δ-action,
for the current period at node ξ the left-hand side of the individual budget
constraint (∗iξ1) is equal to
L∑
ℓ=1
biξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
βiξ,j =
∑
ℓ∈Lc
b¯ℓ +
Laδ
N
+
Jδ
N
and the right-hand side equals
L∑
ℓ=1
pξ,ℓq
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
πξ,jγ
i
ξ,j +
J∑
j=1
(
θiξ−,j − ϕ
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
=
∑
ℓ∈Lc
Nb¯ℓ
δ
δ
N
+ La1
δ
N
+ J1
δ
N
=
∑
ℓ∈Lc
b¯ℓ +
Laδ
N
+
Jδ
N
.
Playing the δ-actions on asset markets every individual sells and offers the
same amount of each security. Hence, net trades cancel so that no dividends
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will actually need to be paid.
Moreover condition (∗iξ2) is satisfied.
Now, what happens if player i deviates from a δ-action profile? She can-
not prevent her opponents from observing their own private characteristics.
Can she prevent the other players from observing the assets’ returns? As
she cannot prevent them from trading assets, choosing actions that induce
default in all states might stop the learning process of the other players.
Acting so as to decrease the price of the collateral commodities while at
the same time increasing the price of the non-collateral commodities is the
unique way to cause default. How can a single player achieve this goal?
In order to decrease the price of the collateral commodities at time t, she
can increase her offers on the commodity market for these goods. By do-
ing so, she is physically constrained by her (finite) initial endowment: this
is constraint (F2ξ). In order to be able to increase the bids for the non-
collateral commodities she could first use the money from the additional
sales of the collateral commodities and, second, she might have some addi-
tional dividends from asset market transactions at time t−1. To satisfy the
individual budget constraint (∗iξ1) at time t− 1, hence to finance the asset
purchases in that very period, she needs to make some additional asset sales
which are again constraint by the availability of (finite) initial endowments
that need to be used to put up for the collateral: this is constraint (F2ξ−)
—where ξ− is the predecessor of node ξ. Hence, player i can neither increase
the bids for non-collateral commodities arbitrarily high nor offer arbitrarily
large quantities of collateral commodities. The influence on the price of
player i is bounded. Thus, for each node ξ, there exists a lower bound on
the bids b¯ℓ in the δ-action profile such that, if every trader bids above this
bound, player i cannot induce default. From now on, a δ-action will always
be understood to be such that every player’s bid lies above b¯ℓ.
Step 3.
The pre-M-transition actions.
If the asset holdings are strictly positive and if players want to switch to
a δ-action profile at node ξ, there needs to be transition period to settle
the asset market obligations. Otherwise, the δ-action profile might not be
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budget feasible, i.e., might violate condition (∗iξ1).
For the pre-M -transition period at node ξ, define the following actions:
- on the commodity markets
biξ,ℓ :=
{ ∑J
j=1 θ
i
ξ−,jCjℓ for ℓ ∈ Lc
N
δ
for ℓ ∈ La
qiξ,ℓ :=
{ ∑J
j=1 ϕ
i
ξ−,jCjℓ for ℓ ∈ Lc
δ
N
for ℓ ∈ La
for all ℓ ∈ L, i ∈ N .
- on the asset markets
βiξ,j :=
δ
N
,
γiξ,j :=
δ
N
for all j ∈ J , i ∈ N .
The resulting prices are as follows:
pξ,ℓ =
{
1 for ℓ ∈ Lc
N2
δ2
for ℓ ∈ La
πξ,j = 1.
for ℓ ∈ L, j ∈ J . Choose δ sufficiently small so that the prices of commodi-
ties used for the promises of assets are so large that all assets default in the
transition period.
It is easy to verify that the pre-M -transition actions satisfy the feasibility
constraints (F1ξ), (F2ξ) and (F3ξ). For the individual budget constraint
(∗iξ1) at node ξ we obtain for the left-hand side
L∑
ℓ=1
biξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
βiξ,j =
∑
ℓ∈Lc
J∑
j=1
θiξ−,jCjℓ +
LaN
δ
+
Jδ
N
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and for the right-hand side
L∑
ℓ=1
pξ,ℓq
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
πξ,jγ
i
ξ,j +
J∑
j=1
(
θiξ−,j − ϕ
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
=
∑
ℓ∈Lc
1
J∑
j=1
ϕiξ−,jCjℓ + La
N2
δ2
δ
N
+ J1
δ
N
+
J∑
j=1
(
θiξ−,j − ϕ
i
ξ−,j
)(∑
ℓ∈Lc
Cjℓ
)
=
LaN
δ
+
Jδ
N
+
∑
ℓ∈Lc
J∑
j=1
θiξ−,jCjℓ.
Moreover condition (∗iξ2) is satisfied.
From now on, unless otherwise stated, every block of δ-actions will always
be preceded by the play of such transition actions.
Step 4.
The post-M-transition actions.
After the experimentation block, when a state, ω, has been identified,
the individuals play actions (according to Lemma 5.2) so as to target a
given allocation. This target allocation might require some holdings in cer-
tain assets which are not budget feasible given the δ-action played in the
last experimentation period (e.g., a player may need to have saved much
more money than she did according to the δ-action in order to finance her
purchases according to the target allocation). Therefore, we add two peri-
ods of post-M -transition after the experimentation block where players can
settle the asset holdings from the M -block (first post-M -transition period)
and build up the necessary asset holdings for the target allocation (second
post-M transition period).
Let the identified state be ω with target allocation x∗iξ [ω], together with
actions, ϕ∗iξ [ω] and θ
∗i
ξ [ω], on the asset markets. The first post-M transition
period is identical to a pre-M transition period (cf. supra). The second
post-M -transition period at node ξ can be intuitively described as follows:
People who have money from asset sales bid it on the goods markets, people
who need money offer a tiny little bit of their endowment in order to get
money. Commodity prices resulting from this action profile will be high, as
only a little bit of commodity is offered. They turn out to be sufficiently
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high for every player to fulfill her budget constraint. The only point might
be that some player is forced to sell a tiny little bit of her initial endowment
while the collateral requirement associated with her asset sales requires her
whole endowment vector to be collateralized. This would contradict (F2ξ).
Thus, player are actually asked to sell a little bit less of assets than would
be needed, were they to mimic exactly the target trades in assets. As a
consequence, each player will save a small quantity of collateral that can
be sold on the commodity market in order to fulfill her budget constraint.
It turns out that the quantity of money lost by selling less assets can be
compensated by the addition sale of commodities. More precisely,
- on the commodity markets, play:
biξ,ℓ :=
{
1
L
∑J
j=1 π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
if
∑J
j=1 π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
≥ 0
0 otherwise
qiξ,ℓ :=
{
−δ 1
L
∑J
j=1 π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
if
∑J
j=1 π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
≤ 0
0 otherwise
- on the asset markets:
βiξ,j := π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
θ∗iξ,j[ω]− η
i
ξ,j
)
,
γiξ,j := ϕ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]− η
i
ξ,j
for all j, i, and where ηiξ,j :=
∑
ℓ
qi
ξ,ℓ
Cjℓ
(with the usual convention 1/0 := 0).
Since x∗iξ [ω] is feasible, the asset markets clear,
∑N
i=1 ϕ
∗i
ξ [ω] =
∑N
i=1 θ
∗i
ξ [ω].
Therefore,
0 =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
=
N∑
i=1,
ϕ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]−θ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]>0
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
+
N∑
i=1,
ϕ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]−θ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]<0
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
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Hence,
N∑
i=1,
ϕ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]−θ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]>0
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
= −
N∑
i=1,
ϕ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]−θ∗i
ξ,j
[ω]<0
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
.
The resulting prices are as follows:
pξ,ℓ =
1
δ
πξ,j = π
∗
ξ,j[ω].
for ℓ ∈ L, j ∈ J . Choose δ > 0 sufficiently small.
It is easy to verify that the transition actions satisfy the feasibility con-
straints (F1ξ), (F2ξ) and (F3ξ). For the asset trades note that (F1ξ) holds,
as x∗iξ [ω] is feasible.
• Let us check whether the individual budget constraint (∗iξ1) is satisfied
at node ξ. If
∑J
j=1 π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
≥ 0, we obtain for the left-
hand side
L∑
ℓ=1
biξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
βiξ,j =
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
+
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
and for the right-hand side:
L∑
ℓ=1
pξ,ℓq
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
πξ,jγ
i
ξ,j +
J∑
j=1
(
θiξ−,j − ϕ
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
=
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]ϕ
∗i
ξ,j[ω].
• If
∑J
j=1 π
∗
ξ,j[ω]
(
ϕ∗iξ,j[ω]− θ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]
)
≤ 0, we obtain for the left-hand side:
L∑
ℓ=1
biξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
βiξ,j =
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
θ∗iξ,j[ω]− η
i
ξ,j
)
,
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and for the right-hand side:
L∑
ℓ=1
pξ,ℓq
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
πξ,jγ
i
ξ,j +
J∑
j=1
(
θiξ−,j − ϕ
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
=
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]
(
θ∗iξ,j[ω]− ϕ
∗i
ξ,j[ω]− η
i
ξ,j
)
+
J∑
j=1
π∗ξ,j[ω]ϕ
∗i
ξ,j[ω].
Thus, each budget constraint is satisfied. Finally, It is easy to see that
these actions are tailored so that each player verifies the collateral constraint
(F2ξ).
Step 5.
We now describe the within-block strategies.
The equilibrium block has length M + T . Suppose the true state of
the world is ω. During the first M periods, play δ-actions (with a transition
period if this is not the first equilibrium block of the whole play). During
the first M periods of an equilibrium block, every trader is able to observe
all assets’ returns and, by combining this information with her own private
initial endowments and stage-payoffs, updates her prior belief, P. According
to (IA), by choosing M long enough, the probability that each player puts
a weight larger than 1 − ε on the true state of the world, ω, can be made
arbitrarily close to 1, whatever being ε > 0. More precisely, suppose that
there exists a positive integerM such that, conditional on any of the finitely
many states ω ∈ Ω, updating the prior P with the M signals that result
from the δ-action profile yields a posterior truncated probability, Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(hiξ)
25,
for each player i, that puts weight strictly greater than 1/2 on {ω} with
probability at least 1− ε. That such an integer M exists will be proven in
Step 6 below.
Let ωˆi denote the state given the highest probability by player i under
her own belief, Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(hiξ) (ties can be broken arbitrarily). Because of the
choice of M (see above), the identified state ωˆi is identical across players
i with probability at least (1 − ε)N . Indeed, this would be the probability
25The current equilibrium block is supposed to start at time τ(ξ¯) = t¯ ∈ N.
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according to which every player, having observed her own history, will put
a weight greater than 1/2 on the true state, ω, if each history was drawn
independently. Even if initial endowments and stage-payoffs were proba-
bilistically independent, the assets’ returns are certainly not independent.
This correlation among histories can only increase the probability above
according to which players reach a consensus on the true state.
Let us denote by ωˆ the state on which, with probability at least 1 − ε,
players put the highest posterior probability at the end of the M -part of
the block.26 For the remaining T periods of the block, players start with a
post-M -transition actions, and then play the profile that results in a stage-
payoff uiξ
(
x∗iξ [ωˆ]
)
for τ(ξ) = M + 2, ...,M + T in state ωˆ. The actions are
constructed using Lemma 5.2 for every node ξ with τ(ξ) = M+3, ...,M+T .
Hence, during the first M periods of an equilibrium block, individuals are
learning the true state of the world. In the last T − 2 periods, where T
is large relative to M , the target utility allocation is reached. If player i
deviates unilaterally, then the equilibrium block ends immediately, and a
punishment block begins in the next period. The lengths, M and T , will be
chosen more precisely in steps 3 and 6.
After a deviation, a punishment phase is played, made of a certain num-
ber, Pn, of punishment blocks, each of length M + T , and the end of the
current block. The number Pn depends on the number, n, of deviations
observed. The construction of a punishment block is as follows. Players
play throughout a δ-action profile as defined earlier (preceded by a transition
period). This enables to learn during the punishment phase while keeping
the size of net trades arbitrarily tiny. If any player unilaterally deviates
from the punishment phase, then the punishment block dedicated to the
first deviation ends immediately, and a new punishment phase (consisting
in Pn+1 blocks) begins in the next period. After the Pn punishment blocks,
if no further deviation has been detected, players switch to a post-deviation
block.
Play in a post-deviation block is divided into two parts. First, there
are M periods of learning using the δ-action profiles, followed by a post-M -
26Ties can be broken by some arbitrary rule.
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transition actions, and finally there are T − 2 periods where action profiles
are played, such that the target allocation after the nth deviation is reached.
The target allocation in the T − 2 last periods of a post-deviation block
consists in playing a certain sequence of ssirf allocations. Which allocations
are targeted depends on the number of deviations already observed. For
example after the first deviation in the T−2 last periods, the profile yielding
vi,1devξ [ωˆ] in state ωˆ is played, for ξ with τ(ξ) = M+3, ...,M+T . The first two
periods after theM block is are post-M -transition actions. Compared to an
equilibrium block, a post-deviation block consists as well of a learning phase
ofM periods and a target allocation in the last T−2 periods. The difference
is that the second sub-block does not target the equilibrium allocation but
rather ssirf allocations that are strictly worse than the target allocations
of the equilibrium block or the previous post-deviation block.
Step 6.
Play begins with an equilibrium block which is followed by a pre-M -
transition period (for the settlement of assets’ obligations) and another
equilibrium block if no unilateral deviation was observed. A post-deviation-
n block with no additional deviation is followed similarly by a pre-M -
transition period and another post-deviation-n block. A punishment-n block
(i.e., a punishment block devoted to the nth deviation) with no unilateral
deviation is followed by a post-deviation-n block.
On the equilibrium path, each player’s private belief, Piξ(h
i
ξ), is derived
by Bayesian updating the prior, P, using the information of her private
history, hiξ. At the same time, each player computes her truncated belief,
Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(hiξ) as defined earlier. This belief serves for the identification of the
most likely state of the world, ωˆ, according to which the allocation x∗iξ [ωˆ]
is targeted during the last T − 2 periods of the block. By construction,
Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(hiξ) is reset to the prior, P, at the beginning of each block.
For a given ω, let the random variable, T ωs , be the first return time to state
s ∈ S:
T ωs := inf{n ∈ N | X
ω
n = s},
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where (Xωn )n stands for the stochastic process (with values in S) correspond-
ing to ω. The number
f (n),ωs := Pr(X
ω
s = n)
is the probability that the process returns to state s for the first time after
n steps. Since every state s is recurrent, it is easy to prove (and well known)
that the expected number of visits to s is infinite, i.e.,
∑
n∈N
p(n),ωss =∞,
where p
(n),ω
ks := Pr(X
ω
n = s | X
ω
0 = k) for any (k, s) ∈ S
2.
Since the Markov chain, ω, is irreducible and such that all the states in
S are positive recurrent, it admits a unique invariant measure, µω ∈ ∆(S).
The chain ω being aperiodic, the limit of the expected number, pn, of visits
of each state s ∈ S verifies:
lim
n→+∞
p
(n),ω
ks =
1
E[T ωs ]
= µω(s).
IfM , the length of the experimentation block, is large enough, the prob-
ability that, for every i, Pi
ξ\ξ¯
(hiξ) puts the maximal probability on the true
state, {ω}, at the end of the block can be made arbitrarily large: by ob-
serving the realization of their random signals, the players can observe the
realization of Xω (IA-1), hence, can compute the empirical mean corre-
sponding to the expected return time Ms of each state s. Hence, they can
approximate p
(n),ω
ss with arbitrary accuracy. According to (IA-2), two dif-
ferent states of the world, ω, ω′ will induce different invariant measures,
µω, µω′ . Thus, for M large enough, all the players will be able to distinguish
between state ω and ω′ with probability at least 1 − ε. As a consequence,
all the players will learn the true state with probability at least 1 − ε. Let
us denote by Mε the smallest such integer (whose existence was announced
in Step 5 above). The crucial observation is that Mε is independent from
the discount factor λ, since it concerns only the learning process. From now
on, we suppose that M ≥Mε.
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Step 7.
It remains to choose T large enough so that each player’s welfare loss
(with respect to the benchmark v∗iξ [ω]) can be compensated by a sufficiently
long targeting period of length T , provided players are sufficiently patient.
By construction of the δ-actions and by definition of the targeting actions
during the T -phase of an equilibrium block, the difference between v∗iξ [ω]
and the actual payoff that accrues to player i at node ξ can be made lower
than ε (for δ sufficiently small). Let us denote by U i
D(ξ0)
(σ∗, ω) the final
overall payoff induced by the equilibrium strategy, and by U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, ω),
the final payoff induced by our equilibrium target allocation.27
During the learning phase (of length M) and the post-M transition
of two periods of each equilibrium block, the maximal stage-utility loss
is u, while during the targeting phase (of length T − 2), it is ε. Suppose
T − 2 = QM for some integer Q. One has:
U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, ω)−U i
D(ξ0)
(σ∗, ω) ≤ (1−λ)
+∞∑
j=0
λjQM
[1− λM+2
1− λ
u+λM+2
1− λQM
1− λ
ε
]
,
where the sum of the right-hand-side is taken over the sequence (indexed
by j) of equilibrium blocks (of length M + T = (Q+ 1)M). Thus,
U i
D(ξ0)
(x∗i, ω)− U i
D(ξ0)
(σ∗, ω) ≤
1− λM+2
1− λQM
u+ λM+2ε.
For every every ε > 0, there exists some Qε,λ large enough and some λε
close enough to 1, so that the right-hand-side of the last inequality is lower
than ε. From now on, we assume that Q ≥ Qε and λ ≥ λε.
Therefore, along the equilibrium path, players learn the true state with
probability at least 1 − ε and their final payoff will be within ε of the
benchmark. It follows that a patient player prefers not to deviate even if
the truncated belief, after a sequence of misleading signals calls for an action
profile that she thinks will give her a very low payoff for the duration of the
current block: at the start of the next block, the pseudo-belief will revert to
27The slight abuse of notations in the arguments of the overall utility should not create
any confusion.
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the prior, and with high likelihood, experimentation in the next blocks will
reveal the true state of the world, and enable the other players to provide her
with the equilibrium payoff or to effectively punish her in case of deviation.
Actions may reveal a piece of information about a player’s private pay-
offs. For instance, by deviating, player i may induce a final allocation for
player j different from the one that is prescribed at equilibrium. This differ-
ent allocation may in turn provide j with some information in terms stage-
payoff that was out of scope with the equilibrium allocation. And even
during a punishment phase, a deviator might be tempted to keep talking
with her opponents through the manipulation of their commodity alloca-
tions. Nevertheless, (IA) implies that, as long as they still observe every
asset’s return, all the players will learn the true state with arbitrary preci-
sion whatever being their stream of stage-payoffs.28 By manipulating allo-
cations (hence stage-payoffs), a player cannot prevent her opponents from
eventually learning the true state of the world, ω.
Step 8.
It remains to choose Pn (the number of punishment blocks after n devi-
ations) large enough so that no player has any incentive to deviate, neither
on the equilibrium path, nor off this path, whatever her private belief about
ω or her higher order beliefs (about others’ beliefs). For this purpose, we
need to guarantee that a post-deviation long-run discounted payoff never
exceeds the equilibrium long-run discounted payoff. Suppose that the de-
viation occurs at node ξ′ = (t′, st′−1, s
′), that it is the (n + 1)th deviation
observed during the play and that there are no further deviations at later
nodes. It will at most yield ui to player i. Then, the post-deviation payoff
can be made ε-close to the following maximum:
(1− λ)λt
′−1
[
ui +
M+T∑
t=2
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)[u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
]
28In other words, players need to be able to observe the sequence of stage-payoffs resulting
from some ssirf allocation, plus asset returns and initial endowments. For a patient
player, the choice of the particular sequence of ssirf allocations is irrelevant.
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+
Pn+1∑
k=1
[ (k+1)(M+T )∑
t=k(M+T )+1
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)[u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
]
+
∑
k≥Pn+1+1
[ k(M+T )+M∑
t=k(M+T )+1
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)[u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
]
+
k(M+T )+M+2∑
t=k(M+T )+M+1
λt−1u
+
(k+1)(M+T )∑
t=k(M+T )+M+3
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)[v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ [ω]]
]]
. (5.5)
Indeed, the long-run discounted payoff after a deviation consists of once a
(maybe) very high payoff from deviating, then the payoff from a punishment
during the current block plus Pn+1 punishment blocks lastingM+T periods
and finally the payoff from succeeding post-deviation-(n+1) blocks of M +
T periods including possibly a very high payoff in the post-M -transition
period. On the other hand, since no deviator can prevent her opponents
from learning the state of the world with arbitrary precision (even during
the punishment phase and whatever being the behavior of the deviator), the
reward payoff, EPi
ξ
(σ)[v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ [ωˆ]], computed with the most likely state, ωˆ
(according to the players’ truncated belief), can also be made arbitrarily
close to EPi
ξ
(σ)[v
i,(n+1)dev
ξ [ω]].
By contrast, if the (n + 1)th deviation did not take place, i’s long-run
discounted payoff would consist in the payoff from post-deviation-n blocks
of M + T periods. Therefore, it would be arbitrarily close to:
(1− λ)λt
′−1
∑
k≥0
[ k(M+T )+M∑
t=k(M+T )+1
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)[u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
]
+
(k+1)(M+T )∑
t=k(M+T )+M+3
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)[v
i,ndev
ξ [ω]]
]
. (5.6)
Note that we assumed here payoff of 0 in the post-M -transition periods.
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In order to check whether the difference (5.6) - (5.5) is positive, all we
need is to ensure that:
(1− λ)λt
′−1
[
u− u+
Pn+1∑
k=1
(k+1)(M+T )∑
t=k(M+T )+M+3
λt−1EPi
ξ′
(σ)
[
vi,ndevξ [ω]− u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)]
+ εn
∑
k≥Pn+1+1
[ (k+1)(M+T )∑
t=k(M+T )+M+3
λt−1
]
− u
∑
k≥0
[ k(M+T )+M+2∑
t=k(M+T )+M+1
λt−1
]]
> 0
Note that since vi,ndev[ω] results from a ssirf allocation, we have
EPi
ξ′
(σ)[v
i,ndev
ξ [ω]− u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
] > 0
for every node ξ = (t, st−1, s), and every individual i. Let us define
gξ := min
i∈N
EPi
ξ′
(σ)[v
i,ndev
ξ [ω]− u
i
ξ
(
wiξ
)
].
It is sufficient to require that:
(1− λ)λt
′−1
[
u− u+
Pn+1∑
k=1
[ (k+1)(M+T )∑
t=k(M+T )+M+3
λt−1gξ
]
+ εn
(1− λT−2)
(1− λ)(1− λM+T )
λ(Pn+1+1)(M+T )+M+2
− u
(1− λ2)
(1− λ)(1− λM+T )
λM
]
> 0,
It is easy to see that, whatever being the distance,
(1− λ)u−
(
(1− λ) +
(1− λ2)
(1− λM+T )
λM
)
u,
and for every εn > 0, and every λ ≥ λε, there exists some integer P
λ,ε
n+1 big
enough so that this last inequality is satisfied.
Suppose a deviator keeps deviating. While being punished by δ-actions,
the most she can grasp is δ units of each commodity in each period. Im-
mediately a new punishment starts with a punishment phase at least as
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long as the one before. As the reward in the post-deviation block declines,
continuing deviating becomes even less attractive as the payoff in equation
(5.5).
This completes the proof that it is in no player’s interest to deviate
from the prescribed equilibrium strategy, be it on the equilibrium path (i.e.,
whenever no deviation already occurred), or out of the equilibrium path
(i.e., after a deviation occurred), provided: M ≥ Mε, λ ≥ λε, T = QM
with Q ≥ Qε, and ∀n, Pn ≥ P
λ,ε
n .

5.6 Concluding Comments
In this paper we investigated the general properties of perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in imperfectly competitive environments with incomplete information.
We proved that adding collateral constraints within the rules of trading has
an ambiguous effect. Collateral constraints limit the extent to which agents
can pledge their future wealth and ensure that players with incorrect be-
liefs never lose so much as to be driven out of the market. Consequently
all agents, regardless of their beliefs, survive in the long run and continue
to trade, possibly on the basis of those heterogeneous beliefs. Cao (2010)
showed that the presence of heterogeneous beliefs together with collateral
lead to additional leverage and asset price volatility (relative to a model with
homogeneous beliefs or relative to equilibria in the complete markets econ-
omy). Our result suggests that this conclusion is partly due to his narrow
(though standard) definition of perfect competition. Indeed, due to imper-
fect competition, those traders with incorrect beliefs can strategically learn
the state of the world. We therefore provided a partial characterization of
learning equilibria, at the end of which no player shares incorrect beliefs
— not because they were eliminated from the market (although default is
possible at equilibrium) but because they have taken time to update their
prior belief. The striking point is that our (partial) Folk theorem provides
us with a wide range of equilibria, many of them being first-best efficient,
many others being dominated.
Let us end with a final remark concerning the link of the present work
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with the perfectly competitive set-up. In Giraud and Weyers (2004), as
already mentioned, a first step towards the present Folk theorem had been
obtained in the particular setting of exogenously incomplete markets (with
finite horizon). Here, we get a Folk theorem for economies where missing
markets are endogenously determined, due both to the presence of collateral
constraints and to the lack of complete information. At the end of Giraud
and Weyers (2004), however, the asymptotic properties of type-symmetric
strategic equilibria were studied when the number of individuals of each type
grows to infinity. It was shown that there is a discontinuity at the limit:
Indeed, the limit-set of equilibria remains quite large while it is well-known
that, at least with real assets, finite-horizon economies with incomplete
markets generically admit a finite number of perfectly competitive equilib-
ria (Duffie and Shafer 1985). An analogous remark holds in the present
incomplete information set-up. Suppose that each type of player is actually
represented by K identical individuals, and let K → +∞. The same argu-
ment as in Giraud and Weyers (2004) allows us to extend our partial Folk
theorem to the asymptotic case. Therefore, we get that, at the limit, there
is still a continuum of Bayesian perfect equilibria, exhibiting a large vari-
ety of efficiency properties (although each individual is negligible). It also
suggests that, despite the considerable literature devoted to its foundation,
the very concept of perfect competition itself deserves further investigation.
In particular, whether it is captured as a price-taking assumption or else
as the limit benchmark obtained by letting the weight of each price-maker
shrink to zero does not lead to the same conclusion.
Our result and this last observation suggest that considerable care is
necessary in invoking the impact of collateral regulation on the inefficiency
of equilibria with private information —both in perfectly and imperfectly
competitive environments.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
To show Lemma 5.1 for our model, we modify the proof of Giraud and
Weyers (2004) slightly.
Proof. Fix a node ξ ∈ D at time t ≤ T . Since the allocation of initial
endowments (wiξ)i are Pareto-inefficient in the L-good spot economy there
exists a consumption stream (x¯iξ)i that Pareto dominates (w
i
ξ)i and satisfies
for every good ℓ ∈ L
N∑
i=1
x¯iξ,ℓ =
N∑
i=1
wiξ,ℓ.
By the strict monotonicity of the preferences, there exists a consumption
stream (x¯′iξ)i such that
uiξ(x¯
′i
ξ ) > u
i
ξ(x¯
i
ξ) i = 1, ..., N
and
N∑
i=1
x¯′iξ,ℓ =
N∑
i=1
wiξ,ℓ.
Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, there exists a hyperplane
containing (x¯′iξ )i and (w
i
ξ)i with a strictly positive price vector pξ. Thus the
individual budget restriction
pξ · x¯
′i
ξ = pξ · w
i
ξ
is satisfied and furthermore
Eω[u
i
ξ(x¯
′i
ξ )] > Eω[u
i
ξ(x¯
i
ξ)] ≥ Eω[u
i
ξ(w
i
ξ)]
for all i ∈ N and t ≤ T .
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5.7.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
To show Lemma 5.2 for our model, we modify the proof of Giraud and
Weyers (2004).
Proof. Since (x¯i)i∈N is feasible there exist feasible and affordable allocation
(ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N such that the asset markets clear at every node ξ ∈ D. For all
j ∈ J we have
N∑
i=1
θ¯iξ,j =
N∑
i=1
ϕ¯iξ,j.
Therefore, if
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j = 0, then
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j = 0 and vice versa.
Using the market clearing condition on the goods markets we obtain
from the definition of the actions
N∑
i=1
qiξ,ℓ =
N∑
i=1
(
wiξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ−,jCjℓ
)
=
N∑
i=1
(
x¯iξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ,jCjℓ
)
,
N∑
i=1
biξ,ℓ = pξ,ℓ
N∑
i=1
(
x¯iξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ,jCjℓ
)
.
Hence,
p¯ξ,ℓ =
∑n
i=1 b
i
ξ,ℓ∑n
i=1 q
i
ξ,ℓ
= pξ,ℓ.
From the definition of the actions using the market clearing condition
on the asset markets we obtain for the asset prices
• for
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j =
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
πξ,j =
∑N
i=1 β
i
ξ,j∑N
i=1 γ
i
ξ,j
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=
π¯ξ,j
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j
= π¯ξ,j
• for
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j =
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j = 0
πξ,j =
∑N
i=1 β
i
ξ,j∑N
i=1 γ
i
ξ,j
=
π¯ξ,j
∑N
i=1
δ
N∑N
i=1
δ
N
= π¯ξ,j.
The final allocation of sales and of purchases for asset j ∈ J are given
by
ϕiξ,j = γ
i
ξ,j,
θiξ,j =
βiξ,j
πξ,j
.
The final allocation of good ℓ ∈ L available for consumption after trading
at node ξ ∈ D is given by
xiξ,ℓ = w
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕiξ−,jCjℓ − q
i
ξ,ℓ +
biξ,ℓ
pξ,ℓ
−
J∑
j=1
ϕiξ,jCjℓ
Therefore,
ϕiξ,j =
{
ϕ¯iξ,j if
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
δ
N
otherwise
θiξ,j =
{
θ¯iξ,j if
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
δ
N
otherwise
xiξ,ℓ =
{
x¯iξ,ℓ if
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j =
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
x¯iξ,ℓ −
∑J
j=1
δ
N
Cjℓ otherwise
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It remains to check that the budget constraint (∗iξ1) for the bids and
offers is satisfied.
L∑
ℓ=1
biξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
βiξ,j ≤
L∑
ℓ=1
pξ,ℓq
i
ξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
πjγ
i
ξ,j +
J∑
j=1
(
θiξ−,j − ϕ
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
Inserting the assumed aci for biξ,ℓ, q
i
ξ,ℓ, γ
i
ξ,j and β
i
ξ,j we obtain for (∗
i
ξ1)
• for
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j =
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j > 0
L∑
ℓ=1
p¯ξ,ℓ
(
x¯iξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ,jCjℓ
)
+
J∑
j=1
π¯ξ,j
(
θ¯iξ,j − ϕ¯
i
ξ,j
)
≤
L∑
ℓ=1
p¯ξ,ℓ
(
wiξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ−,jCjℓ
)
+
J∑
j=1
(
θ¯iξ−,j − ϕ¯
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
which holds since (x¯i, ϕ¯i, θ¯i)i∈N was assumed to be a feasible alloca-
tion.
• for
∑N
i=1 θ¯
i
ξ,j =
∑N
i=1 ϕ¯
i
ξ,j = 0
L∑
ℓ=1
p¯ξ,ℓx¯
i
ξ,ℓ ≤
L∑
ℓ=1
p¯ξ,ℓ
(
wiξ,ℓ +
J∑
j=1
ϕ¯iξ−,jCjℓ
)
+
J∑
j=1
(
θ¯iξ−,j − ϕ¯
i
ξ−,j
)
Dξ,j
As (wiξ)i ≫ 0, this strategy profile is full. This completes the proof.
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Summary
This thesis consists of two main parts: The first one is on coalitional
market games whereas the second one is on strategic market games.
In coalitional market games the relationship between cooperative games and
markets, and their respective solution concepts are investigated. In joint
work with Jan-Philip Gamp we show the following results:
• For coalitional market games with transferable utility we present a
detailed proof that extends the results of Shapley and Shubik (1975)
to any closed convex subset of the core following a remark of these
authors.
• For coalitional market games with non-transferable utility we extend
the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner
core.
• Afterwards, we investigate the relationship between the inner core and
asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions.
A strategic market game is a non-cooperative game that is used to describe
the price formation in an exchange economy. In this thesis the departing
point is the model in Giraud and Weyers (2004).
• For strategic market games with finite horizon, I show proving an ana-
logue of a perfect folk theorem that even with collateral requirements
almost everything is possible as soon as people are sufficiently patient.
• Finally, in joint work with Gae¨l Giraud, for strategic market games
with infinite horizon and incomplete information we prove a partial
folk theorem a` la Wiseman (2011).
Keywords
Market Games, Coalitional Market Games, Competitive Payoffs, Core, In-
ner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions, Strategic Market Games,
Collateral, Folk Theorem, Finite Horizon, Infinite Horizon, Incomplete In-
formation
Re´sume´ en Franc¸ais
Cette the`se comporte deux parties : La premie`re partie porte sur les jeux de
marche´s coope´ratifs et la deuxie`me sur les jeux de marche´s strate´gi-
ques. Dans le cas des jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs, le lien entre jeux coope´-
ratifs et marche´s et les concepts de solution associe´s sont e´tudie´s. E´tablis en
commun avec Jan-Philip Gamp nous avons montre´ les re´sultats suivants :
• Pour les jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs a` utilite´ transfe´rable nous pre´-
sentons une preuve qui ge´ne´ralise les re´sultats de Shapley et Shubik
(1975) a` des sous-ensembles convexes et ferme´s du coeur suivant une
remarque des auteurs.
• Pour les jeux de marche´s coope´ratifs a` utilite´ non-transfe´rable nous
e´tendons les re´sultats de Qin (1993) a` une large classe de sous-ensem-
bles ferme´s du cœur interne.
• Ensuite, nous e´tudions la relation entre le cœur interne et les solutions
de ne´gociation asyme´triques de Nash pour les jeux de ne´gociation.
Un jeu de marche´ strate´gique est un jeu non-coope´ratif utilise´ pour de´crire la
formation des prix dans une e´conomie d’e´change. Dans cette the`se le point
de de´part est le mode`le de Giraud et Weyers (2004).
• Pour les jeux de marche´s strate´giques a` horizon fini, je montre prou-
vant un the´ore`me analogue a` un the´ore`me de folk, que meˆme en
pre´sence d’obligation de collate´ral, presque tout est possible tant que
les joueurs sont assez patients.
• Finalement, dans un travail commun avec Gae¨l Giraud, pour les jeux
de marche´ strate´gique a` horizon infini et avec de l’incertitude nous
prouvons un the`oreme de folk partiel a` la Wiseman (2011).
Mots cle´s
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rizon Infini, Information Incomple`te
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